Syria: a transition in question

More than fifteen years after the start of the civil war in Syria, and following the fall of the Assad regime in late 2024, the country continues to face numerous political, security, economic and social challenges. The Israeli-US attacks on Iran and Lebanon have had repercussions across the region, particularly in Syria, delaying the foreign investment essential to its reconstruction and further weakening the country. These regional tensions are also affecting its security situation, which remains fragile despite an improvement since the violence of 2025. Politically, the legislative elections held in October 2025 marked a turning point for the country, but they raise questions about the Syrian authorities’ ability to strengthen the country’s sovereignty, rebuild robust institutions and foster an active civil society. What are the prospects for the country’s reconstruction and what are the main security challenges? What assessment can be made of the political and social situation in Syria? Insights from Didier Billion, Deputy Director of IRIS and Head of the Middle East/North Africa Programme.

What impact have the Israeli-US attacks on Iran and Lebanon had on Syria?

We know the destabilising effects across the entire region of the war declared by the United States and Israel against Iran on 28 February. Syria, which is struggling to rebuild forms of political and economic stability after almost 14 years of civil war, is also suffering the consequences of the resulting situation. Admittedly, it has been spared fighting and bombardments, but it is easy to understand that, in this climate of tension and destabilisation, the foreign direct investment (FDI) it vitally needs is arriving in wholly insufficient amounts. Turkey and Saudi Arabia, which initially appeared to be the states most committed to helping rebuild the country, are showing their limitations: the former because of its domestic economic difficulties, the latter because Mohammed bin Salman’s ambitious and highly costly projects are being hampered by the consequences of 28 February. As usual, the European Union is more a spectator of events than a determined actor and, in this instance, appears more concerned with the issue of Syrian refugees on its soil, whom it would like to send back to their country, than with establishing an effective and planned aid programme for Syria. China, at this stage, remains very cautious and clearly has no intention of taking any risks by becoming more deeply involved alongside Damascus. For obvious reasons linked to the war in Ukraine, Russia is no longer an influential actor, even though it has managed to secure the continued presence of its military bases on Syrian soil, an issue of vital importance to Moscow. As for the United States, Donald Trump, in a moment of mental confusion, recently suggested that Ahmed al-Charaa’s troops intervene militarily in Lebanon to settle the score with Hezbollah… further proof of his abysmal lack of understanding of the regional situation and the political dynamics at play there.

The regional and international circumstances are therefore unfavourable for Syria, which is seeing the prospects for its reconstruction delayed at a time when the urgency of the situation would, on the contrary, require the process to be accelerated.

Security challenges directly affect the prospects for the country’s reconstruction and normalisation. Where does Syria currently stand in terms of security?

Far from being stabilised, the situation has nevertheless improved. The violence that erupted in March 2025 against loyalists of Bachar al-Assad’s regime in the country’s coastal regions, before turning into sectarian violence against members of the Alawite community – around 1,500 civilians were killed –, and then, in July of the same year, this time against Druze villages, probably leaving more than 1,200 people dead and displacing over 100,000, has not recurred. Despite sporadic clashes that persist, the violence is no longer of the same intensity. In January 2026, fighting was concentrated this time in the Kurdish districts of Aleppo and then in the north-eastern regions of the country, which are de facto autonomous.

The last major concern was the possible resurgence of Daesh activities, which ultimately did not materialise, despite a number of military operations facilitated by the partial withdrawal of US troops. A related issue was that of the camps holding jihadist prisoners under Kurdish control, which were transferred in an organised manner to the control of Ahmed al-Charaa’s troops, thus preventing the prisoners from escaping and dispersing.

Although the security situation is therefore not fully stabilised, it has unquestionably improved. Nevertheless, a serious source of tension persists as a result of Israeli policy: the instrumentalisation of part of the Druze community to create areas of tension in the south of the country, regular air strikes that continue on Syrian territory and the expansion of the area illegally occupied by the Tel Aviv army on the foothills of the Golan Heights combine to pose a series of challenges for the authorities in Damascus. It is regrettable that the so-called international community remains, moreover, almost entirely silent about these blatant breaches of international law. For these reasons, the factors of destabilisation are now more geopolitical than strictly sectarian, even though forms of “Sunni revanchism” have not disappeared and may create situations of tension.

This reduction in the drivers of violence can be explained by the declared and methodical determination of the new political authorities to rebuild a centralised security apparatus, with particular emphasis placed on the military institution. Numerous measures have therefore been combined: the gradual integration of militias, the reopening of officer and non-commissioned officer schools from the summer of 2025, the determination to return the army to its barracks and the introduction of strict discipline are all contributing to the stated objective, even though factors of fragility undeniably persist.

These regional tensions are unfolding in a country where stability remains precarious. What assessment can be made of the political and social situation in Syria?

Legislative elections were held on 5 October 2025, the first since the fall of Bachar al-Assad. One may indeed wonder whether they were not held too soon for a society atomised by the ordeals endured during the years of civil war. To make matters worse, all political parties were banned after al-Charaa’s came to power, and it is legitimate to question the credibility of elections held under such conditions.

The electoral system implemented is also highly complex but, to focus on the essentials, two thirds of the candidates were selected by local committees appointed by an electoral commission formed by Ahmed al-Charaa’s. The final third were directly appointed by al-Charaa’s himself. It was under these unusual conditions that 210 parliamentarians were elected/appointed, only 10% of whom are women.

These new legislators are all ideologically close to the authorities and will be unlikely to oppose the executive’s proposals and decisions. In reality, it seems that the main tasks in the months and years ahead will be to rebuild the social ties destroyed by the war, reconstitute a civic identity and implement transitional justice. To achieve this, the authorities must draw on the traditions of solidarity that remain vibrant within Syrian society and on its active forces – civil society activists, intellectuals, entrepreneurs, etc. –, rather than keeping them marginalised. The threefold process of rebuilding an effective state apparatus, reconstituting an active civil society and preserving the country’s sovereignty constitutes the main challenge facing the authorities. No one knows whether they will succeed.