Tensions, Crises and Contradictions in Turkey

Nearly 10 years after the attempted coup of 16 July 2016, the repressive strategy implemented by the Turkish political authorities continues to be applied in a troubling manner, raising serious concerns.

Two events have recently unfolded in quick succession, highlighting how the rule of law is being constantly and methodically eroded, while fault lines appear to be crystallising within the ruling power and the coalition governing the country.

First, the leadership of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923, was ousted. Elected following the party congress at the end of 2023, this leadership defeated the outgoing team led by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. He had been the unsuccessful candidate of the opposition—despite its unity—against Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who secured another presidential election victory in May 2023. At the time, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu had run a campaign between the two rounds with xenophobic undertones, using themes similar to the “Great Replacement”, primarily directed against Syrian refugees while the civil war continued to rage in their home country.

Following the convention, the defeated delegates—who were thus in the minority—filed a lawsuit, alleging irregularities, including the buying of delegates’ votes. After a lengthy legal process, the verdict was handed down on May 21. Refusing to leave the party headquarters, the leaders and activists present were forcibly removed by riot police. It is in this context that Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is set to resume his former duties as party leader in the coming days, stating without batting an eye that his party knew how to purge itself “when necessary”, thereby acquiescing to the court’s rulings.

These decisions by a judiciary whose independence has, to say the least, been eroded in recent years are clearly directly political, undoubtedly inspired from the presidential palace. This is part of a widespread crackdown against the CHP, the party that won the 2024 municipal elections and whose main leader, Ekrem İmamoğlu, the mayor of Istanbul, was imprisoned 14 months ago. Since then, 23 CHP mayors have been imprisoned and 25 have been removed from office.

The government’s sophistry, cloaked in court rulings, doesn’t fool many people. The aim is to decapitate a party that poses a real threat to the government in the run-up to future elections, particularly the presidential race. The fact that the state apparatus can interfere directly in the affairs of political parties is fundamentally at odds with the necessary independence of these parties and constitutes yet another breach in a rule of law that has already been severely undermined. Nevertheless, this wave of repression indicates a certain unease within the leadership circles of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which also fits into the context of the succession of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, which will arise in the short or medium term. Significantly, the leader of the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and Devlet Bahçeli— the main coalition partner supporting Erdoğan—called the ousted CHP leader, Özgür Özel, to wish him a happy Eid al-Adha—the Feast of Sacrifice—which is currently being celebrated in Turkey. The disagreement over the ousting of the CHP leader could not be clearer.

The nervousness in the corridors of power was also evident in the president’s decision to close the private Bilgi University on 22 May 2026—only to reverse that decision 48 hours later! The presidential decree banning the university consisted of a single sentence with no explanation. The reversal contained no further explanation. What is the logic here? An attempt to silence a university with a liberal reputation, founded in its time by academics who were ousted from their posts after the September 1980 military coup, and which, as we recall, was last year one of the main sites of protest following the arrest of Ekrem İmamoğlu. How are we to make sense of these about-faces? Other than fuelling a climate of polarisation in a context where the government is failing to curb deepening economic difficulties, exacerbated by the consequences of regional conflicts, foremost among them the war against Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. These developments provide a new illustration of what political scientist Ahmet Insel calls a “random autocracy”.

Adding to this rather bleak picture is the stalemate surrounding potential progress on the Kurdish issue, which is likely the most significant political challenge that Turkish society must resolve. It is worth recalling that hopes had been raised on this issue at the end of 2024 and that a resolution process had then been initiated. At its congress in May 2025, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) had decided to disband and planned to surrender its weapons. President Erdoğan appeared to emerge as the winner of this political episode, despite had barely invested any effort in it, contenting himself with vague statements about the brotherhood between the Turkish and Kurdish peoples, and the need to remain unyielding in the fight against terrorism. Following the announcement of the PKK’s self-dissolution, he emphasised the new phase that was beginning for “a Turkey free of terrorism.” However, this is not enough to move forward. Positive proposals must be put forward without delay so that all stakeholders can demonstrate tangible progress. The cross-party commission known as the “Parliamentary Commission for National Solidarity, Brotherhood, and Democracy,” which began its work in the summer of 2025, could fulfil this desirable role, but in reality it is highly opaque. While a report was indeed made public in February 2026, no measures have been passed since then. These few factors point to a particularly tense domestic political situation that gives the unpleasant impression of an era coming to an end. The AKP is no longer in a position to offer a compelling narrative capable of reinvigorating its social and electoral base, which has weakened considerably in recent years, even if it has not disappeared entirely. This situation paradoxically contrasts with Turkey’s continued assertion of its role as a key player on numerous international issues. We will return to this.