War(s) for Regional Hegemony in the Middle East

Following a brief halt in military operations after the remote signing, on 17 June 2026, of the memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States, hostilities resumed abruptly on 7 July in the Persian Gulf, shattering the hopes raised during this ceasefire interlude. Should this come as a surprise? What are the underlying causes that explain the resumption of hostilities?

A great many comments and analyses have been produced over recent months, amounting to immediate reactions, sometimes useful, to the almost uninterrupted succession of events, but more rarely taking the necessary distance to decipher the fundamental issues underlying the multiple phases of these wars against Iran.

The Islamic Republic of Iran at the heart of regional dynamics

What ultimately emerges as the defining factor is a direct struggle for regional hegemony, in which the United States sets the overall framework, with Israel as a strategic partner, whereas in Palestine or Lebanon it is Tel Aviv that makes the key decisions, with Washington’s support, unquestionably decisive, but without direct intervention on its part. However, while since 28 February 2026 the objectives stated by Donald Trump have shifted considerably, and often contradicted one another from day to day, those asserted by Israeli leaders are clear. For them, the aim is to neutralise Iran, currently the only power capable of challenging a regional order dominated by the Israeli-US axis. The objective for Tel Aviv is therefore to weaken Tehran as much as possible and by every means available, even to the point of bringing about its collapse. The aim is to break apart a millennia-old state, potentially capable of counterbalancing Tel Aviv’s ambition to unilaterally reshape the regional order without concession or restraint and to realise the utopia of Greater Israel. In this context, the United States initially appeared to be following Israel’s lead after apparently being duped by Benjamin Netanyahu and at no point does the occupant of the White House seem to have anticipated the destabilising international consequences of his decision to enter the war.

The fierce rivalry between Israel and the Islamic Republic reflects the profound geostrategic shifts that have swept through the region since the implosion of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar world. It is worth recalling, for example, that during the 1980s the relationship between the two states was very different in nature, with the former even selling weapons to the latter during the war that pitted it against Saddam Hussein from 1980 to 1988. Since then, Israel’s fundamental strategic equation has rested on its obsession with preventing any other regional power from challenging its own. Since the early 1990s, however, the Islamic Republic has consistently pursued a policy designed to give it an effective capacity for regional influence and therefore strategic depth. To this end, it has worked to master the uranium enrichment cycle and build a network of partners known as the axis of resistance.

Overlaid on the military rivalry between the two states is an economic rivalry which, in this instance, takes concrete form in the objective of controlling energy and trade routes and hubs: the Strait of Hormuz for Iran, the Eastern Mediterranean for Israel. These parameters relate to the development of economic flows linking Asia, the Middle East and Europe and to the many projects that embody them: the New Silk Roads, the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor, the Development Road linking southern Iraq and Turkey, the trans-Gulf railway project, the revival of the Hejaz Railway. From this perspective, the issue is therefore the delineation of the place that each power wishes and is able to secure within production and exchange networks. In other words, the place of each within the dominant mode of economic production.

The emerging contours of regional realignments

That is why, contrary to what is frequently argued by many observers, Iran is not primarily seeking to subvert the regional or international order but, on the contrary, to secure the firmest possible place within it. From this perspective, Iranian leaders share the same political logic as the leaders of the BRICS+, of which Iran is now a member. They are not seeking to create an alternative to the dominant economic order but to integrate into it. The Iranian nuclear issue must therefore be understood not only as a search for security assurance by Tehran’s leaders but also as a means of securing within the international system a place denied to Iran by the United States and the majority of Western countries.

We are currently experiencing a moment of regional apolarity in which exacerbated competitive dynamics are crystallising, all aimed at securing a form of regional hegemony. First and foremost, the Islamic Republic versus Israel, but other contenders are also in the running. That is why new partnerships are taking shape. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan in particular all consider, albeit for different reasons, that the most destabilising regional factor that currently needs to be contained is the State of Israel. It is nevertheless worth emphasising that all these states remain close partners of the United States, which illustrates the complexity of the processes under way. The visible effects of these rivalries/realignments extend beyond the regional framework alone and reflect an international order undergoing profound upheaval.

Tactical divergences between the United States and Israel

While, for Israel, Iran represents a direct and immediate regional rival, the issue looks different from the perspective of the United States. From Washington’s standpoint, the overriding concern is that a state might assert itself within the regional and global order without pledging allegiance to the United States. Unlike Israel, which seeks to neutralise Iran to ensure that it no longer poses a threat for many years, the United States aims to contain Iran and prevent it from reshaping the regional order on terms that would be far too favourable to it. This requires method and a medium-term vision, qualities lacking in Donald Trump’s often erratic political decisions. The fact that sanctions policies against Iran are passed down from one US administration to the next is precisely intended to reduce Iran’s room for manoeuvre and prevent it from pursuing a policy of regional assertion that purports to dispense with the blessing of US imperialism. In a word, the United States aims to force Iran to pledge allegiance. In this sense, Washington’s and Tel Aviv’s objectives do not always coincide. To serve his own interests, Donald Trump needs a stabilised Middle East and, as far as possible, one structured by a system of partnerships favourable to him. This can be seen in his support for Syria’s new political authorities, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, whom he has placed under the “sponsorship” of Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Israel’s logic is radically different since, by contrast, it is pursuing a policy of regional destabilisation and fragmentation designed to weaken states.

Pro-Israel lobbies exert undeniable influence over Washington’s policy direction, but neither they nor Israel impose their choices on the United States. Netanyahu’s influence over Trump is real, but the fundamental interests of US imperialism remain the main explanatory factor. Thus, the logic of the Abraham Accords – initiated by Donald Trump I, continued by Joe Biden – is primarily aimed at strengthening US influence in the region by consolidating the political and economic normalisation of relations between Israel and the Arab states of the Middle East. That is why some initiatives of Israel’s supremacist government may appear problematic for US interests.

All the more so because, as a further complicating factor, the issue of rivalry with China looms beyond the strictly Iranian question. We know the importance, admittedly relative, of Iranian hydrocarbon exports to Beijing and, above all, Iran’s central role in transporting these energy resources. The crucial role of the Strait of Hormuz is now well known. In the eyes of Chinese leaders, preventing the collapse of the Iranian state, which would lead to further destabilisation, is vital. It should nevertheless be noted that, at the same time, Chinese leaders fully understand that the continuation of the war is helping to weaken the United States, which is not unwelcome to them.

Ultimately, two trends are converging. On the one hand, the direct rivalry between Israel and Iran for regional hegemony – taking into account other protagonists, primarily Turkey and Saudi Arabia – and, on the other, the determination of US imperialism to use every means available to curb Iran’s ambition to free itself from the rules it lays down. Washington’s and Tel Aviv’s interests converge but do not fully coincide. In both cases, while the Islamic Republic is unquestionably the country under attack, it is also a country pursuing its own logic of power and, to that end, does not hesitate either to build a network of beholden partners in the region to reinforce its interests or to brutally repress the protest movements developing within it that could weaken it even further.