Algeria: Towards a Paradigm Shift in Foreign Policy

Following an attempted coup in Niamey against General Abdourahamne Tiani’s regime on the night of 28–29 August 2026, Algeria, for the first time since its independence, openly provided military support at the request of the Nigerien authorities by deploying four fighter jets and two cargo aircraft, thereby breaking with its long-standing doctrine of non-interference. This military intervention beyond Algeria’s borders raises new questions. How can Algiers’ military support for Niamey be explained? How can Algeria’s historic shift in foreign policy be explained, and what are the underlying issues? We take a closer look with Brahim Oumansour, associate researcher and director of the Maghreb Observatory at IRIS.

What is the context of Algeria’s military intervention in Niger?

On 30 August 2026, Algiers decided to send four Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jets, an Il-78 refuelling aircraft and an Il-76 transport aircraft to the Niamey airbase in Niger, following an attempted coup and a mutiny in Niamey. This was preceded by an initial delivery, on 9 August 2026, of four military helicopters donated by Algeria to the Nigerien armed forces. The military deployment to Niger forms part of a dual security and diplomatic strategy. More broadly, this operation takes place against the backdrop of a deeply destabilised regional context, characterised by rapid geopolitical realignment in the Sahel. A series of coups d’état in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger has led to the collapse of regional security arrangements and facilitated the expansion of jihadist groups, in particular Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). The accelerated withdrawal of French forces, against a backdrop of tensions with Bamako, has paralysed the G5 Sahel and left a security vacuum that the Alliance of Sahel States has been unable to fill. For Algiers, this deterioration represents a direct threat to national security. Algeria shares approximately 2,500 km of borders with the Sahel, including nearly 1,000 km with Niger, which is also a major route for sub-Saharan migration flows towards North Africa.

Added to this security dimension is a series of diplomatic crises that have undermined Algeria’s influence in the region, largely linked to the rise to power of new leaders who are often at odds with Algiers and are backed by Russia or other states. Relations with Bamako deteriorated over the handling of the crisis in northern Mali, culminating in Assimi Goïta’s denunciation of the peace agreement signed in Algiers in 2015. Tensions with Niamey erupted in 2023 following the Algerian authorities’ pushback of sub-Saharan migrants towards the Nigerien border. Tensions were exacerbated in April 2025 when the Algerian army shot down a Malian drone near its borders, prompting a coordinated response from the three member states of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), which recalled their ambassadors. General Abdourahmane Tiani’s visit to Algiers in February 2026 had led to a gradual thaw and the restoration of relations, as signalled by the ambassadors’ return to their posts in July.

To what extent does this military intervention beyond Algeria’s borders signal a paradigm shift in Algeria’s foreign policy? What does it reflect?

This intervention does indeed mark a historic turning point in Algeria’s foreign policy. The deployment of its military arsenal beyond Algeria’s borders – long unthinkable under Algerian doctrine – effectively signals a paradigm shift in its foreign policy. Historically, Algeria has defined itself by a stance of non-intervention, inherited from its colonial experience and its commitment to the principle of national sovereignty, which have fuelled its doctrinal refusal to engage in any military intervention beyond its borders, with the exception of the Algerian army’s participation in the Six-Day War in support of Egypt.

This represents a show of strength, with a new stance that Algiers is clearly embracing, through which it is sending a strong signal aimed primarily at the regional powers and actors that Algiers describes as ‘hostile’ and accuses of playing a role that contributes to instability in its regional environment. Algerian leaders wish to break with a foreign policy based solely on a defensive strategy and neutral mediation diplomacy, which have been rendered largely ineffective by the sometimes heavy-handed interventions of external powers whose influence in the region continues to grow. This is the case in Libya and the Sahel. Algeria’s soft power, long based primarily on its revolutionary and Third Worldist heritage, has shown its limitations, as demonstrated by recent developments linked either to the U-turn by certain African countries on the Western Sahara issue or in their direct relations with Algiers.

Algiers wishes to fully assume its role as a linchpin of regional stability and to re-establish its regional influence by complementing its diplomatic efforts with the development of economic cooperation, primarily in the energy sector, now backed by its military strength. Algeria’s support for Niamey is also becoming vital for the continued implementation of the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline (TSGP) project, a massive scheme stretching over 4,000 km designed to link Nigeria to Algeria via Niger, with the aim of transporting gas to Europe.

This shift in Algiers’ long-standing policy of non-intervention raises certain questions regarding the country’s strategic positioning in the region, particularly in the Sahel. What is this positioning, and how is it likely to evolve?

This unprecedented intervention raises questions regarding its duration, geographical scope and the context in which it is taking place … It stems from years of frustration fuelled by the inability to act within one’s own geostrategic environment, which is turning into an arena for the struggle for influence and competition between global and regional powers.

Although surprising and decided upon as a matter of urgency to prevent a coup – without, incidentally, being put to a parliamentary vote – this operation is no coincidence: it forms part of a profound shift towards a structural redefinition of Algeria’s regional strategy. The 2020 constitutional amendment authorised, for the first time, the deployment of troops abroad, under a multilateral mandate and with parliamentary approval. This shift in doctrine has been accompanied by a dramatic increase in the defence budget, which has risen from around 10 billion dollars in 2022 to nearly 25 billion in 2026. It also builds on an existing framework for military cooperation, notably the Joint Operational Staff Committee (CEMOC), established in 2010 between Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.

This one-off deployment of military assets to Niger in 2026 – which, according to Algiers, is targeted and justified on the grounds of protecting borders and regional partners – thus illustrates this shift towards interventionism, which could prove lasting and potentially extend to other countries if the operation achieves its objectives without any unintended consequences. Algiers is thus taking a new step in a gradual but profound transformation of its strategic posture, aiming for a diplomatic rebalancing designed to restore its influence in an environment where the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Russia and Turkey have increased their presence. Given the chronic instability and security fragility in the Sahel, and the active presence of actors pursuing agendas that compete with or run counter to Algeria’s vital geostrategic interests, it is highly likely that Algeria’s military intervention in Niger will be a long-term undertaking, particularly as the legal framework and the financial and military resources allow for it.

However, even such limited and short-term operations are not without risks, particularly in a highly unstable region characterised by shifting alliances.

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This article has been translated from French into English using artificial intelligence.