Saudi Arabia’s Splendid Isolation

Saudi Arabia has once again demonstrated its inability to influence the course of events in the Middle East. After four years of a more or less observed ceasefire, Yemeni rebels seized control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in a lightning offensive—the Saudis’ only route for exports to Asia following Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Furthermore, on Thursday, September 10, the Saudis suffered a drone attack originating from Iraq. The attack targeted the 1,200-km-long east-west oil pipeline, forcing them to shut it down.

A series of setbacks

This series of stinging setbacks in the space of just a few days demonstrates that, despite highly publicized announcements, alliances, mutual defense pacts (the Mecca Accords), and the now largely theoretical protection of the United States, the Kingdom finds itself alone in having to face an environment that is increasingly hostile to it.

A War That Got Off to a Bad Start and Just Won’t End

When they launched a war against the Houthis in 2015, the Saudis did not expect to become embroiled in a conflict that would last this long. In that war, Saudi Arabia had allied itself with the United Arab Emirates; however, differences over their respective objectives quickly emerged. For the Saudis, the primary goal was to neutralize a threat on their border, while the Emiratis, for their part, were pursuing strategic and economic ambitions in southern Yemen. This culminated in the December 30, 2025, bombing of the port of Mukalla by Riyadh and the destruction of a shipment of Emirati weapons intended for the forces of General Aïdarous Al-Zoubaïdi of the Southern Yemen Transitional Council. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia demanded the withdrawal of military forces from Yemen—and from Hadramaut in particular—which was carried out. General Aïdarous has since sought refuge in the United Arab Emirates.

From the breakdown of the 2022 ceasefire to the lightning-fast advance in the south

What raises questions is the Houthis’ lightning-fast advance into a region that is quite far from their bases and their ability to mobilize several thousand fighters and considerable military resources. What is even more surprising, however, is the lack of resistance offered by the legitimate government’s troops in Mokha and their withdrawal from the strategically vital island of Perim, thereby allowing the Houthi rebels to take control of Bab el-Mandeb.

The Unbearable Isolation

In this latest development, Saudi Arabia finds itself alone. According to Axios, President Donald Trump refused to intervene despite requests from Mohammed bin Salman. As for the Mecca Pact, Turkish forces based in Somalia did not get involved, and Egypt—which has a direct stake in shipping through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal—remained, as usual, silent. Not to mention the Emiratis and Israelis, who have a presence in the Horn of Africa—particularly in Somaliland—and who did not react.

The Emiratis’ stance is understandable. They are settling the score for the Mukalla attack and are thus making Saudi Arabia pay for their expulsion from southern Yemen. Furthermore, some reports indicate that the command of the Yemeni force that held this region withdrew following a shift in the stance of their military leader, who—in keeping with the Yemeni tradition of shifting alliances according to the interests of the moment—reportedly aligned himself with the United Arab Emirates.

This major setback for the Saudi crown prince highlights the fragility of his kingdom and its inability to defend itself in a hostile environment. The attacks on the pipeline and the Houthis’ takeover of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait can be interpreted as a response to the “Mecca Pact”—the ink on which is not yet dry—and as Iran’s defiance of that agreement. The Iranians are signaling that they are present and in control of the situation.

The drone attack on the oil pipeline originated in Iraq, where General Qaani of the Revolutionary Guards had recently visited. It also demonstrates the central government in Baghdad’s inability to control its own territory. The Iraqis, anxious to preserve their relations with the Saudis, have dismissed several high-ranking military officers in the region and closed three border crossings with Iran.

The situation is reminiscent of the attack on September 14, 2019, when drones targeted the Saudi oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais—an attack the Houthis claimed responsibility for, but which, according to a UN report, was launched from Iraq. At that time, as now, Donald Trump was in power and did not react to come to his ally’s aid.

Riyadh is now bitterly experiencing what it’s like to find itself in a hostile environment with no real ability to defend itself, despite the proliferation of alliances that have proven fruitless. Today, the Saudis have the choice to keep a low profile, but if the Houthis prevent their ships from passing through the strait, the situation will quickly become untenable. They will then have to intervene militarily to clear the area and liberate it—either alone or with allies of convenience—but do they have the capacity to do so?

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Results That Defy Predictions

First, voter turnout stood at nearly 78 percent, showing that Israeli citizens considered the stakes of this election to be crucial. Palestinians in Israel, for their part, voted at a rate of nearly 80 percent, expressing a total rejection of the policies of Benjamin Netanyahu, the outgoing prime minister.

The electoral system, based on near-full proportional representation, once again highlights the difficulty of securing a clear majority without resorting to coalitions—where, traditionally, secret negotiations are the norm, accompanied by their share of broken promises, betrayals, and shifting alliances.

However, beyond the parameters related to the rules of the electoral system itself, the results of these elections are above all an expression of the divisions plaguing Israeli society over domestic policy issues. A wide variety of scenarios are therefore possible in the days and weeks ahead, and it would be futile to make any predictions with even a modicum of certainty in the context of this article.

The officially announced results show that the coalition led by Benjamin Netanyahu, composed of five parties, came in first with 53 elected seats out of the 120 in the Knesset, the Israeli parliament; the opposition coalition led by Gadi Eisenkot, composed of four parties, won 48 seats; and finally, the two Arab lists won 19 seats. Since an absolute majority requires 61 members of the Knesset, negotiations are now beginning to determine the composition of the future government.

Several observations can be made at this stage.

Although it has seen a significant reduction in the number of its members—the outgoing majority coalition had 64—the fact remains that the bloc led by Netanyahu has not collapsed, despite the various accusations leveled against it throughout the election campaign: corruption, violations of democratic principles—notably embodied by its judicial reform plan aimed at bringing the Supreme Court to heel—and, above all, its responsibility for failing to prevent the October 7 attacks, or worse, for having been informed of Hamas’s preparations and failing to alert the relevant security services. Despite these accusations, a significant portion of the electorate has absolved him of responsibility for the genocidal policy implemented in Gaza and the ethnic cleansing carried out in the West Bank.

Nevertheless, the other 67 members of the Knesset, representing the opposition, point out that the coalition led by Netanyahu has been rejected by a majority of the electorate.

The coalition led by Gadi Eisenkot, the former chief of staff, has failed to meet the goals it set for itself and is also unable to form a government on its own. It is also worth noting that most polls were once again incorrect, as they had placed this coalition ahead of the one led by Netanyahu. During the campaign, Gadi Eisenkot distinguished himself from his main opponent on numerous domestic policy issues. For instance, he called for the establishment of a commission of inquiry into the security failures that led to the October 7 attacks, even though Netanyahu has stubbornly refused to do so; he expressed support for the conscription of ultra-Orthodox Jews—the “God-fearing”—who have been exempt since 1948; and he has frequently emphasized the need to respect the principle of the separation of powers. Gadi Eisenkot has also frequently stated that, if he were to win the election, he would relentlessly return to the foundations of the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel, which he defines as “Jewish and democratic.” We can therefore conclude that, in addition to his condemnation of Netanyahu’s populist and illiberal excesses, he also distances himself—at least publicly—from the Basic Law on “Israel, the Nation-State of the Jewish People,” adopted in 2018, which codifies the existence of two categories of Israeli citizens with different rights based on ethnic criteria: Jews and non-Jews. If he comes to power, the coming weeks will confirm—or not—whether he keeps this promise on a matter of paramount importance.

The Palestinians of Israel, however, are the real surprise of this election due to their strong showing. Arab parties have won a total of 19 seats, compared to just 10 in the previous legislature. This result can be explained by their very strong turnout, which in turn was driven by the increasingly stigmatizing situation they face in Israel, particularly since October 7. As has been frequently noted in recent days, they are de facto the “kingmakers” of the future government structure. Benjamin Netanyahu is well aware of this, and during his October 28 press conference, he stated bluntly that “the Arabs stole the election.” The meaning of this statement is crystal clear and confirms that, for him and his coalition—composed of racist and supremacist parties—the Palestinians of Israel possess no legitimacy.

In light of these results, one of the key questions is whether Gadi Eisenkot’s “Change” bloc will agree to form an alliance with Arab lawmakers. The answer is difficult to discern, given the deep divisions within the bloc. One of its components—Avigdor Liberman’s party, with 7 seats—has, for example, repeatedly expressed its opposition to such a prospect, while Yair Golan’s Democrats, with 8 seats, would be more inclined to support it. A possible solution could take the form of support without the participation of the parties representing the Palestinians of Israel, but what assurances would Gadi Eisenkot then be able to offer them?

The Palestinian issue: conspicuously absent from the campaign

While there are many differences among the various Jewish electoral coalitions on domestic policy issues, these differences are clearly less pronounced when it comes to the Palestinian question.

Benjamin Netanyahu’s convictions have long been known, and one must acknowledge his unwavering obsession with the subject. Since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, he has consistently opposed any form of compromise with the Palestinians and the prospect of a sovereign Palestinian state. He has never deviated from these positions, and the other members of his coalition fully share them. The methods used against the Gaza Strip since October 7 and the ongoing ethnic cleansing in the West Bank show just how far this policy can go.

Gadi Eisenkot, for his part, has also clearly rejected the prospect of a Palestinian state, ultimately reflecting the conviction of the majority of Israeli public opinion. The difference between him and Benjamin Netanyahu lies in the fact that he does not rule out the possibility of negotiations a priori, though their goal would be to determine the status of a hypothetical “autonomous region” or “quasi-state” that would remain under Israel’s exclusive security control. While he has certainly condemned the policy of terror organized by the outgoing government in the West Bank—which encourages daily abuses by fanatical settlers against the Palestinian civilian population—he does not oppose the very principle of settlement. For him, it is, in a sense, a matter of settling “properly.”

There is therefore no agreement on methods, but the shared disregard for international law appears to be the same in both rival coalitions. Despite the nuances—and even the differences—the outgoing head of government and the leader of the opposition essentially hold the same position: no Palestinian state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, and an open disregard for international law. It is also striking to note that none of the Israeli political leaders—aside, of course, from those representing the Palestinians in Israel—bothers to formulate specific, positive proposals to break the deadlock and reverse the deterioration currently plaguing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The trauma of October 7 is so profound within Israeli society that a national consensus exists among the country’s Jewish parties, preventing any critical reflection.

Upcoming Episodes

Now that the official results have been announced, the Israeli president must meet with political leaders and appoint the person he deems suitable to form a government. It will be up to that person to find a way to secure the 61 Knesset members needed to achieve a majority in the Knesset. The negotiations could be lengthy and, if they fail, could lead to the calling of new early parliamentary elections. President Herzog has certainly urged political leaders to find a solution as soon as possible, but nothing is certain, and speculation is futile.

In the meantime, Benjamin Netanyahu, the outgoing prime minister, remains in office. He has proven over the past few years that he is capable of making the worst possible decisions to stay in power, and we cannot rule out yet another attempt to charge ahead regardless of the consequences. Unfortunately, the possibility of a new campaign of strikes against Iran—following the U.S. midterm elections—which would undoubtedly provoke a response from Tehran and help foster the reestablishment of a national unity government in Tel Aviv, cannot be ruled out.

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This article has been translated from French into English using artificial intelligence.