Withdrawal From OPEC: The Risky Gamble of the United Arab Emirates

The effective withdrawal of the United Arab Emirates from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), this Friday, 1 May 2026, comes as no surprise in itself. It is the timing chosen that is surprising. Indeed, the question of oil export quotas has for several years been the main point of friction between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, with Riyadh wishing to restrict supply from OPEC countries in order to guarantee, with Russia’s support within OPEC+, a break-even price that meets its financing needs for its ambitious development plan “Vision 2030”. The Emirates, which before the conflict in Iran were exporting nearly 3 MB/D, had the ambition of increasing their production to around 5 MB/D. This ambition had been announced by Sultan Al-Jaber, Minister of Energy, President of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), during the COP28 which he chaired.

This withdrawal will no doubt have an impact on the functioning of OPEC, already weakened by several departures, including that of Qatar in 2018. The organisation, which controlled 50% of the oil placed on the market, now represents only 30% of global production.

A Timing That Highlights Divergent Approaches to the Conflict With Iran

What is most surprising about this decision to withdraw from OPEC is its timing. This withdrawal comes right in the middle of a conflict whose outcome cannot be predicted. The Emirates, which until now had tried to spare their Iranian neighbour and served as a safe haven for the deposits of Iranian oligarchs (Revolutionary Guards and other mullahs), have changed strategy.

The Emirates were probably the country most targeted by Iranian missile and drone fire. They did not intervene militarily in support of their American and Israeli allies and benefited from French assistance under the defence agreements that bind the two countries. The recent statements of 1 May on the social network X by Anwar Gargash, Mohamed Bin Zayed’s influential political adviser, leave no room for ambiguity: “Of course, no unilateral Iranian arrangement can be trusted or relied upon after the treacherous aggression against all its neighbours”. Trust with Iran has now been completely broken. And behind the scenes, the Emirates are encouraging the United States to resume hostilities.

The Choice of Alliances

Abu Dhabi stands apart from the other Gulf states through its closeness to Israel. The understanding with Tel Aviv goes far beyond recognition or the establishment of diplomatic relations. The two countries are engaged in numerous forms of cooperation, particularly in the field of defence. Israel is said recently to have supplied its Gulf partner with a sophisticated missile defence system.

Cooperation between Israel and the Emirates extends to Africa. The Emiratis have opened the doors of Somaliland to them, a highly strategic point in the Horn of Africa and located a short distance from the Houthis’ Yemen.

This solo strategy exasperates its large Saudi neighbour, which has adopted a completely different approach. Riyadh maintains its alliance with Washington and is careful not to respond to Donald Trump’s insulting remarks. At the same time, the Wahhabi kingdom now favours other alliances, trying to build an axis with Pakistan, Turkey and Egypt, three regional powers. The Saudis want to neutralise the Iranian threat without seeking Iran’s annihilation. In this, they seem much closer to the Omanis (who have been marginalised by the United States). Abbas Araghchi, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, therefore travelled to Muscat on 25 April before going to Moscow. He was received by the Sultan and held in-depth discussions with his counterpart Sayed Badr Al-Busaïdi. Yet Oman has always been cautious in its relations with Iran. Is this out of sympathy for the regime or a choice to preserve good-neighbourly relations with a powerful neighbour that has significant capacity to cause harm?

The Absence of Reaction From the Gulf Countries to the Iranian Attacks: Powerlessness or Cautious Wait-and-see?

The absence of reaction from the Gulf countries as a whole is surprising. Their vital installations were hit hard by Iranian ballistic attacks without this prompting retaliations on their part. These countries could have taken part, even symbolically, in retaliatory actions, given the formidable arsenal accumulated, with the support of American forces. They favoured a wait-and-see, even pusillanimous, attitude. The Omanis, who share control of the Strait of Hormuz with the Iranians and a large part of whose traffic passed along the route through their territorial waters, accepted this closure without batting an eyelid.

This absence of reaction can be understood through doubts about the ability of the Americans and Israelis to destroy the capacity of Iran, their immediate neighbour, to cause harm, and with which they will have to continue to reckon.

This also explains the Emirati desire, which distinguishes them from the other Gulf monarchies, to put an end to this threat once and for all.

What Consequences for the GCC Countries?

This conflict will have multiple consequences. It will formalise a de facto rupture between the two rival monarchies (Saudi Arabia and the Emirates), but could call into question the functioning of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which has never succeeded in reconciling the often divergent interests of each side.

The other consequence will be the diminishing importance of the Strait of Hormuz as an outlet for oil and other exports. Plans to revive old routes are already under consideration (the Hejaz railway could be extended to all the Gulf countries and reach the Mediterranean, for example), Saudi Arabia already has the port of Yanbu, which allows it to export a large part of its oil production via the Red Sea. The Emiratis will strengthen the capacities of their maritime outlet at Fujairah in the Arabian Sea, outside the Strait. The Omanis had an intuition that will prove successful by developing the immense maritime complex of Duqm on the Indian Ocean.

The conflict with Iran will have had the merit of clarifying the positions of each side.