Iran’s Miscalculations

Iran had won the first round of its confrontation with the United States, but the intransigence of the most radical wing of the regime led its leaders to make a serious mistake. One that could prove fatal. By attacking the Gulf monarchies through its proxies in Iraq and Yemen, Iran prompted them to react.

The Gulf countries were subjected, to varying degrees, to massive drone and missile attacks without responding. These attacks were launched from Iran, but also by Shia militias directly controlled by the Tehran regime.

The limits of diplomacy

Throughout the first phase of the conflict, the Saudis attempted to restrain the Americans and prioritised diplomacy in order to preserve relations between neighbouring countries, which they regard as essential to maintaining the existing system.

Iran’s persistent determination to control the Strait of Hormuz is jeopardising the economy of the entire region and placing all the countries bordering it at the mercy of Iran, which can decide whether or not to allow ships to pass through the strait.

For months, the Saudis and the other Gulf countries allowed Pakistani and Qatari diplomacy to take its course in the hope of avoiding an escalation whose consequences would have been unpredictable. Oman’s latest proposal for the two countries to jointly manage the strait was rejected by Iran.

Knowing when to stop, or not

Tehran could have stopped there and reaped the benefits of this first phase, which it had won against the Americans and their Israeli allies. But, as the saying goes, “Those whom Jupiter wishes to destroy, he first drives mad.” Iran, through its intransigence, no doubt caused by the internal disputes shaking the regime, sought to press its advantage, even at the risk of making mistakes that could cost it dearly.

By encouraging the Houthi rebels to open a new front and prevent Saudi-flagged vessels from navigating through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Tehran risks reviving a conflict that the world had forgotten. The consequences for the part of Yemen controlled by the Houthis could be disastrous for them.

Iraq, weakened since the US invasion of 2003, is facing deep internal divisions. Iran maintains its influence over the Shia militias affiliated with it. The attacks against Kuwait, Jordan and Saudi Arabia were launched from Iraqi territory.

Saudi Arabia awakens

Saudi Arabia’s response, having recently joined the United States in an air raid against these Iraqi militias, is a clear indication of a change in Riyadh’s policy. The Saudis had absorbed attacks without responding, as had most Gulf countries. Today, they are making it clear that neutrality is no longer an option. The joint raid is reported to have killed six high-ranking Iranian “advisers” operating alongside the Shia militias.

Another sign of Saudi displeasure is the cancellation of the visit that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi was due to make to Saudi Arabia on 30 July. The attacks launched from Iraqi territory originate in Basra and target neighbouring Kuwait, but also originate in Salah al-Din province and target Erbil in Kurdistan.

By targeting Iraqi Kurdistan, Iran risks mobilising against it the Kurdish factions that had so far refused to join the attack on Iran. This would be a serious strategic mistake, potentially enabling the ground offensive that Washington has so far lacked.

Iran’s assumption that the Gulf countries would distance themselves from the United States and would not retaliate has proved incorrect. The United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Jordan had already discreetly participated in retaliatory raids against Iran. The fact that the Saudis have officially announced their participation in a raid against Iranian proxies is a clear sign that the situation has changed.

Limited operational capabilities, but a impressive arsenal

The armed forces of the Gulf countries possess a formidable and highly modern arsenal. While the operational capabilities of the countries in the region are not optimal, this considerable force, if deployed in support of the Americans, could greatly increase the damage inflicted on Iran in the event of a full-scale conflict.

Furthermore, attacking Egypt by launching drones against the port of Damietta and disrupting navigation in the Red Sea, and consequently through the Suez Canal, one of the country’s main sources of revenue, is another risky gamble. Egypt possesses considerable military capabilities, which it would not hesitate to deploy alongside its American and Gulf allies, on whom it is largely financially dependent.

The obstacle would be the resumption of Israeli participation in attacks against Iran. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, as well as Egypt, would be reluctant to join forces with an Israeli-American coalition.

The current situation in Iran appears to be a process of headlong flight similar to that experienced by France during the Reign of Terror. In the coming weeks or months, the country’s leaders may have to confront coalitions far larger than those they have faced so far. What will the Western countries do in this equation?