The War in Iran and Its Consequences for the Region

More than three months after the outbreak of the conflict involving Israel, the United States and Iran, no one can predict its final outcome, despite the announcement of an agreement whose contours remain unclear and open to differing interpretations. Iran has demonstrated a capacity for resilience and retaliation that had been underestimated by its adversaries. Iran emerges victorious from this confrontation. Its opponents have achieved none of the objectives they had set themselves. The regime remains in place and its grip is stronger than ever. Tehran will not relinquish its enriched uranium despite Donald Trump’s triumphant declarations. Its ballistic capability, which spread fear across the region, has been only marginally weakened. Its overseas assets, particularly in the Gulf, have been partially unfrozen and the fate of the Strait of Hormuz remains unresolved.

What consequences for existing alliances?

This episode of warfare, which engulfed the entire Gulf region, has already had significant consequences. It is no longer certain that the countries of the region, which have already endured several thousand Iranian strikes (7,500) on their infrastructure, retain confidence in the ability of their American ally and protector to guarantee their security. On the contrary, resentment is palpable towards those who drew them, against their will, into a conflict that jeopardises regional stability and everything connected to it. Official contacts between Riyadh and Washington have slowed markedly in recent months. This is a sign of cooling relations.

A conflict exposing the region’s powerlessness in the face of threats

What is most striking is the apparent paralysis affecting the countries of the region. Their discomfort reveals a powerlessness that has now been laid bare. American protection was not sufficient to shield regional states. Worse still, they were dragged into a conflict they had not wanted.

In search of regional alliances

Riyadh, which had already begun before the conflict to build a new regional axis involving Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt and Qatar, finds itself reinforced in this approach. Mohammed bin Salman’s rapprochement with Turkey takes on critical importance in this context. Riyadh and Ankara are pursuing plans to create, or revive, a land corridor for transporting goods between the Gulf states and Europe. The objective is to revive the famous Hejaz railway line linking Istanbul to Mecca, inaugurated in 1908 during the Ottoman Empire. This line, passing through Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, would connect to other rail networks across the Arabian Peninsula. Qatar, for its part, is studying the possibility of reactivating a gas pipeline linking it to the Syrian port of Baniyas.

The Saudi-Turkish project also aims to circumvent the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and avoid insurance premiums, which have risen by 300%.

Syria as a beneficiary of the regional situation

Another notable feature is that all these projects highlight the importance of post-Assad Syria. The two principal allies of Syrian President Ahmed al-Charaa, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, would enable this exhausted country to derive substantial revenues from transit rights across its territory. Damascus is thus moving from Middle Eastern pariah to a central regional role.

The inability to respond highlights the region’s disarray

The absence of retaliation by Gulf countries in response to Iranian attacks is a sign of deep uncertainty. These countries are nevertheless attempting to preserve the future. They know Iran will remain their immediate neighbour and that accommodation will ultimately be necessary. The absence of retaliation, aside from a raid carried out by Emirati air forces last April, can also be explained by the structural weakness of Gulf militaries. The monarchies of the Peninsula do not wish to engage in a conflict whose outcome remains highly uncertain. The formidable arsenal accumulated in recent years is proving of little use and their deterrent capacity has been reduced to its bare minimum.

Oman in a position of diplomatic failure

Within this broader picture, Oman’s case is particularly emblematic. The Sultanate has always maintained a carefully balanced neutrality and sought to privilege dialogue. Until the outbreak of hostilities, Oman played the role of intermediary between neighbouring Iran and the United States. Oman’s contribution to the conclusion of the Vienna agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme (JCPOA) had been crucial in the early stages of negotiations.

After the conflict began in February, the Sultanate, which had worked until the very end to secure an agreement, felt betrayed by its American ally and was abruptly removed from its role as facilitator between the two parties, in favour first of Pakistan and later Qatar. This constitutes yet another setback for Omani diplomacy.

Said Badr al-Busaidi, Oman’s Foreign Minister and former mediator in discussions between Iran and the United States, stated in an interview with The Economist that the American administration had “allowed itself to be drawn” by Israel into this war at a time when an agreement had appeared within reach. The assassination of Ali Larijani, former Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (2025–2026), deprived the Sultanate of its principal Iranian interlocutor.

Yet Oman remains a major regional actor. It shares the Strait of Hormuz with Iran and maritime traffic mainly passed through Omani lanes within its territorial waters. The Sultanate did not react to Iran’s closure of Hormuz, and Iranian attacks did not spare the terminals at Duqm and Fahal near Muscat. Apart from formal protests, the Omanis did not respond. It must also be said that Oman benefits from its position outside the Strait’s waters. Many of the goods that previously transited through Hormuz to supply Gulf countries are now unloaded at Omani ports on the Arabian Sea and transported overland to their final destinations.

What implications for Bahrain and Kuwait?

The situation in Bahrain, which hosts the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), and in Kuwait is more delicate. These two countries have become targets of Iranian attacks, even if air defence systems have so far succeeded in limiting the impact of retaliatory strikes following American attacks on Iranian targets. The price appears high for both countries, whose domestic situations remain fragile: both contain sizeable Shiite minorities and cells accused of links with Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have been dismantled in each country.

Peace agreement: what prospects for the Gulf monarchies?

Donald Trump’s determination to secure an agreement with Iran at any cost will have major consequences for the region. Iran will have demonstrated its ability to withstand two major powers. If the situation in the Strait of Hormuz does not return to the status quo ante and if Iran retains its ability to continue pursuing its nuclear programme, the Gulf monarchies will have to rethink their diplomatic strategy. They will either have to accommodate the Iranian regime or turn towards new alliances, however fragile they may prove to be.