Israeli–American attacks on Iran: what consequences for the Gulf monarchies?

The Israeli–American attacks on Iran will have major consequences for all the monarchies of the Arab–Persian Gulf. For centuries, this region has learned to coexist with its Persian neighbour. It has been a complicated, at times conflictual, relationship in many respects, yet one imposed by geographical proximity and the sharing of a common space.

Since the advent of the mullahs’ regime in 1979, this relationship has taken on a religious dimension and has turned into a struggle for influence over the Muslim world between Sunnis and Shiites. Iran’s desire to extend its influence across the Near and Middle East by creating a buffer zone of loyal proxies serving its interests (Iraqi Shiites, Hezbollah, the Houthis) led to an initial confrontation, which pitted Saddam Hussein’s Iraq against Iran in the 1980s.

The Gulf states faced with a constrained neighbourhood

Faced with this threat, the Gulf monarchies moved closer to the West, so reviled by Tehran. They built their prosperity under the umbrella of American protection and petrodollars, while Iran endured the consequences of its leaders’ expansionist ambitions through increasingly severe sanctions and growing isolation.

Over these four decades, the Gulf monarchies, to varying degrees, have sought to contain the influence of their restless neighbour. A large share of embargoed trade bound for Iran passed through Dubai, while Oman, drawing on its declared neutrality, attempted to play the role of facilitator or “letter box” between Tehran and Washington. The first phase of negotiations on the Iranian nuclear agreement began in Muscat, Oman, in 2011. Since then, the sultanate has maintained good relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, though it has never been particularly close. Omanis have always remained wary of their neighbour, with whom they share control of the Strait of Hormuz.

Qatar, for its part, has sought to maintain good neighbourly relations with Tehran.

Bahrain has always had complicated relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The ruling Al Khalifa family, which is Sunni, suspects Tehran of supporting the Shiite component of the population (representing around 50%) and of fomenting unrest in the country. In this respect, the events of 2011, which shook the throne, remain vivid in Bahraini memory.

Another major Gulf power, Saudi Arabia also has a Shiite component, albeit a minority one concentrated on its eastern seaboard. The Saudi monarchy, guardian of Islam’s holy sites, is equally wary of its Iranian neighbour. On several occasions, disturbances were allegedly provoked by Tehran during the pilgrimage to Mecca. Riyadh was also concerned by the emergence of a Tehran-dominated “axis of resistance” around the Kingdom (Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Assad regime in Syria, Shiites in Iraq and Houthis in Yemen). This Shia crescent had the appearance of an almost total encirclement. However, the weakening of Hezbollah following Tel Aviv’s elimination of the charismatic Hassan Nasrallah in September 2024, the fall of the Assad regime in December of the same year, and the Israeli–American strikes in June 2025 have loosened this stranglehold.

Saudi Arabia, which unlike the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain chose not to join the Abraham Accords, has used its stature as a regional leader to pursue a different path while rebalancing its alliance with the United States.

While there was once discussion of including a weakened Iran in a Middle Eastern security architecture, a new Sunni axis is currently taking shape, marked by the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan (the only Muslim-majority state to possess nuclear weapons). This new configuration allows the Saudis not to depend exclusively on the United States for their security.

What reactions might the Iranian attacks provoke among the Gulf states?

By striking its Gulf neighbours, Iran has taken the risk of breaking the fragile balance that had gradually been established over the years. For the time being, the countries attacked on their own soil have not retaliated, but what will happen if they decide to do so? Most of these states are bound by defence agreements not only with the United States, but also with France and the United Kingdom. Will France be compelled to take part in the defence of the United Arab Emirates under the defence agreements that bind them? Will the attack on Al Dhafra air base remain without consequences?

Even the Sultanate of Oman was not spared by the Iranian missiles, which targeted the port of Duqm (where the British and Americans benefit from port facilities). By failing to spare the Sultanate, Iran is depriving itself of a valuable source of support, notably the only “friendly” country in the region that invested considerable efforts in trying to secure an agreement that might have prevented the American attack. It is unlikely that the Omanis will fail to react to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, over which they share control with Iran.

The attacks of 28 February 2026 plunge the region into the unknown and risk having unpredictable repercussions. It is still too early to foresee the consequences of the ongoing strikes on Iran. Will the regime of the mullahs and the Revolutionary Guards collapse or falter after the elimination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei? Who might be envisaged to replace the theocracy and the Pasdaran? No one yet knows. Does the Iranian leadership still have the resources to survive, and in what form? In the event of chaos, how can the neighbourhood of a country of 85 million inhabitants be managed? All these questions remain, for the moment, unanswered.