Recent Developments in the Kurdish Issue in Turkey and Syria

Over the past few weeks, significant developments have altered the political landscape of the Kurdish issue in Turkey and Syria. These distinct processes ultimately reflect the specific national characteristics of the countries in which these challenges are playing out, and demonstrate once again that the division of the Kurdish people across four Middle Eastern states – Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran – in the aftermath of the First World War has led to different patterns of socialisation and political mobilisation amongst its various constituent groups.

Significant progress in Turkey

In Turkey, a process began in the autumn of 2024 when, to the surprise of most observers, the leader of a far-right nationalist party – despite being known for his intransigence on the Kurdish question – paved the way by proposing that the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), who had been imprisoned since 1999, be allowed to appear before the Turkish parliament to explain himself. Decisions then followed in rapid succession, and on 25 February 2025, Abdullah Öcalan drafted an appeal, made public two days later, which would prove to be a landmark in the long history of the Kurdish question in Turkey. Entitled ‘Call for Peace and a Democratic Society’, the declaration was brief. Referring to the long-standing coexistence between Turks and Kurds, revisiting the reasons behind and the timing of the PKK’s founding, and subsequently emphasising the fundamental importance of democratic values and practices, Öcalan marked a clear break with some of the demands that had characterised the PKK throughout its history. Thus, the idea of a separate state, the possibility of a federal solution, and the prospect of administrative autonomy for the south-eastern regions of Turkey have been abandoned. It is striking that no specifically Kurdish demands appear in this declaration, which instead contains vague references to a democratic and harmonious way of life. Conversely, the cornerstone of the declaration is the clearly worded call for the PKK to lay down its arms and disband, which marks a radical shift in perspective.

On 12 May, at its congress, the PKK voted in favour of its own dissolution – a decision of considerable significance regarding an issue that has been poisoning political life in Turkey for decades, even though a significant decline in the PKK’s military activities on Turkish soil had been observed over the past ten years or so. On 11 July 2025, a ceremony was staged in the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan to symbolically destroy the fighters’ weapons. At the same time, a ‘Parliamentary Commission for National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy’ was established; its proposals were finally made public on 5 August 2026 and subsequently adopted by parliament on 10 August.

Although the term ‘amnesty’ is not mentioned, this is primarily about the prospect of the release of thousands of political prisoners – their number is estimated at between 5,000 and 7,000 – and the return to Turkey of senior figures and fighters currently abroad. Prisoners convicted of membership of the PKK will have their sentences suspended for a period of five to ten years, after which the sentence will be quashed provided they do not reoffend. The Kurdish leaders of the PKK consider that, despite the vagueness of certain measures, a first step – described as historic – has been taken, as a law that has been passed provides a legal framework for the disarmament, return and reintegration of its fighters into civilian life. Abdullah Öcalan himself states: ‘A journey of a thousand kilometres begins with a single step’.

Is this the end of a conflict that began on 15 August 1984 and has claimed at least 45,000 lives? It is too early to say, given the numerous setbacks and disappointments of recent years. Nevertheless, the foundations for political progress are in place, though they still need to be built upon and, above all, put into practice. In the coming weeks, the task will be to continue the political process by addressing issues that remain unresolved to this day: the status of the Kurdish languages and their teaching; the territorial organisation of Turkey; the challenges of democratising political life; and, finally, the future of high-profile political prisoners such as Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ – former leaders of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) who have been in prison since 2016 – and, of course, that of Abdullah Öcalan.

New developments in Syria

In Syria, a completely different dynamic is at play. During the civil war (2011–2014), a region commonly known as Rojava achieved autonomy, led by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), within which the PKK plays a dominant political role. The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 reshuffled the deck, and the new leaders in Damascus were quick to declare their intention to restore the country’s unity and sovereignty. For them, therefore, the aim is to put an end to the de facto autonomous status enjoyed by Rojava.

Recognising the failure of the negotiations, a lightning military offensive was launched at the start of the year by the troops of Ahmed Al-Charaa, Syria’s transitional president, during which the SDF, surprisingly, quickly fell apart. A memorandum of understanding was then signed on 30 January 2026, which was highly favourable to the Damascus government as it put an end to the prospect of lasting Kurdish autonomy in Rojava and enshrined the territorial reorganisation of Syria. The interim authorities in Damascus thus took control of local institutions, border posts, gas and oil fields, and the detention camps housing prisoners from the Islamic State organisation. It is then envisaged that the institutions of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) will be integrated into the Syrian state apparatus and that SDF fighters will be incorporated into the new Syrian army in accordance with a strict protocol. No mention is made of the future of the SDF’s female combat units or the foreign fighters from the PKK. The main concessions – and they are significant – are that Kurdish is recognised as a national language and may be taught freely; the Kurdish New Year, Newroz, will be a public holiday; and Syrian nationality will finally be granted to all citizens of Kurdish origin. There is therefore no recognition of self-government or self-determination, but rather the recognition of a few rights due to a minority. As can be seen, the agreement enshrines a balance of power that is not particularly favourable to the Kurdish forces.

It was in August 2026 that the negotiation process appeared to be finalised and the Kurdish political, administrative, military and security institutions integrated into the Syrian state apparatus. On 25 August, the dissolution of the SDF was announced by its leader, Mazloum Abdi, a former PKK official. He was also appointed as an adviser to Ahmed Al-Charaa on 28 August. This marks the first time in the history of modern Syria that the Kurds have been represented at the highest level of the state apparatus.

Quelques enseignements de ces évolutionSome lessons to be learnt from these developments

Looking beyond structural and cyclical differences, several observations can be made regarding the Kurdish question as it stands today in Turkey and Syria. The situations in Iraq and Iran, for their part, are very different.

Firstly, we note the failure and impasse of the armed struggle initiated by the PKK many years ago, and the possibility of the Kurdish dimension being integrated into more strictly political struggles within the two countries concerned. We are, however, at the very beginning of a new phase, the outcome of which remains to be seen before the decisions taken can truly be realised in practice and sustained over the long term. The history of the Kurdish people is littered with numerous betrayals against them, and we must remain cautious regarding the durability of the measures recently adopted; nevertheless, they do offer grounds for hope.

The consequence of this situation is the abandonment of the prospect of creating a Kurdish state – a prospect, it should be emphasised, that the PKK had already set out in theory many years ago. For some factions within the Kurdish national movement, the territorial question – and therefore that of statehood – is central – as is the case with Kurdish organisations in Iraq – whilst others state that they now refuse to adopt a state-centred perspective and instead pursue a course of action based on demands presented primarily as social and self-governing. This factor is crucial, as it reflects profound differences of opinion regarding the kind of society to be built. Should it be founded on ethnic grounds or, conversely, on the basis of a political citizenship that transcends community and identity-based affiliations? The issue remains unresolved, and often acute rivalries persist between the various branches of the Kurdish national movement.

There is also the central issue of democratic rights. Whilst the Kurdish question – which has the potential to give rise to new regional state dynamics – does not, at this stage, entail the establishment of a unified independent state, it does, on the contrary, raise the issue of opening up the political arena and establishing pluralist systems. The failures of recent protest movements, which have crystallised across the Arab world, in Iran and in Turkey, demonstrate all too clearly that the obstacles are numerous and that the regimes in power are prepared to use every means, including the most violent, to preserve their privileges. Furthermore, the deterioration—and in some cases the complete breakdown—of many state apparatuses has, in certain instances, succeeded in transforming bonds of national belonging into bonds of exclusive communal allegiance, which run counter to a process of democratic opening. This is why transition processes are infinitely complex. The only effective guarantee lies in the opportunity afforded to all peoples and all citizens, without exception, to express themselves freely, to organise themselves within associations, political parties or trade unions, to have unhindered access to the press, the internet and social media, as well as in the right of women to choose whether or not to wear the veil. These rights are not optional: they form the indispensable foundation of any democratic process. Far from being abstract or utopian, this principle represents a condition which, whilst not sufficient, is at least essential for better regulating the development of societies and international relations.

The Kurdish people are no exception to these challenges. Their right to self-determination must therefore be a principle enabling them to take control of their own future. This is all the more true given that Kurdish leaders now recognise the need to engage in the political arena, as armed struggle is no longer the sole means promoted to assert their claims. Whilst the prospect of creating a unified Kurdish state is hardly feasible, it is therefore the question of democratic, cultural and political rights that is primarily at stake for the Kurds and proves to be strategic in any emancipatory political project. This is certainly one of the key challenges facing the various components of the Kurdish national movement in the years to come. It will be unable to do without alliances with other political, trade union and civil society groups that share a vision of progressive civic emancipation, both in the region and internationally.

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Didier Billion is the author of Comprendre la question kurde, due to be published on 9 September 2026 by Armand Colin.

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This article has been translated from French into English using artificial intelligence.