Palestine, Lebanon, Syria: Netanyahu Opts for Escalation for Electoral Gain

As Israel’s general election on 27 October approaches, the escalation of Israeli attacks in Palestine, Lebanon and Syria cannot be viewed in isolation from domestic political considerations. Whilst the election will determine whether Benjamin Netanyahu remains in power, the Prime Minister has chosen to continue the violence despite various de-escalation initiatives, led in particular under Washington’s auspices.

Yet, despite being mired since his election in 2022 in corruption scandals and a highly controversial attempt at judicial reform, Benjamin Netanyahu has managed to see his government’s term through to the end – the most right-wing government in the country’s history, a first since 1973. By helping to keep the country locked in a cycle of constant confrontation, the ongoing conflicts in the region over the past three years have undoubtedly contributed to this longevity.

This sequence of events must be viewed in the context of his war against Iran. Launched by the United States on 28 February this year, this war also owes much to the pressure exerted by the Netanyahu government on the White House[1]. Since entering politics, the Prime Minister has portrayed the Iranian threat as existential to Israel’s security. In this theatre, however, Washington retains control over the conduct of the war, despite repeated calls from the Netanyahu government to extend the campaign until the Iranian regime collapses.

The situation is different in the rest of the region, where Tel Aviv is involved in several open conflicts, whilst enjoying considerable room for manoeuvre. From Palestine to Lebanon, via Syria, these three other fronts are part of the same strategy. By making the conditions for resolving the crisis more onerous – even to the point of rendering them unachievable – the Netanyahu government appears to be using regional confrontation as a means of political survival in the run-up to the election.

In Palestine, the deadlock continues due to Israel’s stance

Firstly, the annexation of the West Bank has seen an unprecedented surge since the Israeli government came to power. Its term in office has indeed been characterised by a proliferation of laws promoting settlement, a policy of forcibly displacing local populations, and economic, administrative and military support for the settlements. According to the NGO Amnesty International, during the Netanyahu government’s first three years in power, the annual budget allocated to the Ministry of Settlements increased by 122 per cent. On 18 August, the Israeli government issued a call for tenders for the ‘E1’ project, which involves the construction of more than 3,000 homes in East Jerusalem. Driven by its far-right minister Bezalel Smotrich, this plan threatens to split the West Bank in two, thereby obliterating any hope of establishing a viable Palestinian state, already undermined by settlement activity.

In Gaza, the peace initiative led by US President Donald Trump and his ‘Board of Peace’, continues to stall in the face of Tel Aviv’s hardline stance. The ceasefire and the resumption of humanitarian aid within the enclave, agreed in Sharm El-Sheikh in October 2025, have not been honoured by the Israeli side. Since then, more than 1,260 people have been killed and 4,100 injured, according to a UN report, whilst the delivery of aid continues to be hampered, with the unloading rate falling from 90 % to 77 %, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

Now it is the turn of the issue of Hamas’s disarmament and the withdrawal of the IDF – points 8 and 13 respectively of the roadmap drawn up by the Peace Council – to come up against Israeli obstruction. The Gaza-based movement continues to affirm its willingness to adhere to the agreed gradual and parallel (‘step-by-step’) process , whereby, at each verified stage of the dismantling of Hamas’s arsenal, Israel withdraws from a portion of the territory. Tel Aviv rejects this phased approach, even though it is favourable to Israel as it retains the right to scrutinise each stage. Its leaders rule out any withdrawal prior to the complete disarmament of Hamas and now add that this must be supervised by a US general.

The second point of the roadmap also provides for the creation of an International Verification Committee, tasked with certifying the implementation of the various stages of the agreement. It is to be composed of representatives from the ‘Board of Peace’, an International Stabilisation Force (ISF) and guarantor states, namely the United States, Egypt, Qatar and Turkey. However, the Israeli authorities object to the presence of representatives from Doha and Ankara on this committee. Consequently, the solution to the crisis put forward by Washington – which is already largely in line with Israeli interests – remains, once again, held up by the maximalist demands of the current government.

In Lebanon, halting the process to encourage escalation

The same logic applies to the situation in Lebanon, where the bilateral talks initiated by the Trump administration culminated, on 26 June, in a framework agreement aimed at ‘establishing lasting peace and security’. This agreement provides, in particular, for the return of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to the whole of the country, through the verified disarmament of Hezbollah and the gradual redeployment of Israeli forces out of Lebanese territory. To this end, the US initiative includes the establishment of ‘pilot zones’, which are to be gradually extended.

However, all the evidence suggests that there is a clear intention on the part of Tel Aviv to steer this process – which is already asymmetrical in the demands it has made of Beirut – towards an increasingly unfavourable balance of power for the Lebanese state, even if it means bringing it to a complete standstill. Despite the numerous ceasefires announced as part of the negotiations, Israel is continuing its aggression in southern Lebanon and has stated that its army will not withdraw ‘under any circumstances’. The argument put forward by the Israeli authorities is that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are incapable of disarming Hezbollah and that it is therefore necessary for Israel to retain control over the verification mechanism for the ‘pilot zones’. This is a debatable argument, given that the Israeli strikes are themselves largely responsible for hindering the deployment of the Lebanese army, and that Israel’s logic of occupation does little to encourage the Hezbollah resistance movement to make compromises.

The security annex to the Washington Framework Agreement specifies that the mechanism for verifying the disarmament of non-state armed groups must be operated by a ‘third party agreed upon by mutual consent’. The latest round of negotiations, held in Rome in early August, stalled over the appointment of this third party, with Tel Aviv in particular vetoing France’s participation. Similarly, the Israeli delegation insisted that inspections should include private homes, something the Lebanese army categorically refuses to allow. Ultimately, the situation led to a deadlock in the negotiations, which were postponed until the end of September without a specific date being set.

Whilst creating a deadlock through its hardline stance, Tel Aviv appears to be gradually moving towards a policy of escalation. On 15 August, an Israeli raid left 11 people dead and 19 injured – the heaviest toll since the ceasefire. Added to this are the daily bombing raids and the use of white phosphorus[2], which seem to push any prospect of residents returning to the region into the distant future.

In Syria, the struggle for regional hegemony

In this Middle East ravaged by war and violence, Syria is no exception. On 18 August, the Israeli air force bombed the Abu Dhouhour military airport, located in the province of Idlib, a few dozen kilometres from the Turkish border. Whilst Israel has occupied part of Syrian territory since the fall of the Assad regime, has stepped up strikes along its northern border as far as Damascus, and is pursuing a strategy of co-opting the Druze minority in the province of Suwayda, the location of this strike indicates an expansion of its operations. Above all, according to the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, the strikes were aimed at preventing the deployment of Turkish forces there. Ankara, which has denied any such intention, has refrained from any military response.

On the Syrian issue, US diplomacy is also at the forefront of efforts to establish a de-escalation mechanism. Its envoy, Tom Barrack – who is also the US Ambassador to Turkey – had secured the creation earlier this year of a tripartite ‘fusion cell’ to monitor the security situation and facilitate further discussions on the withdrawal of Israeli forces. However, the arrangement has remained a dead letter due to Israeli reluctance, justified by security concerns – which are debatable given the new Syrian regime’s limited military capabilities – and fears raised regarding the Turkish military presence on Syrian soil.

This development also forms part of the broader context of the growing rivalry between Ankara and Tel Aviv as they seek to project their influence in the region, against a backdrop of Iran’s waning regional influence. Turkey and Syria remain closely linked due to geography and shared political and security interests, notably the ‘Kurdish question’ . At the same time, the new regime in Damascus is dependent on the Gulf oil monarchies – foremost among them Saudi Arabia – to attract investment vital to the reconstruction of its economy. On 7 August, Turkey also concluded a tripartite agreement on ‘mutual defence and assistance in the event of aggression’ with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

Against this backdrop, the Syrian foreign minister travelled to Islamabad the very day after the Israeli strikes to discuss defence cooperation. This situation provides Netanyahu with a further arena for confrontation in the run-up to the election, as he has stated his intention to combat the “emerging radical Sunni axis”.

Escalation in the run-up to the election

Whilst each of these three fronts is driven by its own logic, the escalation unfolding simultaneously across them is nonetheless linked to the Israeli political calendar. Tellingly, Netanyahu’s political party, Likud, recently put up an election poster featuring the faces of Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei, Turkish President Erdogan, the leader of Hezbollah and even the Democratic mayor of New York, Zohran Mamdani. It was accompanied by the message: ‘They want Netanyahu to lose. Don’t let them win.’

In an election that promises to be particularly hotly contested, this electoral strategy is a major asset for the outgoing Prime Minister, who seeks to present himself as a bulwark against enemies identified as threats to Israel. It also resonates with the positions of the most radical wing of his government, with which Netanyahu allied himself to secure a majority of seats in the last election. The influential minister Itamar Ben Gvir, leader of the far-right Otzma Yehudit party, has spoken out in favour of ‘bombing Beirut’ and ‘crushing’ Lebanon, or even assassinating ‘30 to 40’ Gazans every night……

It should be emphasised, however, that support for this policy extends far beyond the ranks of the governing coalition alone. Large sections of the Israeli political class – and, by extension, Israeli society – do not fundamentally question the use of force as an instrument of its regional policy. One of its main opponents, Gadi Eizenkot, served on Netanyahu’s war cabinet during the first few months of the offensive in Gaza and is one of the architects of the ‘Dahiyye doctrine’[3], deployed in Lebanon in the early 2000s and which advocates the disproportionate use of violence against
civilian facilities.

The former Chief of Staff’s views on Israeli regional policy are particularly illuminating in this regard. Gadi Eizenkot thus condemns the framework proposed by the ‘Board of Peace’ in Gaza, accusing the current government of seeking to ‘leave Hamas in power’.In Lebanon, he advocates freedom of action for the Israeli army that would not be limited to the south, but would extend to Beirut and its suburbs. Consequently, due to the maximalist positions of the political-military establishment, the Israeli election campaign tends to encourage a climate of one-upmanship.

Washington is allowing Israel to continue its escalation

The appearance of the Mayor of New York on the Likud poster can ultimately be seen as a sign of growing concern about the shifting nature of US support for Israel. However, the differences that have recently emerged between Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu over the conduct of the war in Iran should not be equated with a break in Washington’s tolerance of Israeli hubris in the rest of the region.

In Lebanon, the recent deadly strikes were indirectly justified by the US ambassador, Michel Issa. In Gaza, the envoy Jared Kushner merely asked Netanyahu for ‘minor measures’ regarding the disarmament of Hamas. In the West Bank, whilst US Ambassador Mike Huckabee recently described Israeli settlers as “terrorists”, Washington has not openly opposed the “E1” annexation plan.
Finally, in Syria, the reservations expressed by Tom Barrack following the recent air strikes seem to reflect, above all, a fear of the conflict with Turkey escalating, rather than a fundamental disagreement over Israel’s military presence and operations in Syria.

Accordinf to Axios, the Trump administration is said to have indicated to Damascus and Ankara that a resolution to the issue would be easier to achieve after the Israeli elections. This suggests that even Washington is accommodating Netanyahu’s political timetable, even if it means effectively leaving him free to choose to escalate the situation.

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[1] See, in this regard, the book by two New York Times journalists, Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan, Regime Change: Inside the Imperial Presidency of Donald Trump (Simon & Schuster, 2026)

[2] White phosphorus is a highly flammable chemical. Classified as a conventional weapon, but subject to strict regulations, it can have disastrous long-term consequences for agricultural land.

[3] Named after the southern suburb of Beirut, which was devastated by Israeli bombing during the 2006 conflict and then again in late 2024.

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This article has been translated from French into English using artificial intelligence.