The Making of an Asymmetrical Ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon

At the conclusion of the fourth round of direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, which began on 14 April in Washington, Tel Aviv and Beirut agreed on Wednesday 3 June to implement a ceasefire subject to significant conditions. The content of this declaration may well mark a turning point in the conflict, both in terms of its provisions and the ambiguities it leaves unresolved.

On 3 June, the US State Department published a joint declaration as part of the direct talks launched between Lebanon and Israel under US sponsorship, agreeing to implement a ceasefire between the two countries. However, the day after the announcement, southern Lebanon and the Bekaa region once again came under sustained Israeli army fire, resulting in 8 deaths and 15 injuries. According to figures released by the Lebanese Ministry of Health on 7 June, the death toll since 2 March now stands at 3,613 killed, 11,072 injured and more than 1.2 million displaced.

A conditional and gradual ceasefire

In practice, the announcement issued from Washington falls short of a truce and instead resembles a framework agreement, accompanied by conditions and intended to “move towards a comprehensive peace and security agreement”. Its implementation therefore remains contingent upon the “complete cessation of Hezbollah fire” and the withdrawal of all its members from south of the Litani River. By contrast, there is no mention of an end to Israeli strikes, nor of the terms governing any possible withdrawal of its armed forces.

In addition, the declaration sets out the intention of both parties to move towards the creation of “pilot zones” in which the Lebanese army would exercise control “to the exclusion of all non-state actors”. Beyond overlooking the issue of Israeli occupation by focusing exclusively on Hezbollah, this wording suggests that the agreement is intended to be implemented in a gradual and fragmented manner, the details of which remain undefined.

Lastly, the document endorsed by Beirut adopts a particularly confrontational tone towards the Shiite party, accusing it of attempting to “hold the country hostage”. It also echoes the remarks made by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who is overseeing the negotiations, according to whom “Hezbollah is not only an enemy of Israel and the United States, but also an enemy of Lebanon”.

As a result, the tone adopted in the declaration, its imbalanced content and its partial and incremental logic prompted criticism from Hezbollah, which immediately denounced it through its Secretary-General Naim Qassem. The organisation, which continues to wage a guerrilla campaign against Israel in the South, is instead calling for a comprehensive ceasefire and rejects what it sees as a “distinction between the South and the rest of Lebanon”, one that grants Israel the “freedom to kill”.

Ensuring Israel’s security and separating Lebanon from other mediation channels

Beyond these reactions, this sequence highlights a broader evolution in the role played by US diplomacy in the Israeli-Lebanese file. In November 2024, the Biden administration sponsored a ceasefire agreement between the two countries and took responsibility for overseeing its monitoring mechanism. Subsequently, the Trump administration has also been marked by extensive and highly intrusive diplomatic involvement in the Land of the Cedars. Since then, envoys have followed one another, but the objective has remained the same: to capitalise on Hezbollah’s military setback in order to secure its disarmament, or even dismantlement, by relying both on the new leadership at the head of Lebanon’s executive and on the latitude afforded by Israeli military power.

US diplomacy in Lebanon, and more broadly across the region, continues to be guided by the same compass: preserving Israel’s interests and security. From the very first direct talks held in Washington in April, the adopted text referred to Israel’s right to “take, at any time, all necessary measures in legitimate self-defence against any planned, imminent or ongoing attack”, adding that this right would not be affected by the cessation of hostilities. This wording, already present in the November 2024 agreement and its accompanying letter, grants Israel a degree of freedom akin to preventive warfare, which is nonetheless prohibited under international law.

The result? During sixteen months of “truce”, Israel committed more than 10,000 violations according to the United Nations, in a report published in November 2025. Hezbollah, for its part, had committed none until launching six missiles and eight drones at dawn on 2 March, triggering a devastating response from Tel Aviv under the banner of “legitimate self-defence”. Even today, Israeli leaders continue to invoke the same interpretation of the negotiated framework, with the Defence Minister stating that the Israeli army would continue “operating in the security zone in southern Lebanon and retain its freedom of military action”.

Yet this series of negotiations reveals a shift absent from the 2024 agreement. It reflects Washington’s intention to isolate the Lebanese executive from other mediation channels in order to place it in a markedly unfavourable balance of power vis-à-vis Israel. The document therefore states that any agreement must be concluded directly between the two governments, under US auspices “and not through a parallel track”. As the mandate of UNIFIL is due to expire by the end of the year, Lebanon’s negotiating leverage to safeguard its security and territorial integrity appears increasingly constrained.

Likewise, the joint declaration seeks to establish an autonomous Lebanese-Israeli process, separate from the Iranian file. Tehran, which is pursuing parallel discussions with Washington in Pakistan, maintains that no agreement can be reached without an end to the Israeli offensive in Lebanon. Its attack on Israel on 7 June, in response to Tel Aviv’s strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs, follows this logic. For the Lebanese executive, this amounts to a form of interference, with the Lebanese President recently accusing Iran of using Lebanon as “a bargaining chip”. For Hezbollah, Iran’s coercive capabilities remain a strategic asset that should be leveraged in negotiations.

A management framework that risks fuelling internal tensions

Finally, this framework agreement extends beyond the question of ending hostilities and sketches out an approach to managing the thorny issue of Hezbollah’s weapons, while leaving significant ambiguities unresolved. The reference to “pilot zones” in which the Lebanese army would exercise exclusive control remains unaccompanied by any timetable or oversight mechanisms.

The text nevertheless states that the United States reiterates its “intention to support the Lebanese Armed Forces in order to strengthen their capabilities”. It adds that this commitment is based on discussions between the Lebanese and Israeli military delegations regarding a “security framework” providing for “the dismantling of non-state armed groups and preventing their re-emergence”. Washington clearly intends to play a central role in this still undefined mechanism. In April, Marco Rubio told Fox News that his administration was preparing a framework to support “certain” units of the Lebanese army by providing training, equipment and the capabilities required to “act against Hezbollah”.

This idea has circulated for some time within US policy circles, based on the assumption that the Lebanese army’s difficulties in disarming Hezbollah stem less from a lack of means than from a lack of political will, or even from the alleged subordination of some of its senior officers to the Shiite party. This view nonetheless overlooks the fact that any coercive process aimed at disarming Hezbollah through the Lebanese army carries the risk of civil war, as its commander-in-chief Rodolphe Haykal has repeatedly warned. Moreover, creating distinctions between units within the Lebanese Armed Forces would introduce a source of division into one of the country’s few institutions that transcends sectarian cleavages and whose role is to preserve civil peace. Nevertheless, there is a clear willingness in Washington to increase pressure on the Lebanese army. On 21 May, the US Treasury announced sanctions against two Lebanese officers accused of passing information to Hezbollah.

Thus, far from silencing the guns, the joint declaration of 3 June, through its asymmetrical demands and the ambiguities it maintains regarding the management of the conflict’s outcome, appears instead to deepen Lebanese divisions. Backed by the executive and rejected by Hezbollah, it crystallises the fault line between the official authorities and the Shiite party. Naim Qassem described the text as a “capitulation” and held the Lebanese leadership “responsible (…) for internal divisions”. President Joseph Aoun, for his part, responded that “the Lebanese people are not your people”. This growing polarisation will need to be monitored closely and, rather than strengthening the Lebanese state, appears above all to reinforce Israeli positions.