Germany: The Reshaping of the Political Landscape – How Far Will It Go?

Every five years, regional elections are held in the Federal Republic of Germany to renew the parliaments of the 16 Länder. These assemblies play a crucial role at national level: they elect the regional governments, which in turn appoint the representatives who sit on the Bundesrat. These local elections therefore have major political implications for the Federation. In September 2026, three major elections took place: in Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Berlin, where the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD) came out on top in the states of Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, whilst the radical left-wing party, Die Linke, won a majority in Berlin. The rise of the far right across the country and the breakthrough of the radical left in the capital are undermining the authority of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and his party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which embodies the traditional right. So how should we analyse the results of the latest elections? What is behind the rise of the far right? And what are the implications for Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s government?

An interview with Jacques-Pierre Gougeon, university lecturer and research director at IRIS, author of Germany: A Challenge for Europe (Eyrolles, 2024).

What conclusions can be drawn from the elections held in the various German federal states in September?

The last three elections in the federal states of Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Berlin share both similarities and differences. The similarities relate to the breakthrough and long-term establishment of the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD), with very high vote shares in the first two cases – 43.8 per cent and 38.2 per cent respectively – and a less impressive result in the third, at 16.2 per cent. In all three cases, the increase in vote shares is impressive compared with the previous elections: +23 per cent, +21 per cent and +7 per cent. This therefore represents a genuine upward trend. Another common feature of these elections is the collapse of the major traditional parties that have shaped German political life since the creation of the Federal Republic in 1949: Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Vice-Chancellor Lars Klingbeil’s Social Democratic Party (SPD). In Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the situation is so dire for the CDU that, with 4.9 per cent, it will not even be able to hold a seat in the regional parliament – a first since 1949, and indeed since 1946 if one takes into account the first elections organised by the Allies. Not to mention the demise of the Liberal Party, which has historically often served as a supporting force for the major parties in forming a coalition. As for the Greens, they are managing to hold their own with a significant share of the vote – for example, 14.3 per cent in Berlin, ahead of the SPD.

The differences stem from the results achieved by the SPD and the radical left-wing party Die Linke. The Social Democratic Party achieved a very poor result in Saxony-Anhalt – 9 per cent – and a disappointing one in Berlin – 12.1 per cent – a capital city long governed by that very same party, with prominent figures such as Willy Brandt and Ernst Reuter. In Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the 35.5 per cent – although lower than the AfD’s result – owes much to the charisma of the outgoing Minister-President, Manuela Schwesig, who made the campaign her own and did not hesitate to criticise her own party’s national policy within the grand coalition, particularly with regard to the pension reform, which she considers unfair, especially for those who have worked for at least 45 years and would no longer be able to retire at 63. Indeed, this issue is one of the topics that some Social Democratic MPs wish to see re-discussed with the Chancellor. She was also able to highlight her good relations with the business community in a state – Germany’s economically weakest – which is rethinking its maritime economy and seeing the defence industry grow.

As for Die Linke’s situation, it appears paradoxical. Long the favoured party in the eastern Länder, where it saw itself as their champion, it has now been largely overtaken in this regard by the AfD, securing only 9 per cent in Saxony-Anhalt and 6.5 per cent in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. In Berlin, however, it made a breakthrough with 25.7 per cent of the vote, establishing itself as the party of the young, with 43 per cent of 16–24-year-olds voting for it. With its leader, Elif Eralp – the daughter of Turkish refugees – who has highlighted the housing crisis in the German capital and championed the idea of a policy of expropriation, the party is bringing to the fore a new generation of politicians who will undoubtedly have to make compromises in order to govern. As we can see, the German political landscape is in a state of upheaval and undergoing significant change.

How can the AfD’s rise in certain federal states be explained?

The AfD’s result in the recent regional elections must be interpreted on two levels. On the one hand, there is a distinctly East German factor, given that 63 per cent of East Germans perceive themselves as ‘second-class citizens’ and that, whilst economic and social convergence between the eastern and western parts of Germany has certainly made good progress since reunification, it has been proceeding at a slower pace for several years now. In June 2026, German economists published a study with the telling title ‘The catch-up process is at risk’, highlighting the lack of private investment and skilled labour, which are holding back economic development. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in the East stands at only 75 per cent of the level in the West, productivity per worker at 85 per cent, and investment in capital goods at just 64 per cent. As regards incomes, the average gross wage in eastern Germany is 800 euros lower than in the West – a difference of 17 per cent – whilst the gap in living standards is only 8 per cent. These disparities, which are causing genuine disillusionment, are one of the arguments used by the AfD to highlight the ‘establishment parties’ lack of consideration.

This is not enough to explain the rise of this party, which leads in national opinion polls and is also achieving significant results in regional elections in the west, such as in Baden-Württemberg on 8 March 2026, with 18.8 per cent, or in Rhineland-Palatinate on 22 March 2026, with 19.5 per cent. In addition to widespread dissatisfaction with the government – whose performance is endorsed by only 13 per cent of Germans – a groundswell is affecting the two major traditional parties, the CDU and the SPD, which are losing voters to the AfD. The CDU is losing voters who consider it too ‘centrist’ and not sufficiently committed to the issue of identity. The latter is losing ground among the working classes – manual workers and white-collar workers – who no longer see it as the party of social justice. In the 2025 federal elections, 38 per cent of manual workers voted for the AfD, compared with just 12 per cent for the SPD. In Saxony-Anhalt, 60 per cent of manual workers voted for the AfD. Issues of identity and social welfare lie at the heart of this shift.

How have Friedrich Merz and his party, the CDU, reacted to these results? Could the CDU’s decline lead to a gradual breakdown of the ‘firewall’ (Brandmauer), with a view to considering an unprecedented coalition with the AfD in order to remain in power?

For Friedrich Merz, the result of these regional elections is a setback, given that he had taken office as Chancellor with the aim of halving the AfD’s share of the vote. He has been weakened both as Chancellor – and thus head of the grand coalition government – and as leader of the CDU, a section of whose grassroots membership has voiced its dissatisfaction. One wing of the party, close to business leaders and with a liberal tradition, believes that the welfare state reforms undertaken in the areas of pensions and healthcare do not go far enough – particularly due to the SPD’s obstruction – as is the case with tax reform. Hence the idea among some of a minority government, which would give the Chancellor greater freedom of action. As for the CDU’s social wing, it is calling for greater consultation with the trade unions and more attention to be paid to the most disadvantaged, who should benefit from corrective measures.

A section of the CDU – currently more so in the East than in the West – is beginning to question the ‘firewall’ or ‘cordon sanitaire’ strategy adopted towards the AfD. Some local CDU councillors have observed that, at local level, it is possible to work with AfD councillors, who are often close to the local population and their concerns. Moreover, public opinion is divided on the issue of possible cooperation with the AfD. In an opinion poll conducted in August 2026, 27 per cent of Germans said they were in favour of cooperation with the AfD, 32 per cent approved of cooperation with the AfD ‘on a case-by-case basis’ and 37 per cent rejected any form of cooperation, whilst the remainder were undecided. It is worth noting that 48 per cent of CDU supporters are in favour of cooperation with the AfD ‘on a case-by-case basis’, which shows that attitudes on this issue are shifting. This is a highly contentious issue for the CDU and risks fracturing the party.

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This article has been translated from French into English using artificial intelligence.