Is Agriculture the Cornerstone of Europe?

Agriculture has been one of the pillars of European integration, if not its main binding force. Unlike coal and steel, it was relevant to all of the founding countries. It has always held a central place in the public consciousness, since no one is immune to food security issues. This was already true 70 years ago.

When we talk about agriculture and European integration, we are referring to a long-term endeavor spanning several decades. Over the past 70 years, Europe has strengthened its agricultural production. In the aftermath of World War II, the food situation was catastrophic, and ration cards remained in use for a long time in many countries, including France.

Beyond food security, agricultural development has also facilitated land-use planning, the integration of rural areas, and, gradually, the preservation of landscapes. It has also helped ensure the safety of food consumed in Europe. Europe’s regulatory influence remains very significant in this area. These standards have inspired parts of the world, particularly in recent years, with the incorporation of more ambitious environmental considerations.

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has supported far more young Europeans than the Erasmus program. Over seven decades, it has played a major role in ensuring the daily well-being of European populations. At the same time, the CAP has consistently been a source of friction during enlargements.

The United Kingdom negotiated extensively on this issue, as well as on fisheries. When Spain and Portugal joined the Community in the 1980s, agricultural issues were already a source of tension along the Pyrenean border. Numerous debates also took place during Europe’s transition to 27, and then 28, member states: it was necessary to allocate a larger European budget, a third of which is still devoted to the CAP today, after having long accounted for two-thirds. Ultimately, over the 70 years of European integration, the bulk of the Union’s budget has been used to ensure that Europeans have a sufficient, high-quality, and diverse food supply, even if this choice has sometimes sparked controversy.

Agricultural Europe: The Paradoxes of a Common Policy

The history of European agriculture has been marked by several defining moments: production surpluses in the 1980s, followed by changes in economic policy, including the gradual phasing out of quotas in the 1990s and 2000s. European agriculture then opened up to globalization and international trade, just as the European economy as a whole did.

Over time, this evolution has revealed several paradoxes. Beginning in the early 1990s, the CAP undertook structural reforms aimed at better addressing environmental concerns, particularly under the leadership of Jacques Chirac and a France that was then influential on the European stage. Agricultural policy gradually shifted its focus more toward environmental issues and less toward production. At the same time, it became less uniform and more competitive among member states.

Finally, while Europe has a Common Agricultural Policy governing market organization and standards, it does not pursue a truly common external agricultural policy. Outside the Union’s borders, each member state acts largely as it sees fit. It participates in European trade agreements but promotes its own agricultural products, conducts its own economic diplomacy, and markets its products globally through a narrative often shaped by national identity. Discussions about Europe as a global power have therefore never given agricultural and food issues the weight they deserve. Europe has relied heavily on agriculture to unite its member states and societies, but it has struggled to speak with one voice on the international stage, as is often the case in other areas of international politics.

The Future of the CAP: Between Opportunities and Concerns

In recent years, Europe seems to be searching for its identity. Internally, it can inspire weariness, discouragement, or frustration. It is important, however, to recall the positive effects it has had, particularly in terms of mobility and the facilitation of the exchange of goods, people, and capital. We are also seeing, in several European countries, the rise of nationalist movements and criticism of Europe. On the European stage, agriculture has evolved in tandem with these political transformations.

The latest CAP reform, adopted alongside the end of the COVID-19 pandemic, notably strengthened the principle of subsidiarity by allowing each Member State to develop its own national strategic agricultural plan. This was a first since the beginning of European integration. For this policy—one of the few that is truly Community-wide—Member States have thus gained greater latitude to renationalize certain practices.

This trend is expected to intensify in the next phase. The upcoming multiannual financial framework will give Member States greater flexibility in managing their share of the European budget. The CAP, which will remain a significant component of this budget, will be affected both by the transformation of European financial architecture and by its own reform—currently under discussion—which could further reinforce national approaches.

The next multiannual financial framework, covering the period 2028–2034, will be very different. Ursula von der Leyen advocates for greater flexibility and budgetary leeway in light of the accelerating pace of the international agenda, which is no longer aligned with a seven-year rule-setting cycle. The CAP will therefore be affected by both this financial shift and its own reform. The momentum set in motion during the last reform, six years ago, is thus expected to gain momentum.

The German chancellor’s latest statements have made any budget debate on the multiannual financial framework contingent on the issue of budgetary aid to Ukraine. Budget negotiations among member states are becoming extremely complex. Several countries, including Germany and several northern member states, are calling for greater fiscal discipline and a reduction in the overall budget. Taking inflation into account, the budget for the next CAP could decrease by 20% from its current level.

Across all European countries, the upcoming CAP is therefore causing concern. However, this observation should be qualified: in several countries, farmers no longer necessarily wish to benefit from the CAP as it currently stands. Some believe that it hinders transitions, innovation, and entrepreneurship, and that it serves primarily to maintain social peace in rural areas in the short term. In their view, the CAP tends to hinder agricultural performance, whether ecological or economic. A number of farmers, who are more focused on entrepreneurship and innovation, believe that it contributes to maintaining the status quo in part of the agricultural sector.

It should be noted, however, that in many Member States, the CAP is also the primary source of income and security for farms and agricultural production. The agricultural sector is thus split in two across all countries. This divide is particularly pronounced in France, but it is also very evident elsewhere. In Italy, for example, numerous agricultural protests have taken place in the south of the country, with behaviors that reflect the two trends mentioned.

We are therefore facing a budget debate and a reevaluation of the nature of the CAP: what it is today, what it might cease to be, and what it should prioritize funding. Several stakeholders are strongly questioning it.

Ukraine at the Heart of the European Agricultural Equation

Ukraine’s role is a major factor in the European agricultural equation. As suggested in our book Russie – Ukraine : la guerre hybride, co-authored with Thierry Pouch and Arthur Portier, the agricultural issue will have a significant impact on the future of relations between Ukraine and Europe.

Ukraine will not join the European Union by giving up its agriculture, one of its main economic and geopolitical assets. The CAP, in its current form, does not, however, align with Ukraine’s agricultural identity, which is based on very large-scale production, a strong focus on exports, and high capital intensity.

Furthermore, Europe fears the consequences of Ukraine’s accession, which would further disrupt the budget balance and the allocation of CAP funds, at a time when the CAP’s budget may already be set to decrease. Yet Ukraine likely has the most competitive agricultural sector on the European continent. Production costs there are much lower than in France. Thus, if Ukraine joins the Union, the competitiveness gap between the two sectors will be considerable.

Despite the territorial losses it has suffered, Ukraine also has vast agricultural land, soil of exceptional quality, and a network of economic actors that continues to grow stronger despite the war. We must also take into account the progress made by Ukraine’s agricultural sector over the past five years: it has demonstrated both resilience and innovation, and is no longer limited to producing raw materials for export. Its agri-food industry is growing rapidly and producing processed goods with higher value added. Ukraine can also help meet a significant need in Europe: Europe has adopted broad climate and energy transition strategies to move away from oil, but does not produce enough agricultural biomass for energy purposes.

To reduce our dependence on oil, we will need more agricultural resources. A significant portion of certain European fuels already comes from biofuels. Sustainable aviation fuel is a telling example. By 2035, European airlines will have to incorporate a significant proportion of agricultural products into their fuels. The agricultural sectors will therefore be called upon to contribute to the future of air travel. More agricultural biomass is needed, but Europe does not produce enough of it. Ukraine is currently accelerating the development of catch crops and non-food crops to contribute to this production, as Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia, among others, are already doing. These countries are investing more and more in agriculture to reduce their dependence on oil—and not just to ensure their food supply. They are also seeking to reconcile this approach with the commitments made under the Paris Agreement. The European Union therefore faces a challenge in this area.

European Agricultural and Agri-Food Competitiveness

Since decisions are rarely made by all 27 member states, Europe is losing influence and the ability to make its voice heard on the world stage. Yet when the statistics for the 27 member states are combined, European agriculture and the agri-food sector are powerful. It’s a bit like the Olympic Games: if you add up the medals won by the 27 member states, Europe ranks first. But taken individually, the countries have a much more limited role on the international stage.

France is currently going through a pivotal period in its agricultural and agri-food sectors. Its situation is less favorable than it was a few years ago, particularly because it has largely turned its back on the European market. It remains strong—and in some cases even stronger—in certain distant markets, but its influence in political and budgetary negotiations in Brussels has diminished. Furthermore, the center of gravity for agricultural innovation has shifted toward Eastern Europe, particularly toward Poland, which has made significant progress over the past fifteen years.

France has primarily lost market share within the European Union. Its trade balance remains strongly in surplus outside the EU market, but last year it recorded a deficit of 5 billion euros with other European countries. Italy, Denmark, and Spain, on the other hand, have gained market share at France’s expense in recent years.

The French agricultural sector, in all its diversity, therefore risks seeing France’s political influence decline in the coming months. The country’s ability to influence the budget and defend the CAP could be weaker than ever before in the history of European integration. It is also worth noting that a member state’s payment of its contribution to the European Union is tied to conditions that determine its eligibility for EU subsidies, particularly those under the CAP.

Finally, the European Union must contend with external threats, particularly various forms of hybrid attacks. You may have heard about the incidents targeting supermarkets in Europe. They are not the only ones affected: many agri-food companies and industries have also been impacted, particularly in the seafood sector and, more broadly, in cold-chain operations. Stakeholders in these sectors are falling victim to cyberattacks.

Hybrid threats also take more concrete forms: sabotage of industrial sites, and protests that sometimes target farms, livestock-raising areas, or agri-food industries, with the aim of slowing down or disrupting logistics operations. Added to this is a particularly significant amount of multi-channel disinformation on these issues.

European agriculture is also being put to the test by global geopolitical, logistical, and maritime shocks, as well as by climate change on the continent. For a long time, we mistakenly believed that Europe would be sheltered from these upheavals and that they would primarily affect other regions of the world. European agriculture will need to learn from the experiences of many regions facing water scarcity and the challenges of maintaining production amid growing instability. When it comes to agroecology, Europeans will therefore have much to learn from other regions of the world, rather than the other way around. This is an example of the “reverse diplomacy” that is taking shape.