Expert : Europe’s military mobility is a weak spot in times of war

How would you evaluate the current state of ‘military mobility’ in Europe, and have there been any significant developments since 2022?

Gauging the real state of military mobility is a complex task. The clearest evidence of progress comes from transnational exercises, where a central focus is on timing: how long it takes individual states to approve transit or overflight requests for foreign military aircraft. This approval time is a crucial benchmark — and it varies widely between countries and across modes of transport, whether land, air, or sea.

Two things are undeniable. Land movements remain painfully slow — shifting armoured vehicles from one end of the continent to the other can take months. And while air transport is significantly faster, Europe’s capacity to move heavy cargo by air in the event of a conflict on the continent’s opposite side remains highly constrained. Taken together, this means that today, Europe’s collective response to a large-scale act of aggression would be far from efficient.

Fortunately, we have not yet reached that point. All the projects launched since 2018 and continued after 2022 still need time to yield meaningful results. There is no magic bridge or teleportation device. Building European resilience and operational effectiveness requires a wide array of resources — and, crucially, the infrastructure to support them. More on these initiatives can be found here.

Recent weeks have seen several Western media reports on military mobility, ranging from the revival of the strategic “Iron Rhine” railway linking Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany, to proposals for re-flooding drained wetlands as a natural barrier against a potential Russian ground invasion. How do you assess these initiatives?

Any initiative is worth supporting. Transnational coordination is extremely complex, so when a group of states manages to quickly establish cooperation on infrastructure, that’s a positive step. But there’s a real risk in multiplying small-scale projects: financial and human resources can become scattered rather than focused on shared priorities. That’s why managing these efforts at the European level is so important — concentrating resources is essential to achieve any meaningful results over the next decade. A bridge in Sicily, for example, would be of no practical use to either the EU or NATO, and would simply be a waste of funds.

When it comes to projects like rewetting wetlands or the Eastern Shield — a priority outlined in the EU’s Defence White Paper — these are the opposite of military mobility; they are counter-mobility measures. Two points are worth keeping in mind. First, it makes sense to invest in counter-mobility along the eastern border — “dragon’s teeth,” trenches, barbed wire, and the like — as such obstacles can slow or deter aggression. But no barrier is impenetrable, and relying on one alone to provide security is a serious mistake. Only an army can stop an army. From that perspective, we should not be dedicating as many resources to barriers as we do to our armed forces, which remain far more effective in maintaining collective deterrence.

What key steps are needed to enhance the effectiveness of military mobility in Europe, and what major challenges still lie ahead?

The top priority for states is harmonising their procedures to reduce transfer times. Within the EU, significant work is underway, particularly through the European Defence Agency. Funding from the European Defence Fund (SDMMS) is also being used to develop a shared IT platform, giving European states a single system to submit all requests for military movements and logistical support. While progress has been substantial, the process is time-consuming.

One major challenge is that many still assume that in the event of a real war, states would simply lift all barriers and allow free movement. That’s a risky mindset — as we see today, countries may not be willing to bend their own rules. On top of that, the transit request process involves many actors — border police, civilian transport authorities, regional administrations — and not all of them are familiar with military requirements or the options provided by European regulations. Ultimately, what’s needed is a kind of European military Schengen: almost seamless movement of armed forces across the continent.

When it comes to infrastructure, adapting it for military mobility is inevitably a long-term task. That’s why setting clear priorities is essential: a few key logistical corridors — running West–East and North–South — must take precedence, with the majority of funding focused there. Along these routes, it’s not just a matter of upgrading roads and airports. Equally important are the supporting services — troop accommodation, energy transport, storage for ammunition and spare parts — as well as intermodal facilities, like ports that allow vehicles arriving by sea to be transferred directly onto rail.

This is a monumental undertaking, and state funding alone won’t cut it; private investment will also be crucial. That’s where dual-use infrastructure — serving both civilian and military needs — comes into play. When not needed for military operations, it can support the civilian and commercial sectors, boosting the competitiveness of European businesses. Ultimately, investment must also cover air and sea transport, the only modes capable of delivering both speed and scale — though in maritime operations, it’s largely scale that matters.

Propos recueillis par Anastasia Krupka pour The Ukrainian Week.