Nuclear Energy Summit: how can the revival of nuclear power be approached in a context of geopolitical instability?

The second World Nuclear Energy Summit, held in Paris on 10 March 2026 in partnership with the International Atomic Energy Agency, took place against a backdrop of energy tensions and major geopolitical uncertainties. As the war in Ukraine and the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz directly affect oil and liquefied natural gas prices, the revival of nuclear power, supported by France, appears as a strategic issue. What geopolitical and energy assessment can be drawn from this second World Nuclear Energy Summit? What diplomatic priorities is France pursuing in the development of civil nuclear power? In what way had the first summit, held in Brussels in 2024, already reshaped the nuclear sector? An analysis with Teva Meyer, Associate Research Fellow at IRIS and Senior Lecturer in geopolitics and geography at the University of Haute-Alsace.

In a context marked by rising electricity demand, decarbonisation imperatives, and issues of energy sovereignty, what geopolitical and energy assessment can be made of this summit?

This summit comes at a time of a dual geopolitical context favourable to pro-nuclear messaging. The first is, of course, the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz. Its consequences on the inflation of hydrocarbon prices highlight the importance of decarbonisation strategies favouring energy systems that do not geographically depend on the Middle East.

The second is the war in Ukraine. It should be recalled that the current revival of nuclear power predates the Russian invasion. Emmanuel Macron’s Belfort speech, marking this strategic shift in France, came 12 days before the attack. At the global level, this shift was initially driven by the energy price crisis that followed the recession linked to the Covid-19 pandemic in 2021. Nevertheless, Moscow remains absent from this second World Summit, as it was from the first edition in Brussels in 2024. Rosatom, the state-owned company overseeing the Russian nuclear sector, remains the leading global player in the industry. In 2025, the group still controlled more than 40% of uranium conversion and enrichment capacities, while nearly half of the nuclear reactors exported worldwide since 2020 were Russian. It is only in the uranium mining sector that Russia struggles. Rosatom accounts for around 12% of global production, of which 5% comes from Russian mines and 7% from Kazakhstan, where its position is challenged by China. This second Nuclear Summit thus also reflects the absence of a global consensus on the role to be assigned to Moscow within the sector.

Existing strategic tensions in the sector, whether between Russia and Western countries or between the United States and Europe, were pushed into the background behind the central message: the revival of nuclear power. More symbolic than realistic given the global industrial apparatus, the objective of tripling nuclear capacity by 2050, launched at COP28 in Dubai in 2023, has been strengthened with the addition of Belgium, Brazil, China and Italy, bringing the number of signatory countries to 38.

This message was intended to support the central theme of the meeting, namely the financing of new nuclear projects. In a report published in November 2025, the consulting firm Ernst & Young estimated that $3.6 trillion in investment would be required simply to double global nuclear capacity. The challenge is not only economic but also strategic. For European and North American industrial players, having access to financing tools is essential in order to compete with Russian offerings in emerging markets. Despite messages of openness from major banks, including BNP Paribas, Bank of America, Citi and Barclays, the sector still struggles to attract private capital. By signalling strong support, the summit aimed largely to reassure investors unsettled by fluctuations in national nuclear policies.

Directly linked to this objective, the summit also emphasised technological innovation. This is expected to open up new markets for nuclear energy, such as small modular reactors designed to be integrated into countries where electricity systems cannot support large-scale reactors, or to meet the needs of new consumers: data centres, hydrogen producers, and industrial actors seeking heat. Finally, innovation was also at the heart of discussions for its role as a vector of geopolitical resilience. The development of new reactor models, foremost among them fast neutron reactors, is presented as a necessity to reduce dependence on imports of natural uranium.

What are France’s diplomatic priorities in the field of civil nuclear power, and who are its key international partners on this issue?

The objective of the French government is to create the international framework for a revival of nuclear power that benefits its industrial base and facilitates the implementation of the national strategy to build six new European Pressurised Reactors (EPR) by 2042. It should be recalled that the French Nuclear Energy Industry Group (GIFEN) estimates that 3,200 companies are involved in the nuclear sector in France, around 200 of which depend structurally on it for their order books. The organisation also reported nearly 220,000 direct jobs, a level comparable to that of the aeronautics sector.

Paradoxically, the existence of this comprehensive yet complex industrial base gives rise to sometimes divergent strategic interests, which French diplomacy must reconcile. The case of Orano and EDF provides a telling illustration. Orano’s management, which extracts, converts and enriches uranium for a diversified and predominantly non-French client base, has on several occasions supported the adoption of a stricter policy regarding imports of nuclear fuel from Russia. In order to undertake new investments, whose amortisation typically exceeds a decade, the company requires visibility regarding the volumes of materials that Rosatom may or may not continue to sell on European and North American markets.

EDF, for its part, has historically favoured a strategy of diversifying its supplies, relying on several suppliers who themselves source from different mines. While Russia is no longer part of its traditional portfolio of enriched uranium imports, Rosatom still plays a role in the conversion of reprocessed uranium belonging to EDF and used to supply the Cruas nuclear power plant in southern France. At the same time, EDF maintains an industrial relationship with Rosatom through its subsidiary Arabelle Solutions, based in Belfort, which manufactures steam turbines, some of which equip plants exported by Russia.

French diplomacy therefore adopts a differentiated approach, tailored to the diversity of issues. Within the European Union, the primary objective was to modify the institutional frameworks that limited nuclear financing. This notably included the inclusion of nuclear energy in the green taxonomy enabling access to sustainable finance, eligibility for contracts for difference (a public support mechanism aimed at stabilising electricity prices), as well as changes in the position of the European Investment Bank. In this context, France initially relied on the Swedish, Finnish and Czech governments to establish the Nuclear Alliance, intended to counterbalance the influence of anti-nuclear positions advocated by Germany, Austria, Luxembourg and Ireland.

At the global level, the French strategy pursues a dual objective. On the one hand, it aims to secure the supply of natural uranium by consolidating relations with historical suppliers (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Canada) while developing new partnerships, notably with Mongolia and Brazil. On the other hand, France participates in the so-called “Sapporo-5” group, alongside Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, in order to reduce Russian influence in nuclear fuel supply chains.

What are the main geopolitical reconfigurations surrounding nuclear power since the first World Nuclear Summit held in Brussels in 2024?

Three main geopolitical reconfigurations can be identified. The first, already mentioned, is the transformation of the global financial frameworks for nuclear power. It is now much easier for a European country to intervene in its domestic market to ensure economic conditions conducive to investment. The stabilisation of selling prices over several decades through these mechanisms has been crucial in the approval of the construction of the Lubiatowo reactors in Poland and Dukovany II in the Czech Republic. These developments stem primarily from diplomatic efforts within the European Union.

The second reconfiguration lies in the growing awareness of the geopoliticisation of nuclear power, both in North America and in Europe. The Trump administration has made nuclear power one of the pillars of its “energy dominance” agenda, aimed at securing autonomy over its fuel cycle, accelerating the development of new reactors by reducing licensing procedures, and developing new cooperation agreements to export its technologies, as illustrated by the most recent 123 Agreement signed with Armenia in February 2026. In Europe, efforts have primarily focused on restoring autonomy in industrial supply chains, exemplified by EDF’s reacquisition of its subsidiary Arabelle Solutions in 2024 from the American company General Electric, or by Framatome’s relocation to Le Creusot of the manufacturing of reactor vessel components previously subcontracted abroad.

The final reconfiguration concerns efforts at strategic decoupling from Russia in the nuclear fuel sector. Investments undertaken in the enrichment sector are expected to increase production capacities in Europe and North America by around 20% by the end of the decade. While other projects are under discussion, particularly in the United States, this increase will not fully compensate for the volumes currently imported from Russia by Western countries. Finally, the past two years have also been marked by diversification among Central European countries, all of which, including Hungary, have signed nuclear fuel supply contracts with suppliers other than Rosatom for their Soviet-designed reactors.

However, several issues remain unresolved. Firstly, the European Union remains divided on the position to adopt towards Russia. To date, there are no sanctions on Russian imports in the nuclear sector comparable to those affecting hydrocarbons. Moreover, Central European countries continue to favour American actors for their new nuclear programmes, to the detriment of European partners.

Secondly, the question of future natural uranium supply remains uncertain, despite statements from international institutions warning that the expansion of nuclear power globally may be constrained by insufficient extraction. Here again, the challenge is to reassure industry players regarding the sustainability of nuclear policies and to stabilise raw material prices at a level sufficient to justify new investments.