Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Tokyo and Seoul: Protecting Europe and the Indo-Pacific in the face of US interventionism and international crises?

From 31 March to 3 April 2026, the President of the Republic will visit two leading Asian powers, Japan and South Korea, both considerably shaken by the succession of crises triggered by the United States, their principal ally and sole guarantor of their security. Can their shared unease, largely echoed by France, translate into the revival of more active bilateral cooperation, particularly in the fields of security, the defence industry and new technologies? Through its G7 presidency and the forthcoming June Summit to which Japan and South Korea have been invited, France intends to launch initiatives concerning the Middle East, including a possible coalition of willing countries to secure the energy supply chains dependent on the region, including the principal maritime passages from the Red Sea to the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb.

However, the initial objective of this trip, including the state visit to South Korea, the first in 11 years, remains the strengthening of ties with two middle powers with which politico-military cooperation lacks a structuring framework despite a strong attachment to multilateralism and the rejection of power politics.

A deeper relationship between France and two democracies with advanced industrial and technological capabilities would help strengthen a Europe and an Indo-Pacific considerably worried at a time when Washington’s traditional partners and allies are attempting not to be drawn into a conflict launched by Donald Trump without consultation. China, meanwhile, although also shaken in energy terms, continues to draw closer to Russia, whose military equipment supports Iran in its war against the United States, thereby shaping a dangerous front in which a nuclear-armed and increasingly unconstrained North Korea is also participating.

The recognition of a highly asymmetrical security dependence on the United States

Japan and South Korea have many politico-military lessons to draw from observing the coordinated US-Israeli attack against Iran and its repercussions in the Indo-Pacific. It was indeed the degree of interoperability existing between the two armed forces, particularly their air forces, that constituted one of the factors behind the success of the launch of Operation Epic Fury in the first hours of the strikes against the Iranian capital on 28 February 2026. Such a degree of strategic integration does not exist between Japanese and US armed forces, nor even between South Korean and American forces despite their extensive experience of large-scale joint inter-service exercises with live-fire operations such as Ulchi Freedom Shield. While for years Tokyo aspired to become in Asia the equivalent of what British forces represent for the United States within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), another model is now emerging before the eyes of America’s two principal allies in Asia, reduced to the status of junior partners.

Yet from Europe to the Indo-Pacific, US allies are being severely tested. Their territories are regarded as a reservoir of forces and equipment subject to rights of pre-emption according to operational requirements. Their military capabilities, particularly naval assets, are likewise treated as auxiliary forces that can be mobilised on demand, as illustrated by Donald Trump’s pressure to establish a maritime policing operation to secure the Strait of Hormuz, locked down by the Revolutionary Guards since the end of February. South Korea feels particularly vulnerable in the face of North Korea as it has seen its missile defence assets (Patriot missiles and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems) stripped away by the United States for transfer to the Middle East.

There are also suspicions that beneath an apparent diplomatic prudence and posture of restraint, China is not inactive on the Middle Eastern theatre. According to certain sources, Chinese satellites are reportedly providing Tehran with real-time intelligence on US force deployments and the reinforcement of offensive and air defence capabilities at pre-positioned bases in the Gulf (arrivals of F-35As, F-15Es, A-10Cs and the THAAD system).

In this anxiety-ridden context, and faced with Donald Trump’s security blackmail, Japan and South Korea, both of which have substantially increased their military budgets, are seeking new partners. Japan has just appointed an ambassador to NATO and has intensified its strategic dialogue with the European Union.

An energy impact that weakens Tokyo and Seoul more than China

Tokyo and Seoul could not fail to note that, after Venezuela, the United States did not hesitate to target China’s second close partner and indispensable energy supporter in terms of energy supplies. This new blow to Chinese growth, delivered in less than a month, could have helped widen the strategic room for manoeuvre of US allies and partners from the Indo-Pacific to Europe, where China’s political, economic and commercial influence has expanded considerably, posing a potential threat to global supply chains. Yet this has not happened and, for the time being, with oil prices above 100 dollars per barrel, heavily industrialised European and Asian economies are suffering. Japan has been particularly affected, with Middle Eastern oil dependency accounting, according to economists, for between 65% and 90% of its oil requirements. South Korea faces a similar situation, its energy system relying almost entirely on imports.

China’s position appears less difficult even though it is the world’s leading importer of crude oil and one of the principal purchasers of LNG. It buys more than 40% of its crude oil from the Gulf while having, since the invasion of Ukraine, strengthened its ties with Russia, which supplies it at low prices. Moreover, the coal reserves available to Beijing enable it to compensate for any shortage of gas or crude oil, of which it possesses substantial reserves. Even deprived of Iranian supplies following those from Venezuela, it is not certain that Beijing would see its economic growth threatened, particularly as its vessels appear able to transit the Strait of Hormuz without difficulty, having been classified by Iran as a “non-hostile” power. This is an advantage not enjoyed by major Western shipping companies, from the Danish Maersk to the French CMA-CGM.

A second point of crisis has also emerged in the Red Sea with the Houthis. When they targeted commercial navigation in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait at the end of 2023, the global economy was severely disrupted. Container traffic through the Red Sea fell by 90% within three months and the rerouting of ships around the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa, adding ten extra transit days, increased fuel costs by one million dollars per voyage, driving up freight rates between Asia and Europe. The United States then carried out strikes and conducted an air campaign using precision munitions, some costing millions of dollars per interceptor, whose consumption significantly depleted its stockpile of high-precision missiles. This situation is now catching up with Washington and encouraging it to suspend without hesitation deliveries of air defence missiles intended for Ukraine and paid for by Europeans.

Two Asian powers seeking new strategic room for manoeuvre that France and Europe could provide

China is observing the military situation with renewed attention in order to draw valuable lessons for its own strategic objectives. Can the United States wage war on two theatres simultaneously? A Middle East requiring long-term crisis management could quickly exhaust American military capabilities by tying down warships, fighter aircraft, weapons systems and munitions that the Pentagon requires to continue exercising its deterrence mission in the Indo-Pacific. Conversely, a stable Middle East, without the Iranian disruptor and its direct supporters (the Houthis) and indirect supporters (China and Russia), and in which the Gulf monarchies remained close to Washington, could be managed with a lighter footprint. This would free up decisive combat power for the Indo-Pacific, which US political and military circles, echoed by the country’s think tanks, have long designated as the priority theatre, focusing studies and war games for years on the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

If, in the short or medium term, a crisis were to erupt, whether in Taiwan or on the Korean Peninsula, the United States would require allied nations, from Asia to Europe, to support it, whether militarily or in politico-economic terms. Beyond a large-scale logistical and operational effort placing Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Australia on the front line, the effectiveness of a possible coalition would depend on establishing sufficiently deterrent costs for “belligerent actors” in terms of sanctions, technological exclusion and financial restrictions, in which the European Union would have a role to play. These prospects now appear highly hypothetical, blurred by the contours of a succession of interdependent crises, from Europe to the Near and Middle East, where the effects of the war in Ukraine and those of 7 October interact with unpredictable long-term consequences.

President Macron’s visit to East Asia therefore comes at a particularly disorderly and dangerous international moment. Nevertheless, politico-military convergence has never been stronger between France, Japan and South Korea, all seeking greater strategic autonomy both from the United States and from China and Russia. France, as a European power, is also a resident and active Indo-Pacific power with territories, military forces and permanent strategic interests in the region. It has repeatedly demonstrated its operational credibility and power projection capabilities through the regular deployments of the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, nuclear attack submarines and combat naval groups. Since 2018, the French Air and Space Force has organised periodic operational missions in the Indo-Pacific through the Pégase mission. France’s Indo-Pacific commitments, as well as its broader global engagements, illustrate its capacity to intervene concretely in support of international security in a crisis environment. This capability also reflects a broader understanding of the interdependence of theatres, between Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic stability, in which Japanese and South Korean military capabilities and defence industrial resources have a full role to play.

Strengthening frameworks for dialogue and cooperation through a multiscalar approach

Relations and the many exchanges developed between France, Japan and South Korea undoubtedly need to be intensified at bilateral, European and global levels alike. These different levels can complement one another without undermining the development of distinct personal relationships. France’s relationship with Japan is longstanding and extremely rich at the diplomatic and political levels, whereas the bilateral relationship with South Korea appears above all driven by economic and commercial exchanges despite the shared historical memory linked to France’s participation in the Korean War. Moreover, both countries have heavily essentialised their security relations with the United States and, in Japan’s case, the constraints linked to the country’s pacifist constitution have limited the scope of their cooperation, particularly in security matters. Such caution is no longer appropriate today. Maritime security, including participation in the protection of international sea lanes and energy trade routes in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, constitutes an obvious field of coordination for the navies of the three countries and has in fact already existed since the anti-piracy operations launched by the international community in the Indian Ocean in 2008. The presence of the Japanese navy in Djibouti since 2016 could be utilised in this regard. Other operational interactions could also be developed between Paris, Tokyo and Seoul in the fields associated with grey-zone activities, namely space, cyber and the protection of sensitive infrastructure.

Furthermore, while cooperation between France and Japan falls within the framework of an “exceptional partnership” implemented through a precise roadmap (2023-2027), relations with South Korea would benefit from greater institutionalisation at a time when 2026 marks the 140th anniversary of the establishment of relations between Paris and Seoul. Defence cooperation between France and South Korea already includes substantial exchanges in the cyber, space and technological fields. French and Korean industries, both highly capable, offer significant potential for increased industrial cooperation, particularly in the naval, aeronautical and missile defence sectors, as well as in dual-use technologies.

More broadly, France’s consultations with East Asia’s two principal powers, Japan and South Korea, should devote considerable attention to the management of international crises. The Near and Middle East, support for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia, stability in East Asia and the North Korean question will feature prominently on their respective agendas. Relations with China undoubtedly constitute a matter of particular importance for all three countries. On these issues, the objective of Emmanuel Macron’s visit, which also includes a significant economic and commercial dimension, should be to highlight a dynamic of regular consultation between middle powers sharing the same vision of the strategic transformations currently under way.