New Us Sanctions Against Russia: What Impact Will They Have on Russo-American Relations?

On the night of 16–17 September 2026, the US Congress enacted, for the first time since Donald Trump’s return to the White House, new economic sanctions against Russia, specifically targeting its hydrocarbons and its ‘ghost fleet’, thereby also affecting countries importing Russian gas and oil, including India and China. This new bill has raised fresh questions about Russian-American relations. What are the main objectives of the new economic sanctions imposed by Donald Trump? How is Russia reacting to them? Could they undermine relations with its allies? Finally, what can we deduce from this about Russian-American relations? We take a closer look with Igor Delanoë, a research fellow at IRIS specialising in Russian geopolitics.

What are the main objectives of these new economic sanctions imposed by Donald Trump? What stance is Russia taking in response to the sanctions?

These sanctions serve a dual purpose. On the one hand, with the mid-term elections approaching – and looking set to go badly for Donald Trump – they are intended to silence critics across the Atlantic who claim that the US president is ‘caving in’ to Vladimir Putin. It is worth noting that Donald Trump’s approval rating has plummeted to 32 per cent, the lowest level ever recorded for the current occupant of the White House. Secondly, these ‘devastating’ sanctions, as the US press describes them, are also intended to force China and India – the two main buyers of Russian crude – to significantly reduce their purchases. It is also a move by the US administration to gain additional leverage over these countries, with whom it is engaged in a power struggle over the trade deficit and customs tariffs. This manoeuvre echoes the pressure exerted by Washington in late 2025 on India in particular, in the form of threats, to ensure that New Delhi – then Russia’s largest customer for oil purchases – reduced its imports of Russian crude. Whilst the war against Iran continues in a more or less latent form and navigation through the Strait of Hormuz remains dangerous, it is conceivable that the US President wishes to favour American oil tankers with Asian customers. Ceci dit, ces sanctions sont de nature à accroître les tensions sur le marché international et, notamment, la hausse des prix de l’essence et de l’énergie en Europe. That said, these sanctions are likely to increase tensions on the international market and, in particular, lead to a rise in petrol and energy prices in Europe.

Faced with this decision, Moscow can only take note and voice its criticism. Although it remains unlikely, it remains to be seen whether Russia will take retaliatory measures in the areas of civil nuclear power and the export of rare metals to the United States; these are two areas where Russian-American cooperation continues. However, on Monday 21 September, Vladimir Putin signed a decree aimed at placing the assets of the Russian subsidiary of AptarGroup, an American company based in Illinois specialising in the manufacture of packaging, ‘under external administration’. The assets have been seized and ‘temporarily’ transferred to a Russian company, H&N. This is clearly a retaliatory measure following the adoption of these new sanctions by Donald Trump. It also marks a turning point, as until now, US companies had been spared from such confiscations ordered by the Kremlin, unlike European companies, which have borne the brunt of them and continue to be targeted from time to time.

Given its economic situation, what room for manoeuvre does Russia have in the face of these sanctions? Whilst Russia had put in place strategies to circumvent previous Western sanctions, could these strategies continue to be effective given that these US sanctions also target the five main importers of Russian gas and oil, including India and China?

Apart from the fact that oil prices have risen in recent days and that demand in Asia remains strong, Russia’s room for manoeuvre is limited. Recently, Russian oil sales have surged, particularly in the Far East, against a backdrop of instability in the Middle East, and notably following the attack on the east-west oil pipeline in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, during the week of 7 September, crude oil export revenues soared to $2.4 billion, representing a weekly increase of $620 million, bringing the level of Russian oil exports back to where it stood at the end of May 2026. ESPO (Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean) crude, loaded in the Far East and sold to Chinese refineries, was trading at $12.50 above the price of Brent, or $117.10 per barrel. Urals, which is the benchmark grade for Russian oil, was selling at a premium of $6 per barrel, and even as high as $20 above the Brent price in mid-September. This is therefore a long way from the price cap imposed by the G7, set at $44.1 per barrel since 1 February 2026. Under this measure, any country purchasing Russian oil above this price faces sanctions…

In other words, Russia’s room for manoeuvre lies in strong Asian demand – which is also why Donald Trump imposed these sanctions – and the lack of viable alternatives for importers. It therefore remains to be seen whether the Indians and the Chinese will comply, or take the risk and expose themselves to US sanctions by continuing their purchases at the same rate. They may also continue them whilst reducing volumes. The Chinese already demonstrated last year that they were prepared to take the risk by purchasing oil transhipped in Chinese ports from vessels subject to sanctions. Ultimately, the focus of the debate is shifting more towards bilateral relations between Washington and the buyers of Russian oil, rather than between Moscow and Washington. Whether purchases of Russian crude continue or decline will, at heart, reflect a balance of power between the Americans and the buyers of Russian crude, rather than anything else.

Given that Donald Trump seemed to be taking a softer line on Vladimir Putin in recent months, how can this U-turn be explained? More broadly, what assessment can be made of the evolution of Russian-American relations?

A distinction must be drawn between personal matters and the balance of power between states. Donald Trump has, in fact, always maintained that he ‘gets on well’ with Vladimir Putin, and he is no doubt resentful that Putin did not accept the US conditions for a ceasefire in Ukraine in the spring of 2025. However, these new sanctions are aimed just as much at securing a better position for US oil companies as at providing the White House with fresh leverage over Beijing and New Delhi. It is worth noting that Donald Trump imposed them just before the United Nations General Assembly – an international institution he detests – and after the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit, held in Bishkek on 1 September, and the BRICS summit, which took place on 13 September in New Delhi. Even if he does not necessarily understand how these organisations operate, he must surely perceive a form of hostility in their respective agendas towards American dominance, and in particular that of the dollar. In other words, these sanctions are also intended, in my view, to bring these Eurasian countries – including Russia – to heel regarding their ambition to reshape the international order in favour of greater multipolarity and the de-dollarisation of trade (with the exception of India, which is more cautious on this issue).

As for Russian-American relations, they have gone through three phases since Donald Trump’s return to the White House: a phase of renewed dialogue and stabilisation of the confrontation, during the winter and early spring of 2025. This first phase was crucial as it put an end to the unchecked deterioration in relations that had prevailed since 2022 under the Biden administration. Russian-American relations then went through a period of turbulence caused by disillusionment on the American side regarding their ability to resolve the war in Ukraine quickly. Threats and ultimatums were issued by Washington towards Moscow during the summer of 2025, and this phase came to an end with the meeting between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump in Anchorage. This summit succeeded in halting this negative dynamic and restarting contacts between the Russians and the Americans. A third phase thus began, characterised by occasional contacts between Russian and American representatives and the fruitlessness of the trilateral talks – between Russia, the United States and Ukraine – on the Ukrainian issue, without this, however, leading to an escalation in Russian-American relations. This phase, however, led to another disappointment – this time on the Russian side – as the Russians came to believe, following Anchorage, that there was at least a tacit agreement with Washington on the terms for resolving the war in Ukraine. In a way, we are still in that phase today.

Depending on the outcome of the US mid-term elections, we could enter a new phase of Russian-American tensions, characterised – why not? – by a resumption of direct US aid to Ukraine. It is also conceivable that relations will remain in this post-Anchorage plateau phase until the end of Donald Trump’s term of office, with a trilateral dialogue that will at least have the merit of existing. What is certain is that in Moscow, little is now expected of the current US administration regarding the resolution of the war in Ukraine.

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This article has been translated from French into English using artificial intelligence.