Ethiopia: The Difficult Task of Stabilising Tigray

On 16 October 2026, the Ethiopian Prime Minister announced the establishment of a six-month interim administration in Tigray. This decision follows a new offensive by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). According to the Ethiopian government, the aim of this new administration is to restore a stable political climate in order to organise free elections. Given the TPLF’s capabilities, however, the establishment of the interim administration raises numerous questions about the stabilisation of the region. What security challenges does it pose? How might relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea be affected? What could the implications be for the countries of the Horn of Africa? We take a closer look with Patrick Ferras, lecturer at IRIS Sup’ and president of the African Strategies Association.

What is the current state of affairs in Tigray, a region that has been marked for several years by the conflict between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front?

It is worth recalling some background information. Following the 2020–2022 civil war, the Pretoria Agreement (CoHA – Cessation of Hostilities Agreement), signed between the federal government and representatives of Tigray (TPLF), provided for the establishment of an ‘Inclusive Regional Administration’ in this region-state. Its purpose was to act as the main point of contact for relations between the state and Tigray (economic recovery, humanitarian needs, and the disarmament of Tigrayan forces). From the outset, the TPLF, the region’s long-standing political party, was ousted from regional power, and relations with this administration remained highly strained. In April and May 2026, the TPLF, which was barred from standing in the parliamentary elections on 1 June[1], seized the regional headquarters in Mekelle, and Gebremichael Debretsion, its president, took control. From that point on, relations with Addis Ababa were bound to become strained and deteriorate. Abiy Ahmed’s party, the Prosperity Party (PP), won the elections, but the appointment could not be made official until 5 October[2]. By cutting off Tigray’s financial and indeed economic resources, the Prime Minister has shown restraint. As 5 October approached, the TPLF’s Tigrayan forces (TDF – Tigray Defence Forces) launched an offensive which failed to achieve the desired results, as they came up against well-organised National Defence Forces (ENDF) supported by Tigrayan forces dissident from Debretsion’s. By early October, the ground had been recaptured from the TDF, and federal troops were welcomed with joy in most of the major cities[3]. The TPLF nevertheless retains significant capacity to cause disruption. At the same time, the Eritrean troops stationed in Tigray to assist the TDF quickly withdrew from Ethiopian territory.

Meanwhile, tensions have escalated between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Addis Ababa has closed its embassy in Eritrea and declared ten Eritrean diplomats persona non grata. Asmara has done the same.

In what way does the Ethiopian Prime Minister’s announcement on 16 October regarding the establishment of a six-month federal interim administration in Tigray constitute a breach of the 2022 Pretoria peace agreements? What are the security implications for the country as a whole?

Since his appointment to a second five-year term[4], Abiy Ahmed has decided to appoint a caretaker administration for six months (the Federal Government’s Caretaker Administration for the Tigray Regional State). For Ethiopians, the 2022 Pretoria Agreement remains the basis for cooperation between the federal authorities and those of Tigray. Through this move, the Prime Minister is regaining control and undoing the ‘TPLF coup’ of May 2026. The aim of this Addis Ababa-led administration will be to restore peace and security and to facilitate the holding of elections. Indeed, Tigray currently has no representatives in Parliament. The conflict situation created by the TPLF had forced Addis Ababa to refrain from organising elections in this region.

Security concerns remain significant. At the end of September 2026, seven armed groups[5] have formed an alliance to overthrow Abiy Ahmed’s government: the ‘Ethiopian People’s Forces Coalition for Survival’. We find it difficult to discern the true objectives of such an alliance. Indeed, the main movements that make up the coalition were opposed to one another during the 2020–2022 conflict, and their political objectives are entirely different.

The TPLF’s rapprochement with Eritrea is highly surprising and appears to gloss over the atrocities committed by Eritrea’s armed forces during the last conflict (rapes, looting). Eritrea stood alongside Ethiopia in bringing the TPLF to its senses[6].

This coalition will lack cohesion, coordinated command and sufficient numbers of well-armed troops to defeat the Ethiopian army. We will see fighting in the Tigray region, guerrilla actions and the occasional capture of villages, but the federal army is likely to remain in control. The other regions are still affected by the actions of their various armed groups, and it remains difficult to envisage a swift end to the fighting despite Abiy Ahmed’s appeal.

In the Horn of Africa, coalitions and alliances are very often short-lived and their ideological foundations very fragile.

To what extent does the instability in Ethiopia increase the risk of conflict with its neighbour, Eritrea? And what might the consequences be for the countries of the Horn of Africa?

By hastily withdrawing from Ethiopian territory during the ENDF offensive, Eritrea demonstrated that the positions it had put forward on state sovereignty at the meeting in Egypt were not credible. Its assistance should be limited to the supply of arms or logistical support, but it should not intervene on Ethiopian soil. Any provocation could lead to an Ethiopian intervention on Eritrean territory, against the backdrop of Ethiopia’s desire to have a port on the Red Sea. Hosting TDF troops would have the same effect, and Eritrea would find itself very much on its own on the military chessboard of the Horn of Africa.

This region is already a hotbed of turmoil. Sudan is seeing two armies facing off on its soil, whilst South Sudan is set to hold, at the end of December, a sham presidential election that has been postponed several times. Somalia, whose president is overseeing a six-month transition, has been unable to organise elections, and its armed forces, without the assistance of the African Union mission, would be powerless to combat al-Shabaab. Military support for either side is unlikely to alter the military balance in a conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, should one break out.

At regional and continental level, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD, one of Africa’s eight major economic communities) and the African Union will not be key players in the search for peaceful solutions or preventive diplomacy.

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[1] The TPLF did not meet the criteria for a political party.

[2] The Ethiopian Constitution stipulates that the Prime Minister is appointed by the party or coalition that won the elections (in early October).

[3] The people of Tigray no longer want war and have fled the TDF’s recruitment drives. The TPLF, a long-established party, appears to be playing its last cards, but no longer enjoys the popular support it had in 2020.

[4] He had succeeded the resigning Prime Minister (Haile Mariam Dessalegn) from 2018 to 2021. Elected in 2021, the Prosperity Party re-elected him to office in 2026.

[5] The Alliance for Survival comprises mainly the TPLF from the Tigray region, the Fano from the Amhara region and the OLA (Oromo Liberation Army) from the Oromo region.

[6] Since the Pretoria Agreement, relations between the two states have been appalling.

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This article has been translated from French into English using artificial intelligence.