COP31: Challenges and Prospects for the African Continent

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  • Christian Pout

    Christian Pout

    Chair of the CEIDES think tank

As COP31 gets underway in Antalya, Türkiye, could you give us an update on the state of climate diplomacy at a global level?

COP31 is opening against the most challenging backdrop since the 2015 Paris Agreement. The energy crisis linked to the war in the Middle East, rising prices and the budgetary difficulties faced by many governments are weighing on climate ambition. The first day confirmed this: the opening ceremony began an hour and a half late, as negotiators had become deadlocked the previous day over demands from developing countries to include financing on the agenda…

The scientific consensus has become more definitive. The report by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), published on 21 October, concludes that the 1.5°C target – with no overshoot or only a limited overshoot – is no longer achievable. Under current policies, global warming could reach 2.8°C over the course of the century, and 2.6°C if all Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) are implemented. To limit the peak to 1.7 or 1.8°C, emissions would need to be reduced by 18 per cent by 2030, 45 per cent by 2035 and 69 per cent by 2040 compared with 2025 levels. However, global emissions are stagnating at around 58.4 gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent (GtCO₂e) in 2025. The synthesis report from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), published on 27 October, points in the same direction: current commitments would reduce global emissions by only around 6 per cent in 2035 compared with 2019, and by around 9 per cent if fully implemented. This highlights a twofold problem: the inadequacy of the commitments and the slow pace of their implementation. On the ground, this has been an exceptional year: between January and September, the global average temperature exceeded pre-industrial levels by around 1.47°C, and the ongoing El Niño event became, in October, the strongest ever recorded.

It should also be noted that the diplomatic landscape has changed. The United States has chosen to withdraw: its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement took effect on 27 January, and it did not send an official delegation, following the decision on 7 January ordering the withdrawal from 66 organisations, including the UNFCCC. Its share of the Convention’s budget was 22 per cent. Nevertheless, more than a hundred US governors, mayors and elected representatives are attending the conference. The cutbacks also affect multilateral funds: according to the chair of the African Group of Negotiators (AGN), the replenishment of the Global Environment Facility has fallen by around 38 per cent compared with previous cycles.

Furthermore, two new trends are emerging. The first is institutional: Turkey is managing the venue and voluntary initiatives, whilst Australia is leading the negotiations – an unprecedented arrangement. The second is the rise of coalitions outside the UN framework. In April, the Santa Marta conference brought together 57 countries, representing a third of the global economy, to work on phasing out fossil fuels. A second conference will be held in early 2027 in Tuvalu, co-organised with Ireland.

The crux of the debate now centres on the distribution of efforts and costs: who should do more, who should provide the funding, and how can we safeguard development opportunities for countries in the Global South? Climate diplomacy is becoming more fragmented and more pragmatic. UN multilateralism remains the only universal framework, but it is now moving at the pace of its least eager members, prompting some economists to propose replacing consensus with qualified majority voting. However, this debate is not on the agenda in Antalya…

Why do most analysts view COP31 as the conference on implementation? What exactly is it all about?

Because we need to address the issue of implementing what has already been decided. The COP31 Presidency explicitly places concrete and measurable results at the heart of its action programme. Its president, Mr Murat Kurum, Turkey’s Minister for the Environment, Urbanisation and Climate Change, stated at the opening that decisions must be reflected in urban infrastructure, on farmers’ fields, on factory production lines and in households’ electricity bills, as their value becomes apparent when they impact people’s lives. However, the term ‘COP of implementation’ refers to a political priority, not a specific status or a guarantee of success.

This ambition is, moreover, not new. COP30 in Belém, Brazil, had already established a ‘global implementation accelerator’. Admittedly, a distinction must be made between negotiated decisions and initiatives taken by the presidency. Thus, the Brazilian roadmaps on fossil fuels and forests, presented prior to Antalya, are voluntary; they do not constitute new international obligations.

Let us first consider the issue of finance. The Baku–Belém Roadmap targets 1,300 billion dollars (USD) per year by 2035, in support of the 300 billion public finance target. For the first time, two financial issues feature on the agenda: the funding owed by developed countries under Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, and the alignment of financial flows under Article 2.1c.

With regard to adaptation, Belém called for adaptation funding to be at least tripled by 2035, without setting a baseline. The World Resources Institute takes the Glasgow target – approximately 40 billion dollars per year – as an implicit baseline and derives a target of around 120 billion from this, but this figure does not appear in the decision. Belém also adopted 59 adaptation indicators, which are voluntary and explicitly do not entail any new financial obligations. On the just transition, Belém decided to establish a mechanism for international cooperation and technical assistance. Antalya is to set out its governance and the first work programme, with a view to launching it operationally at COP32.

Finally, Antalya marks the start of the second global stocktake under the Paris Agreement – the five-year review provided for in Article 14. It will cover the period 2024–2028 and conclude in November 2028. Its findings are intended to help countries strengthen their next contributions.

The issue of loss and damage clearly illustrates the gap between decision-making and implementation. On 22 October, the dedicated Fund took its most significant decision to date: $21.6 million was allocated to Nepal following a deadly glacial flood – the first approval in the Fund’s four-year history. The $342 million set aside for the first cycle covers around one-eighth of the claims. Developed countries have pledged $822 million to the Fund and have paid in $449 million.

The Turkish presidency has added its own roadmap: to increase the share of electricity to 35 per cent of global energy demand by 2035, up from around 20 per cent today – a non-binding target. It is also launching the BRIDGE initiative to connect developing countries to existing funding, as well as a facility for urban resilience.

We must also acknowledge an uncomfortable truth. The term ‘implementation’ would suggest limited financial resources. A senior European official has warned that there would be ‘no political will’ for new pledges at COP31. The tripling of adaptation funding has not been given its own item on the agenda and will be dealt with under other headings. Furthermore, the electrification target places no conditions on the source of the electricity, which limits its impact on the climate. Implementation will therefore be measured in terms of figures, timetables and mechanisms that actually work.

How has Africa prepared for COP31?

It is true that Africa’s preparations were earlier and better organised than in previous cycles, in several respects.

Politically, the process began with the second African Climate Summit in Addis Ababa in September 2025. This resulted in $150 billion in African commitments, including $50 billion via the African Climate Innovation Pact and the African Climate Facility, and $100 billion from the continent’s banks and financial institutions. Leaders at the summit estimated adaptation needs at $579 billion by 2030. Last September, Kenyan President William Ruto convened the Committee of African Heads of State on Climate Change in New York to consolidate their common position ahead of Antalya.

From a technical perspective, the African Negotiators’ Group – comprising 54 countries under Ghana’s chairmanship for 2026–2027 – held its strategic meeting in Accra to draw lessons from last June’s Bonn session. It incorporated new topics: climate and health, climate mobility, trade measures, critical minerals and industrial transformation. Addressing the heads of state, its chair presented a roadmap treating COP31, COP32 and COP33 as a single policy cycle, with Antalya serving as the foundation and Addis Ababa as a moment of consolidation. The negotiators began their on-site coordination on 1 November. They also called for climate-related trade measures to be included on the agenda.

Most African states have updated their commitments: according to the African NDC Hub, hosted by the African Development Bank, 43 out of 54 countries have submitted their NDC 3.0. Our country has submitted its NDC 3.0 covering 2026–2035, with a reduction target of 41 per cent compared with the baseline scenario. However, a large part of this target remains contingent on external financial and technical support, which directly links our national commitments to the issue of financing.

Furthermore, civil society has organised itself on a regional basis. For Central Africa, Libreville brought together more than 50 participants from Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, the Central African Republic and the DRC at the end of October to develop a common position.

But, let’s be clear, the weak point is well known: negotiations on the global adaptation target stalled in Bonn. Africa is united on the principles, but the details of this collective target remain to be negotiated, in particular the monitoring of the 59 indicators adopted in Belém and their funding. As the AGN Chair said, success will be measured more by our ability to shape the outcome than by the number of our interventions.

There also remains a political challenge: defending a common position does not mean erasing the differences between oil-producing countries, forest-rich countries and island states. In my view, Africa’s effectiveness will depend on its ability to prioritise its demands, build alliances and present projects that are sufficiently well-prepared to secure funding.

What are the specific issues, challenges and prospects for the African continent in the context of COP31?

The first issue is the fairness of the figures. Africa accounts for less than 4 per cent of global emissions but is among the regions most at risk. It received an average of 43.7 billion dollars in climate finance per year in 2021 and 2022, representing around 23 per cent of its needs. These funds cover 18 per cent of planned mitigation projects and 20 per cent of adaptation costs. The distribution is uneven: the ten most vulnerable countries receive only 11 per cent of the total, whilst ten others account for 76 per cent of private investment. In 2024, sub-Saharan Africa received 11 billion for adaptation out of 55 billion in climate finance. Hence the question posed by the NGA Chair: “Where is the money? ”

The second challenge is debt. The AGN is calling for funding in the form of grants and concessional loans rather than loans that increase sovereign debt. Even a low-interest loan weighs on a country’s debt position, hence the growing interest in converting debt into climate investments. The cost of capital remains a decisive factor: with around 20 per cent of the world’s population, Africa attracts less than 3 per cent of global energy expenditure. The Turkish presidency’s electrification target will only be meaningful for the continent if mechanisms to reduce the risk of investment in grid infrastructure are put in place.

The third challenge is of a commercial nature. The European Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism entered its final phase on 1 January 2026. Around 25 billion dollars’ worth of African exports are expected to be directly affected. A study by the African Climate Foundation and the London School of Economics (LSE) estimates that, under the broadest scenario covering all imports, African exports to the European Union (EU) would fall by 5.72 per cent, equivalent to 1.12 per cent of the continent’s gross domestic product (GDP). The African Negotiators’ Group is calling for unilateral climate-related trade measures to be examined within a multilateral framework. It bases its argument on Article 3.5 of the Framework Convention, which states that such measures should not constitute arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. In my view, the challenge for the continent is to decarbonise its export sectors whilst preserving its scope for industrialisation, in line with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

Beyond these three issues, the challenges relate to the funding timetable. The process of replenishing the Green Climate Fund began in July 2026 for the period 2028–2031, with a pledging conference scheduled for late 2027. The year of the African COP will therefore be the financial litmus test. Physical climate conditions are heightening the sense of urgency, as El Niño is expected to bring flooding to the Horn of Africa and drought to southern Africa as early as this month, with the African Development Bank (AfDB) estimating the cost at between 10 and 20 billion dollars. Finally, the outlook hinges on a single date: 2027. COP 32 in Addis Ababa will be an African COP, and the Ethiopian presidency’s preparatory work has already begun. Antalya must lay the operational foundations: a just transition mechanism that preserves scope for national development, a method for monitoring the tripling of adaptation funding, and a Loss and Damage Fund capable of disbursing funds rapidly. For Central Africa and the Congo Basin, the challenge will be to secure recognition of the climate value of our forests within accessible mechanisms. Africa no longer comes to the COP merely as a ‘victim’, but already with its own solutions, its own funding, and its critical minerals, which strengthens its negotiating position.


This article has been translated from French into English using artificial intelligence.