China: An Emerging Agricultural Superpower

China has always placed agricultural development and food security at the heart of its national priorities. Having elevated these issues to the centre of its diplomacy in recent years, whether through the “Belt and Road Initiative” launched in 2013 or through assuming leadership of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 2019, Chinese power is now striving to become a major exporter…

Producing above all

A vast and highly populated country, China has never underestimated the importance of the agricultural sector in driving its development. Following the great famines of the Mao era, which claimed millions of lives during the 1960s, the reforms introduced to launch economic take-off gave domestic agricultural production a decisive role in social progress and territorial integration. In 1980, the challenge was to feed one billion people, a market that became more complex at the beginning of the century as consumers grew more demanding in terms of food safety and quality, and which now encompasses 1.4 billion individuals. Domestic agricultural performance has been remarkable: China has become the world’s leading producer across an impressive range of sectors. A few emblematic figures: 65% of global aquaculture fish production, 50% of pork production, 35% of eggs and wild-catch fisheries, 25% of rice, 18% of wheat, and the world’s leading producer of fruit and vegetables, tea, garlic, seaweed and potatoes…

Enough said! This is not always emphasised, but yes, China is an agricultural, aquacultural and fisheries production superpower. It imports massively, as we shall see, but also harvests colossal quantities from its own land, coastlines and the world’s oceans. Its objective is not autarky but a more subtle formula: produce as much as possible domestically, import what is missing and secure global supply chains in their entirety. But China is not merely seeking to feed its large population, it is progressively building a genuine architecture of power in agriculture and food systems by combining innovation, industry and influence. These three “I’s” form the structural pillars of Beijing’s strategy.

Constantly innovating

The most recent official documents are explicit. Each year, the Chinese authorities publish what is known as “Central Document No. 1”. The version released at the beginning of 2026 confirms that, for Beijing, agriculture remains a fundamental issue of national security[1]. But it also reveals a significant evolution in the way China now approaches food policy. For several decades, the primary objective of the Chinese authorities was to ensure grain self-sufficiency. In a country possessing only around 9% of the world’s arable land while accounting for nearly one fifth of the global population, agriculture is inherently strategic. This major constraint explains Beijing’s sustained focus on protecting agricultural land, maintaining stable production of rice, wheat and maize, and rigorously managing grain reserves. However, China’s strategy is evolving. The 2026 document places less emphasis on increasing agricultural volumes alone and more on quality, efficiency and the modernisation of productive systems. The government also stresses the need to support agricultural incomes, improve rural infrastructure and strengthen the economic attractiveness of agricultural sectors. This dimension is crucial for preserving social stability in a country where disparities between urban and rural areas remain significant. In this respect, it is important to follow current debates surrounding Hukou reform[2], the system regulating the movement of rural populations towards the country’s major cities.

China is therefore now seeking to build a more technological form of agriculture, capable of responding to changing food demand and increasingly intense international competition. This transformation relies heavily on innovation. The authorities highlight what they describe as new agricultural productive forces: the development of biotechnologies, seed improvement and gene editing, intelligent mechanisation, greater use of drones and sensors, logistical efficiency through digital data and robotics. Agriculture, driven by an engineering mindset[3], is expected to become highly technological, capable of increasing productivity while addressing constraints related to land and water scarcity, as well as the ageing of the rural population. To innovate in agriculture, China is investing massively in science, agronomic research and artificial intelligence on a scale few nations can match. One area that deserves closer attention concerns the humanoids that China is designing, deploying and intends to mobilise across rural fields, urban logistics, factories and food-processing industries. These humanoids, whose capabilities are rapidly advancing[4], could well become export products for countries facing shortages in agricultural and industrial labour, beginning with Europe.

These dynamics are now underpinned by China’s 15th Five-Year Plan for the 2026–2030 period, which reveals Beijing’s objective of achieving full economic sovereignty and establishing itself as a productive power across a multitude of sectors, including both those where it already dominates and those where it intends to do so[5].  Agriculture is one such sector, with the ambition of transforming it into an agro-industrial strength capable of exporting. The 15th Plan maintains food as a national security issue while elevating it into a pillar of industrial and technological innovation and an instrument of international influence.

Exporting more

Recent official Chinese communications confirm the intention to better coordinate agricultural imports with domestic production. Beijing implicitly acknowledges that certain structural dependencies remain, particularly regarding soybeans, some meats and dairy products. But it now seeks to manage these flows more strategically in order to avoid excessive vulnerability. This is also the context within which balanced dialogue with Washington in the specific agricultural domain should be understood, because Chinese needs remain tangible in some areas and serve as practical leverage in negotiations with its American competitor[6].

The Trump–Xi summit of 18 May 2026 is particularly revealing in this regard. US agricultural exports to China had fallen by 66% in 2025 as a result of trade tensions, reciprocal surcharges and China’s determination to reduce purchases. During the meeting, China committed to increasing imports of American agricultural products and to working towards reducing certain tariff and non-tariff barriers, with several previously blocked issues, including beef and poultry, returning to the agenda. The White House stated that China committed to purchasing at least 17 billion dollars’ worth of American agricultural products annually from 2026 to 2028, in addition to commitments concerning soybeans, although Beijing was considerably more restrained on this matter. One possibility is that Sino-American agricultural trade will become more managed if the relationship moves towards lasting stabilisation, unless it becomes more conflictual should bilateral tensions rise again. China is aware of this and is therefore turning towards Latin America, particularly Brazil and Argentina, Africa, notably Ethiopia, Kenya and South Africa, as well as Russia and the European Union, in order to de-risk supply chains and reduce dependence on the United States.

However, another dimension remains insufficiently discussed: China is exporting more and more. In agriculture, agri-food and fisheries-based food production, the trend is unmistakable: 12 billion dollars in 2000, three times that amount in 2010, 60 billion in 2020 and 90 billion in 2025[7]. This places China sixth globally among exporters in these sectors, just behind France at 95 billion dollars, a position it is likely to surpass soon, while the United States still leads with 175 billion, followed by the Netherlands and Brazil at 150 billion each and Germany at 120 billion. If agricultural equipment such as agricultural drones, technologies and robotics integrated into agro-industrial production chains were included, China’s export figures would be even more substantial.

What should therefore be retained is that Beijing is becoming one of the world’s major export leaders, even though its agricultural and food trade balance remains heavily in deficit, around 100 billion dollars in 2025! This contrasts sharply with the country’s overall trade surplus of 1.2 trillion dollars last year! This allows China to purchase what is needed on global markets to feed both populations and livestock, while gradually supporting its industrial and technological strategic autonomy in pursuit of becoming strong and influential in sectors capable of enduring over time.

Beijing has remained remarkably consistent in its agricultural trajectory: agriculture is vital for the country, indispensable globally and strategic for shaping international relations. It is also worth noting that China is industrialising its decarbonisation efforts and increasingly gaining ground in climate engagement, at a time when other states hesitate or struggle to maintain the pace of investment required. One consequence is growing influence in the normative sphere, another key area in which Beijing fully embraces power politics, including with regard to geoengineering aimed at mastering climatic adversity… Since 2020 and the Covid-19 pandemic, the Middle Kingdom has clearly launched a counter-offensive on all fronts! Project this agricultural ambition forward alongside China’s demographic decline and food balances could gradually rebalance by 2050, generating larger domestic productive surpluses capable of meeting external demand. Will we therefore inevitably see more Chinese agri-food products on global and European markets tomorrow?

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[1] For an in-depth analysis, see USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (2026), China’s Priorities in Agriculture and Rural Development in 2026, GAIN Report CH2026-0022.

[2] “A passport to prosperity: China is quietly making life easier for rural migrants”, in The Economist, 30 May 2026.

^[3] On this subject, see the excellent analysis by Dan Wang, “Breakneck: China’s Quest to Engineer the Future”, Penguin, 2025.

[4] See Wendy Chang, Rebecca Arcesati and Altynay Junusova, “Embodied AI: China’s Ambitious Path to Transform Its Robotics Industry”, Merics Report, April 2026.

^[5] Matteo Torres and Thomas Grjebine, “Le 15ème plan quinquennal chinois : Pékin accélère, et nous ?”, Haut-Commissariat à la Stratégie et au Plan (HCSP), 28 May 2026.

[6] To better understand this geoeconomic background, see Jean-François Di Meglio, “Chine et États-Unis: divorce impossible”, in Le Déméter 2026: Appétits stratégiques et pivots agricoles, IRIS Éditions, Club DÉMÉTER, pp 79-99.

[7] The figures presented in this paragraph are drawn from the International Trade Centre (ITC TradeMap).