The U.S. Industrial Defense Strategy after Ukraine

« We need a paradigm shift to meet the needs of today and the future fight. » With these words, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment, William A. LaPlante, acknowledged the changes that the US Defense Industrial Base (DIB) must undergo to adapt to the rapidly changing strategic environment, particularly with the return of high-intensity conflict.

The ongoing challenges of COVID-19 (industrial workforce shortages and contrained supply chains) have been compounded by those of the war in Ukraine, with the classic triptych: support to Ukraine, replenishment of stocks, and ramping up of industrial capacity. In that respect, the world’s largest defense industrial base faces issues similar to those encountered by European countries. However, the situa􀆟on in the United States differs significantly from that in Europe, at least in one respect: the United States is simultaneously preparing for a potential major confrontation with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), identified as « the pacing challenge » in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) of October 2022. Thus, the US must grapple with the challenge of prioritizing its responses to numerous threats. This is all the more evident as a new theatre of conflict has opened up – or reopened – in the Middle East, and Washington has supported Israel in its fight against Hamas by supplying it with precisionguided munitions.

These simultaneous challenges have strained the American DIB, shaped by three decades of industry consolidations through mergers, inconsistent demand signals from the Pentagon, “just-in-time delivery”, low stocks, and closing of production lines. A CSIS 2023 study estimated that in a Taiwan Strait conflict, “the United States would likely run out of some munitions— such as long-range, precision-guided munitions—in less than a week”, underlining that shortfalls in defense industrial capacity would prevent the country to sustain a protracted conflict, especially not on three fronts…