Turkey – Syria: A Brief Anatomy of a Complicated Relationship

This article was written on 26 December 2024. It was published on 20 January 2025 on the website of the Centre arabe de recherches et d’études politiques de Paris (CAREP Paris). We are reproducing it here with its permission.

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For the past twenty years, the trajectory of relations between Ankara and Damascus has been a key indicator of the evolving regional geopolitical balance of power, in which Turkey seeks to establish itself as an essential player. A look back and a look ahead…

Early 2000s: Turkish-Syrian Relations in Light of Ankara’s Regional Assertion

The 2003 invasion of Iraq by U.S. imperialism significantly influenced Turkey’s regional policy. Indeed, its refusal to comply with George W. Bush’s request to deploy 62,000 soldiers on Turkish soil to attack Iraq from the north clearly expressed Turkey’s desire to distance itself from the policy promoted by Washington’s neoconservatives. In addition to risking regional isolation, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which had been in power in Ankara since November 2002, could not confront its electorate, which was overwhelmingly opposed to the war and the U.S. foreign policy.

To Washington’s dismay, a reconfiguration of Turkey’s regional policy took place, marked by a dramatic warming of relations with its long-despised Syrian neighbor, with which a major crisis had almost led to military confrontation in September 1998. The visit of Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül to Damascus in April 2003 and Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad’s visit to Ankara in January 2004, the first by a Syrian head of state to Turkey, were clear signs of this rapprochement. During these visits, the real surprise did not come so much from Syrian statements but from Turkey’s diplomatic maneuvering which, despite the pronounced anger of U.S. leaders^[1], reserved a particularly warm welcome for its guests. Ankara and Damascus had everything to gain from improving their relations. Turkey saw it as an opportunity to restore its image within the Arab world; Syria saw a strategic advantage, as rapprochement with Ankara helped ward off the grim fate predicted by Washington’s neoconservative leaders..

The easing of relations between the two countries explains, for example, the acceptance by Syrian leaders of Turkey’s role as a facilitator with the Jewish state during four rounds of talks starting in 2008. This exercise, which ultimately failed, was only possible for several months because Turkey enjoyed the trust of both enemy parties and exemplified the mediation diplomacy that was highly valued within the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time.

On a strictly bilateral level, the signing of a free trade agreement that came into effect in 2007, the removal of visas between the two countries, the organization of joint cabinet meetings, and the creation of a Strategic Cooperation Council in September 2009 indicated the extent of the reconciliation between the two states. There was even a reactivation of old economic networks in the border area, which could have gained traction in the following years, potentially fostering the regional rise of cities like Aleppo or Gaziantep, had the civil war not occurred.

In reality, this spectacular rapprochement with Syria signaled Turkey’s breakthrough at the regional level. The multiplication of political initiatives went hand in hand with an unprecedented economic expansion – as confirmed by the fifth Turkish-Arab Cooperation Forum, held in Istanbul in June 2010, which created a free trade zone between Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. A few months later, in November 2010, during an official visit to Lebanon, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan proposed the creation of a “Shamgen” space in the Middle East – a wordplay based on “Sham”, another name for the city of Damascus.^[2].

This new direction in its foreign policy allowed Ankara to gain an unprecedented level of popularity within Arab public opinion. It is remembered that in January 2009, Erdoğan did not hesitate to dramatically leave the Davos Economic Forum, feeling disadvantaged in the speaking time allotted to him compared to that of Shimon Peres, who was participating in the same panel. The Secretary-General of the Arab League, Egypt’s Amr Moussa, who was also present, did not deem it necessary to leave the debate. Through his behavior, Erdoğan in a way expressed the grievances and frustrations of the Muslim world, earning him genuine popularity within it, with some Arab media even hastily comparing him to Gamal Abdel Nasser.

This aura was further strengthened in May 2010 during the crisis between Turkey and Israel following the Mavi Marmara incident, named after the flagship of a flotilla of eight boats chartered by Turkish humanitarian organizations. Their goal was to peacefully break the illegal blockade imposed by Israeli authorities on the Gaza Strip, which led to the intervention of Israeli special forces in international waters. The Israeli assault – which can be seen as an act of piracy – resulted in the deaths of nine Turkish nationals who were aboard the ship.

Thus, the 2000s marked a true turning point and the realization by Turkey of its potential power and its ability to influence its regional environment.

The consequences of the political shockwave from the Arab uprisings and the Syrian civil war.

From the winter of 2010-2011, when a political shockwave spread through the Arab world, Turkey faced a moment of hesitation: should it maintain ties with the regimes in power or, on the contrary, engage in supporting the protest movements? It was the second choice that was ultimately made, and Turkish diplomacy seemed to triumph. Erdoğan undertook a notable tour in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya in the autumn of 2011, and although Turkish leaders never used the term themselves, it became common at the time to refer to a “Turkish model.”

Within the leadership circles of the AKP, there was a clear intention to forge close partnerships with the Muslim Brotherhood, who seemed poised to achieve significant victories in countries undergoing revolutionary processes. This, incidentally, was more a political opportunity seized by Ankara’s leaders than a true ideological symbiosis with the Muslim Brotherhood, contrary to what is often claimed. While political goals may express genuine convergences, the histories, national frameworks, and agendas of these protagonists do not truly align, and Erdoğan has never been a member of the Brotherhood.

It was the revolutionary movement in Syria that would shake things up. While a remarkable rapprochement had developed between Ankara and Damascus since the early 2000s, Turkish leaders were stung by Assad’s complete disregard for their urgent calls for democratization. By the summer of 2011, after several futile missions by Turkish emissaries to Damascus, the Turkish Prime Minister developed a kind of political obsession aimed at overthrowing the Syrian president. On several occasions, Erdoğan predicted the imminent fall of the neighboring regime, stating that he would soon be able to visit Damascus to pray at the Umayyad Mosque. The Turkish political authorities now sought to actively support the protest movement, and it was in Turkey that the Syrian National Council (SNC), the main opposition movement and recognized interlocutor of the international community, was established in October 2011. High-ranking officials from the Free Syrian Army were also welcomed. This marked the beginning of a massive process of accepting Syrian civilians fleeing the fighting and settling in Turkey under often precarious conditions. By supporting various components of the rebellion politically and militarily, the Turkish leaders showed considerable leniency toward the more radical groups that gradually emerged in the Syrian chaos ^[3]. They also seek to instrumentalize the Turkmen minority despite its numerical and organizational weakness. The unexpected resilience of the Damascus regime, supported by Moscow and Tehran, especially from the end of summer 2015 onwards, then led Turkey into serious difficulties in managing this crisis. Certainly, many states have repeatedly made mistakes regarding the Syrian issue, but Turkey’s errors are particularly concerning. How can one give genuine credit to the regional deployment of its policy if it is unable to assess the political and military dynamics of a neighbor with whom it shares more than 900 kilometers of borders? It is the course of the foreign policy pursued that seems to be failing.

This is why the Turkish executive, realizing its relative diplomatic isolation, radically shifted its positions on essential issues during the summer of 2016. The statement made by the Turkish president on July 4, 2016, during the Eid al-Fitr celebrations, about the necessity of restoring dialogue with Syria – to be clear: with the political authorities of Damascus – left many observers stunned. After five years during which Ankara had consistently demanded the immediate and unconditional departure of Al-Assad, this shift was indeed dramatic. For Turkish leaders, the aim was to re-enter the international diplomatic game by abandoning their previous positions and accepting that the question of Bashar Al-Assad’s future would be addressed at the end of a transitional process, rather than demanding his prior departure. Then, the goal was to take part in the fight against jihadist groups, some of whose attacks on Turkish soil were attributed to them, and to contribute to implementing a political compromise solution by moving closer to Moscow. Turkey’s ties and influence with multiple Syrian opposition armed groups would allow it to play a crucial role in the success of the Kremlin’s initiatives. This is why Erdoğan traveled to Saint Petersburg on August 9, 2016, to reconcile with Vladimir Putin, with whom relations had been severely strained since November 2015, when Turkish forces shot down a Russian aircraft in the Turkish-Syrian border area. This reconciliation would earn Turkey the opportunity to join the Astana process alongside Russia and Iran ^[4].

It is worth briefly revisiting the Astana group, and more specifically the agreement that established four so-called “de-escalation” zones, where the use of any type of weapon was theoretically prohibited. Putin will attempt to trap Erdoğan by assigning him the responsibility of overseeing the implementation of decisions in the province of Idlib, which became a haven for all the armed groups that had suffered military defeats under Russian and Iranian pressure. This was, in reality, an impossible mission for Turkey, as the rebel groups were not particularly willing to submit to Turkish control. Nevertheless, Ankara deployed between 13,000 and 15,000 soldiers, which allowed for regular contact with the province’s leaders, particularly those of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham – a point that would prove important later. Finally, despite its relative impotence, Turkey remained in a position to control trade flows and humanitarian aid in the region.

A final decisive factor for Turkey in the complex management of the Syrian situation concerns the refugees. Fleeing the catastrophic deterioration of the situation in their country, nearly four million Syrians poured into Turkey. The country takes pride in having welcomed them, even though it was often under difficult and much-criticized conditions. On this issue, European moral authorities are poorly placed to lecture, given the evident cowardice and abdication of responsibility by the European Union. This influx of population has led to significant sociological changes in Turkey, particularly in the southeast, and has gradually sparked political tensions that have been exploited by opposition parties.

The Kurdish issue: Turkey’s obsession with Rojava and the PKK ^[5]

Last but not least, the chaos prevailing in Syria contributes significantly to reactivating the Kurdish issue. The challenge, perceived as existential by Ankara, lies in the fact that the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), dominates all other Syrian Kurdish groups and declared an autonomous administration, Rojava, in November 2013. This was transformed on March 17, 2016, into the administrative system of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria, and renamed on January 1, 2019, to the Autonomous Administration for North and East Syria (AANES). Turkey thus faces a vast zone controlled by the PYD at its border, which it labels a “terrorist entity.” The situation becomes more complicated when the PYD demonstrates that its armed branches, the YPG and YPJ – respectively, “People’s Defense Units” and “Women’s Defense Units” – trained by the PKK, are capable of successfully opposing the Islamic State (ISIS) in ground combat, earning them the support of Western powers, led by the United States, and Russia. Nevertheless, Turkey’s distrust regarding the Kurdish issue was evident during the siege of the city of Kobani (from September 2014 to June 2015), primarily between the PYD forces and ISIS fighters, during which Turkey, stationed along the border and overlooking the city, remained passive despite being part of the international anti-ISIS coalition. The Turkish president even stated that, in his view, the PKK is the same as ISIS. Turkey thus finds itself in a major contradiction, as those it considers its main enemies are simultaneously supported by its allies and partners.

Turkish political leaders perceived the discreet resumption of relations between the PKK and the Damascus authorities in 2012 as a retaliatory measure against their policy of supporting the Syrian armed opposition. It is true that there was an increase in PKK attacks against the Turkish army in the southeast of the country during 2012. Beyond strictly military aspects, it becomes clear that the PKK is now crystallizing a regional strategy that includes Syrian Kurds and, to some extent, those in Iraq.

Considering that these political and military parameters pose a significant threat, the Turkish army has carried out a series of military operations in northern Syria^[7], with the goal of establishing and controlling a demilitarized security zone several kilometers wide along the Turkish-Syrian border, and consequently, pushing the Kurdish groups of the YPG and YPJ as far south as possible. The “Peace Spring” operation in October 2019 was probably the most illustrative and swift initiative aimed at realizing this project. Taking advantage of the announcement of the U.S. withdrawal and thus the reduction of American support for the PYD, the Turkish army forced the Kurdish armed forces to retreat quickly southward to avoid being defeated. Initially, the Syrian government viewed the growing influence of the PYD as a means to put pressure on Turkey, but the relative disappearance of the threat from opposition armed groups greatly diminished the significance of this tactical choice.

In reality, it is the internal-external dialectic of the Kurdish issue that imposes itself on the authorities in Ankara, as the regional affirmation of the Kurdish cause and the control of a vast area in northeastern Syria by the PYD could, in turn, encourage the mobilization of Kurdish nationalists in Turkey. Erdoğan has fully grasped this challenge and does not hesitate to instrumentalize this issue to strengthen his control over the levers of power within Turkey itself. Thus, since July 2015, the handling of the Kurdish challenge has significantly deteriorated in Turkey, confirming the option of a hypothetical military solution, which is entirely illusory, at the expense of seeking a political solution.

The aftermath of December 8th.

It is in light of these multiple parameters that it is possible to assess Turkey’s policy in the very volatile situation in Syria. The first announcements by Turkish leaders after Al-Assad’s flight clearly indicate their satisfaction with the new equation that prevails, with the Turkish president even declaring several times that he had always been on the right side of history. The successive visits to Damascus, in less than two weeks, by Ibrahim Kalin, head of Turkish intelligence (MIT) on December 12, and Hakan Fidan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and himself a former head of MIT for many years, notably during the darkest hours of the Syrian civil war, on December 22, both very close to the Turkish president, are signs of the importance they place on establishing close relations with the new Syrian officials. The reception they received from Ahmed Al-Charaa leaves little doubt about the smoothness of the current relations between the two parties. The Turkish impatience is further explained by the fact that Erdoğan, after managing to reconcile with all the states in the region with which he had fallen out—United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt—had been trying in vain to reconnect with Bashar Al-Assad for over two years. The latter had rejected him, demanding as a prerequisite the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Syrian soil, which Turkey firmly refused. The situation has changed. After hesitations, shifts in direction, and a few setbacks in the deployment of its regional policy, it appears that Turkey is seizing the new situation that now prevails in Syria to reaffirm its indispensable role. The geographical and now political proximity to the new Syrian authorities are key factors for Ankara, which does not hesitate to maximize their use. Two issues remain to be dealt with as priorities between the two countries.

First and foremost, of course, is the Kurdish issue, which, in the short term, is at the center of all bilateral attention. We have discussed the importance of this issue for Ankara. During the offensive that led to Al-Assad’s fall, observers noted the active presence of the Syrian National Army (ANS) forces. This grouping, which is only an army by name, is made up of a dozen groups, mostly Arabs and Turkmens, with diverse interests but sharing their allegiance to Turkey. The ANS is Turkey’s spearhead to push Kurdish forces—gathered since 2015 in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—southward, acting particularly brutally in the recapture of the cities of Manbij and Tall Rifaat. Erdoğan thus sees his long-prepared plan coming to fruition, and Hakan Fidan specifically stated during his visit to Damascus that “the territorial integrity of Syria [was] non-negotiable.”^[8] . The SDF, clearly on the defensive, are trying to negotiate with the government of Ahmed Al-Charaa to preserve the autonomy they have held for several years, while being aware that they risk losing Washington’s support, whose main concern remains the fight against ISIS.

The political equation is complicated to resolve. Either Ahmed Al-Charaa sets as his goal to preserve the unity of Syria and accepts a compromise with the SDF—this would risk angering the Turkish leaders—or, on the contrary, he may be inclined to accept Turkish demands, but this could create a point of fixation with the Kurdish forces. However, the partition of the Syrian Arab Republic or the replication of an Iraqi-style scenario applied to the Kurdish regions of Syria does not seem likely to be repeated, particularly due to Ankara’s extreme vigilance over developments in areas controlled by the PYD. The PYD’s federalist project remains a Kurdish project embedded in the PKK’s strategy against Turkey. However, it is not about using the areas it controls as a military base against Turkey, but rather creating a model of an autonomous Kurdish region, different from the regional government of Iraqi Kurdistan, which would encourage the Kurds in Turkey to mobilize in order to acquire, at a minimum, a form of local autonomy.

The other issue to address is the refugee crisis—we have already seen that it has become a delicate domestic political issue for Erdoğan, in a deteriorated economic situation that has undoubtedly weakened him in recent months. Accelerating the return of at least a significant portion of the Syrians in exile would then be instrumentalized for his own political interests. In the cabinet meeting on December 23, 2024, a decision was made to create a Turkish immigration authority office authorized to share official documents of Syrian refugees in Turkey with Syrian authorities, at the Turkish embassy in Damascus and the future consulate in Aleppo. However, it is hardly realistic to imagine the return of some three million refugees with a magic wand. Some have put down roots in Turkey and are not willing to return and settle permanently in their home country. Moreover, the Syrian economic situation is probably not capable of absorbing such a massive return of population in such a short time. It can also be noted that a return to Syria would likely generate difficulties in several sectors of the Turkish economy: it is striking to observe that the stocks of several Turkish construction and public works groups experienced a significant increase in the days following Al-Assad’s flight. In other words, economic parameters will quickly play a major role in the negotiations in the weeks and months ahead.

In conclusion

The few remarks above clearly show that the war in Syria has acted in multiple ways as a factor in the evolution of Turkey’s regional policy while also having profound consequences for Turkey itself. The situation seems unquestionably favorable to Ankara, which, for the moment, has positioned itself as one of the beneficiaries of the new political equation opened on December 8. However, the Kurdish issue is not resolved and could become a point of tension in the future of Turkish-Syrian relations.

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^[1] Thus, Paul Wolfowitz, then Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Bush administration, could declare: “I think everything Turkey does with Syria or with Iran should fit into the framework of a general policy established with us, aiming to get these countries to change their bad behavior.”, AFP, 25 juill. 2003.

^[2] Jean-Paul Burdy et Jean Marcou, « Le cheminement complexe des nouvelles relations turco-arabes », Hérodote, 2013, 148, p. 12.

^[3] David E. Sanger, « Rebel arms flow is said to benefit jihadists in Syria », The New York Times, 14 oct. 2012.

^[4] The Astana process, initiated by an agreement signed on May 4, 2017, by Russia, Iran, and Turkey, is a series of meetings between various parties involved in the Syrian conflict aimed at implementing a political solution to it.

^[5] “Rojava” is the term used by Kurdish nationalists to refer to the areas of Western Kurdistan that they have conquered in Syria, taking advantage of the chaos caused by the civil war.

^[6] « Erdogan : “Daesh et le PKK, c’est la même chose” », Reuters, 6 oct. 2014.

^[7] Operation “Euphrates Shield” (August 24, 2016); operation in the Idlib region aimed at establishing twelve Turkish observation posts (October 13, 2017); Operation “Olive Branch” in the Afrin region (January 20, 2018); deployment of patrols in the Manbij sector (June 18, 2018); Operation “Peace Spring” (October 9, 2019); Operation “Spring Shield” (February 27, 2020).

^[8] Esra Tekin et Seda Sevencan, « Hakan Fidan : l’intégrité territoriale de la Syrie n’est pas négociable », aa.com, 22 déc. 2024.