Iran/United States: Are Negotiations Really Possible?

Two months after talks began between Washington and Tehran, the prospect of a new agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme remains uncertain. Negotiations appear to have reached a deadlock and neither side seems willing to make the concessions necessary to achieve a compromise. At the same time, the positions of Washington and Tel Aviv appear less aligned than they were at the outset of the conflict. The prolonged stalemate and lack of diplomatic progress are contributing to growing divergences between the two allies and affecting the course of negotiations with Iran. Where do negotiations between the United States and Iran currently stand, and what are the main obstacles preventing progress? Could divergences between the United States and Israel affect the future of negotiations? Finally, under what conditions might negotiations be revived, and could an agreement still be capable of limiting Iran’s nuclear capabilities? Insights from Jacques Audibert, former Political Director at the Quai d’Orsay, lead negotiator for France on Iran from 2009 to 2014, former diplomatic adviser to François Hollande, and member of the IRIS Board of Directors.

After two months of negotiations between Iran and the United States, marked by numerous obstacles, what interim assessment can be made? Given the losses suffered among Iran’s leadership and the erratic reshuffles within the State Department since Donald Trump’s return, do you believe there is sufficient expertise on both sides to reach an effective compromise?

The first observation is that, unfortunately, there is not really any interim assessment to make, because the race has not truly begun. Genuine negotiations do not yet appear to have started. After two months, no tangible progress can be observed. There have been periods of de-escalation, phases of more positive exchanges, followed by periods of heightened tension, as is currently the case, with exchanges of fire that could intensify further. This dynamic is nonetheless likely to continue in the form of a medium-intensity conflict: periods of calm are likely to alternate with periods of tension, including episodes of strikes such as those taking place today. The essential point is that negotiations should begin and continue. At present, there is nothing to suggest that this is happening.

As for the parties’ ability to negotiate, on both the Iranian and American sides, this is one of the major current problems. While both sides have an interest in moving towards negotiations and neither appears to reject them entirely, no progress has been recorded.

On the Iranian side, the leadership has been decimated. Several factions must coordinate in order to develop a common position. This requires internal exchanges and negotiations between Iranian actors, which appears difficult under the threat of potentially lethal strikes carried out by the United States or Israel. The Iranian authorities are therefore disorganised and constrained by their own institutional mechanisms, which make the adoption of a unified position difficult. The Supreme Leader, the Revolutionary Guards, the government and the Majlis do not necessarily share the same approaches.

On the American side, there is greater unity of position, but it is dictated by a president whose diplomatic negotiating capacity appears limited. His political language is the one that proved effective in domestic American politics: invective, unilateral positions that can verge on insult, reversals, or assertions detached from reality. These methods do not work in international negotiations. Furthermore, the negotiating tools mobilised by Washington do not appear sufficiently developed. The interlocutors seem primarily tasked with rapidly repeating presidential positions. Nothing suggests that a genuine negotiating team comparable to the one that worked towards securing the Vienna agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme (JCPOA) of 14 July 2015 has been assembled today.

On both sides, negotiating capacity therefore appears weak. This explains the lack of progress against the backdrop of a medium-intensity conflict alternating between periods of tension and periods of relative calm. The current period corresponds more closely to a phase of escalation.

Does Iran’s insistence on imposing a ceasefire in Lebanon as a condition for an agreement, and Donald Trump’s so far largely ineffective pressure on Netanyahu to halt the escalation, not reveal a loss of US control over negotiations in favour of Iran and increasingly divergent approaches between Washington and Tel Aviv?

The positions of Washington and Tel Aviv do indeed appear to be diverging. At the time of the attack at the end of February, the United States was persuaded by Israel that a major strike aimed at decapitating the Iranian executive would lead to rapid success. The results observed show that this did not produce the expected effects. Since then, positions have gradually moved apart. Benjamin Netanyahu wishes to continue the confrontation with Iran and, to do so, uses the continuation of the conflict with Iran’s principal proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah. Strikes in southern Lebanon are therefore continuing. The possible consequences for negotiations do not appear to be a major concern for Israel, and it is even possible that any negative impact on the negotiation process suits this approach, since it continues to pursue the objective of eradicating Iranian power and Iran’s capacity to wage war, which does not appear realistic.

That said, it does not appear that the United States has lost control of negotiations to Iran. Rather, both sides appear unable to negotiate effectively. Neither side is genuinely gaining the upper hand. Both would benefit from reaching an agreement, but expectations remain too high on both sides at present. This situation is typical at the beginning of a negotiation process. The next step is to start building compromises, sometimes through sequencing: distinguishing issues according to their degree of urgency, addressing some immediately, others in the medium term and others over a longer timeframe.

In this conflict, reopening the Strait and ending the blockade of Iranian ports constitute shared interests. The question then becomes what concessions might be possible and, above all, whether credible nuclear negotiations can begin immediately. At present, the Iranians do not appear ready to move forward on this issue, but a position stated today may evolve tomorrow. That is precisely the principle of negotiation: shifting positions until a possible opening emerges. For the moment, that does not appear to be happening.

With negotiations seemingly becoming bogged down, how do you think the situation could be unlocked? Given Iran’s existing enrichment capabilities, could an agreement realistically prevent the country from advancing towards acquiring nuclear weapons?

A relatively rapid breakthrough could occur if a compromise were found on sequencing the issues.

Initially, the matters considered most urgent should be addressed: sustaining the ceasefire, restoring freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, probably in exchange for a partial lifting of sanctions or the unfreezing of Iranian assets.

At the same time, negotiations should immediately begin on the central issue: the nuclear programme. A solution on this matter will not be found quickly. During previous negotiations, five years were required. Reaching a compromise on the nuclear issue is essential, but it takes time. The issue includes several dimensions, notably verification of the commitments made by the various parties, particularly Iran. These mechanisms are extremely technical and require many months of work. This work should therefore begin immediately, alongside a commitment from the Iranians to freeze their activities. There is, however, no guarantee that such a commitment could be secured.

All of this is unfolding in a context marked by a degree of irrationality. Following the American operation conducted with Israel in June 2025, it was claimed that the entirety of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure had been “obliterated”. This is clearly not the case. Today, the actual impact of the strikes on Iran’s nuclear capabilities remains unknown. It is impossible to determine which concealed facilities remain, what has become of the enriched uranium stockpile, particularly the well-known four hundred kilograms, or to what extent Iran’s capabilities in the production and use of centrifuges have advanced. During the years following the US withdrawal from the agreement in 2018, Iran was no longer bound by the obligations contained within it and was therefore able to continue its research activities and develop its capabilities without the same constraints.