China removes tariffs for African countries: a strategic tool for Beijing?

Since 1 May 2026, China has chosen to abolish customs duties on products from 53 African countries. This measure comes amid global trade tensions and could represent a major economic opportunity for the continent’s states. However, to benefit fully from it, they will need to put in place strategies to protect their markets and strengthen their export capacities. To what extent can African states truly benefit from this lifting of tariff barriers? What are China’s objectives behind this measure? And how can they avoid falling into an unbalanced trade relationship? Christian Pout, President of the African Centre for International Diplomatic, Economic and Strategic Studies (CEIDES, Cameroon), explains.

From 1 May 2026, exports from 53 African countries, with the exception of Eswatini, to China will be exempt from customs duties. What does Africa gain from this reform?

The announcement made by the Chinese President on 14 February, on the sidelines of the 39th African Union Summit, forms part of a context marked by a tariff war, a crisis in trade multilateralism, a global race for critical resources needed for the energy and digital transitions, and the acceleration of the dedollarisation of cross border payments via China’s CIPS system[1]. Read in isolation, the measure might look like a gift; placed back within this matrix, it is a strategic instrument.

Indeed, since 1 December 2024, the 33 African least developed countries (LDCs) had already benefited from China’s zero tariff policy on 100% of their tariff lines; as of 1 May 2026, it is middle income countries that will gain full duty free access to a market of 1.4 billion consumers, across nearly 97% of tariff lines. Added to this are procedural facilitation through the “green channel” and the prospect of a structuring economic agreement announced in Addis Ababa.

On paper, the scope is broader than that of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and more stable than that of the European “Everything But Arms” initiative. But in practice, the benefit remains conditional on supply capacity. The figures recall the structural constraint: 89% of African exports to China still fall within the extractive sector. For my country, Cameroon, where 85% of exports are little processed or not processed at all, with an overall trade deficit of more than CFAF 2,000 billion in 2025 and a coverage ratio that has fallen to 59%, tariff exemption only unlocks real potential in segments capable of moving upmarket (processed cocoa, worked wood, agro industry, textile and clothing, high value tropical fruits). For raw materials, which are already taxed only lightly on entry into China, the effect will be marginal. Zero tariffs open a door, but they do not create exportable supply.

China announced this decision unilaterally, without prior negotiation with African states. What is Beijing ultimately seeking through this measure? Is it simply a gesture of generosity towards Africa?

The unilateral nature of the measure is itself the message. In the context of the tariff war, the decision positions Beijing as a champion of free trade in the Global South in the face of Western protectionism. The calculation is strategic, multidimensional too, and it should be unpacked without naivety.

First, securing the upstream segments of the value chains of the Chinese economy. With around 62% of global electric vehicle sales in 2025, 85% of global battery cell manufacturing capacity, 41% of global mined cobalt, more than 80% of the world’s graphite extracted and refined, and cumulative overseas investment of US$143 billion between 2014 and 2025 in the electric vehicle and battery sector, Beijing must lock in its access to cobalt, lithium, manganese, copper and rare earths, which are indispensable to the energy transition and to absorbing its own industrial overcapacity.

Second, disciplining African diplomatic choices. The explicit exclusion of Eswatini, Taipei’s last African ally, is a political signature of the measure and illustrates the pressure exerted to align diplomatic practices with the “One China” doctrine. Zero tariffs would therefore be a lever in this diplomacy of compliance.

Third, stimulating, by reflection, Chinese exports themselves, since a more solvent African market will import more affordable electric vehicles, solar panels, consumer electronics and machine tools.

Fourth, advancing dedollarisation. Zero tariffs must be read alongside the African rollout of China’s CIPS payment system, which processed 175,000 billion yuan (around USD 24,400 billion) in 2024, up 43%. For Beijing, the more Africa exports, the more it is encouraged to settle transactions in yuan, and the more the yuan internationalises, a virtuous circle for Chinese monetary sovereignty, much to Uncle Sam’s displeasure… We should also not forget that unilateralism has a structural reverse side; what is granted without negotiation can, by design, be withdrawn without consultation.

So far, trade flows remain structurally unbalanced in China’s favour and to Africa’s detriment. What must be done so that Africa is not swallowed up by the Chinese giant and truly benefits from this new trade relationship?

First of all, it is necessary to keep in mind the sequence of certain free trade agreements, where premature tariff dismantling, without industrial preparation, widened the deficit rather than stimulating exports. That being said, four conditions seem necessary to us.

First, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) should be made a prerequisite. No state acting alone carries weight against the world’s second largest economy; only continental integration will build the volumes, regional value chains and balance of power needed to export something other than raw materials. The framework agreement initialled on 10 December 2025 between the Ministry of Trade (MINCOMMERCE) and the Chinese Embassy in Cameroon will only deliver on its promises if it is embedded in this dynamic.

It is also necessary to break with the dialectic of dependence on commodities through a demanding industrial policy. The Indonesian precedent is a point of reference: since the ban on exporting unprocessed nickel in 2014, Indonesia has become the world’s leading producer and has attracted US$22 billion in Chinese investment. China’s zero tariff policy should be backed by targeted restrictions on exports of raw minerals, local content requirements imposed on investments, contractualised technology transfers, and the upgrading of the cocoa, coffee, cotton and wood sectors.

Furthermore, it is important to negotiate rules of origin and non tariff barriers intelligently, otherwise zero tariffs would become a magnet for re exports. Non tariff barriers (SPS standards, HACCP/GACC certifications, language requirements, logistical constraints, establishment approvals, etc.) also constitute the glass ceiling for high value African exports.

Finally, building trade defence is vital. China is, simultaneously, the country most targeted in the world by anti dumping investigations, and one of those that uses them most actively as an export lever. Africa, by contrast, remains poorly equipped. The tariff exemption offered by Beijing must be accompanied by the strengthening of national and continental trade investigation authorities, operational anti dumping mechanisms and safeguard instruments that can be activated, otherwise the direct exposure of local industry to competition from Chinese overcapacity will only finish what the structural deficit has begun… The monetary opportunity (direct settlements in yuan via CIPS, reduced cost of double conversion, lower exposure to the dollar) must be seized selectively and through negotiation, without replacing one dependency with another.

Zero tariffs are certainly an opportunity, but they will only become an advantage if backed by a negotiated framework, intelligent rules, credible trade defence and a genuine supply side policy.

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[1] CIPS (Cross-Border Interbank Payment System): an international payment network created by the People’s Bank of China which makes it possible to send money between countries directly in the Chinese currency (yuan), without going through the circuits dominated by the dollar and the SWIFT network.