30.10.2024
Deteriorating situation in Middle East: what is at stake ?
Interview
15 janvier 2024
The American strike on Baghdad on January 4th targeting a leader of a pro-Iranian Shiite militia and the American-British strikes on facilities in Yemen on the night of January 11-12th are presented as retaliation for the attacks by these militias on American bases in Iraq and Syria and the attacks by Yemeni rebels on commercial vessels in the Red Sea since October 7th. What is the background to these attacks and do they increase the risk of a conflagration with the opening up of new theatres of confrontation? What role did Iran play in organising these attacks on American bases, and are these actions part of Iran’s strategy in the conflict between Hamas and Israel? What can we learn from US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s tour of the Middle East and US strategy in the region? Didier Billion, deputy director of IRIS and Middle East specialist, takes stock.
An American strike on Baghdad on January 4th targeting a leader of a pro-Iranian Shiite militia, and American and British strikes on facilities in Yemen on the night of January 11-12th… What is the background to these attacks and do they increase the risk of a conflagration with the opening up of new theatres of confrontation?
For several weeks now, we have seen an increase in the number of targeted assassinations and other military operations carried out by the United States and some of its allies against political supporters of Hamas. This indicates the extreme volatility of the political situation in the Middle East and the real risk of a regional conflagration. All the more so as, for their part, the Israeli leaders are proceeding with the same methods and have not hesitated to physically eliminate leaders of Hamas – Salah Al-Arouri in Beirut on January 2nd – or of Hezbollah – Wissam Tawil on January 8th in southern Lebanon -, thus not hesitating to violate the national sovereignty of a neighbouring state.
The US and British strikes against Houthist military targets on the night of January 11th to January 12th are part of the same logic, aimed at intimidating an organisation that claims to be part of an anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli « axis of resistance ».
Despite this worrying situation, we need to take a cool view of the risks involved. Apart from Israel, none of the main players in the region has any interest in the deterioration of the situation and each of them knows just how far they should not go. For the sake of their own interests and their respective political agendas, each state and each political organisation is fully aware of the dangers of further regional destabilisation.
In the case of the Yemeni Houthist forces, the American-British strikes are presented as a response to the attacks committed by these forces against ships belonging to Israeli or Western shipowners in the Red Sea. This situation could potentially have serious repercussions for international trade, as the Red Sea and its northern extension, the Suez Canal, are vital for the latter: around 12% of international maritime trade and 30% of world container trade passes through the Bab Al-Mandab strait. This is probably the main reason for the concerted strikes. This is a warning to the Houthis, who will be forced to heed it. Especially as, despite their declarations, they can hardly have any military influence as such on the outcome of Israel’s war against the Palestinian people.
What role did Iran play in organising these attacks on American bases, and are these actions part of Iran’s strategy in the conflict between Hamas and Israel? What is the risk of open conflict between Iran and the United States as a result of the American response?
We know that, for many years now, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been developing a policy of regional influence, so keen is it to assert a role that cannot be ignored, and even a form of leadership. This is not the equivalent of an expansionist policy, contrary to what is often claimed. We are certainly aware of the links that exist between Iran and the various components of the « axis of resistance », but this in no way means that Tehran constitutes a centre from which orders should be issued to the States or organisations linked to it. In each case, the importance of the national political agendas of the countries concerned must be measured.
In Yemen – as in all the countries of the region – the empathy of the population for the Palestinian cause is obvious. By stepping up their military operations in the Red Sea, the Houthis are undoubtedly seeking to win back the support of a section of the Yemeni population that they lack. The impressive scale of the demonstration in the capital, Sana’a, on January 12th – clearly attended by several hundred thousand people – to denounce the American-British strikes was a success for the Houthist leaders from this point of view. There is also the need for them to strengthen their positions in the difficult negotiations with Saudi Arabia, which have been going on for almost a year now, with the aim of reaching a political agreement that will finally put an end to the war that has been bloodying Yemen since 2015. As we can see, internal and external political issues are intertwined.
Relations exist between the organisations of the « axis of resistance », which express their condemnation of Israeli and US policies, but it would be wrong to overestimate their degree of operational cooperation. For example, it is easy to understand that the issues facing the Houthists in Yemen are radically different from those facing Hezbollah in Lebanon or any of the militias in Iraq or Syria.
At this stage, the risk of an explosion between Iran and the United States remains low, because both are aware that the situation could get out of control. The most likely scenario remains the status quo, which is unfortunately proving to be a dead end. The team of conservatives in power in Iran is not prepared to make any concessions whatsoever if the proposals that might be put to them do not live up to their demands for normalisation. As far as the United States is concerned, it is hard to imagine the Biden administration being in a position to propose appeasement measures and show goodwill towards Tehran just a few months before the American presidential elections. Accusations of weakness would then immediately fly and could be costly in electoral terms.
On January 5th, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken embarked on his fourth Middle East tour, visiting Israel, the West Bank and five Arab countries. Against a backdrop of generally rising tensions, particularly on the Lebanese front and in the Red Sea, what can we learn from this visit and from the US strategy in the region?
Antony Blinken’s fourth tour of the Middle East was hardly a success, and it was impossible for it to be any different for one simple reason. His timid requests to Israel to reduce the intensity of its bombing and to take greater account of the humanitarian situation of the population of Gaza cannot hide the reality of Washington’s decisive support for Tel Aviv. Day after day, the United States remains the leading supplier of weapons, without which Israel’s leaders would not be able to pursue their planned killing spree with the determination we all know. Moreover, the US veto of UN resolutions calling for a ceasefire is a clear indication of US support for Israel. This is why the Arab capitals we visited listened cautiously to Antony Blinken’s demands, without showing him any great enthusiasm.
It has not escaped anyone that the Arab leaders, beyond their compassionate declarations, have hardly taken any political initiative worthy of the name in favour of the Palestinian people. The League of Arab States has been conspicuous by its deafening silence since October 7th. However, they must take account of their respective public opinions, which are overwhelmingly in favour of the Palestinian cause, and cannot afford to align themselves too openly with Washington. Once again, there is an expression of the major contradiction between the hypocrisy of most Arab regimes and the support of the peoples of the region for the Palestinian cause. It also explains why, with the exception of Bahrain, no Arab state has officially agreed to take part in the anti-Houthist coalition – pompously named the « Guardian of Prosperity » – set up by the United States and the United Kingdom on December 18th 2023.
Anthony Blinken did not therefore win any real support during his regional tour, but he reaffirmed the central role of the United States and was at least able to secure a form of tacit understanding from a number of regional partners.
Translated by Deepl.