What Changes Are Underway in the Geopolitical Balance of Power in the Middle East?

The geopolitical reconfigurations under way in the Middle East are of considerable importance and stand as the delayed consequences of 7 October 2023.

First, in Palestine. Despite the irreducible determination of the Palestinian people to remain on their land and to resist as best they can, it appears quite clearly that the balance of power favours the State of Israel. In Gaza, the ceasefire of 10 October 2025 – which is in no way a peace plan, contrary to what many political and media figures endlessly repeat – is not being respected by Israel, and more than 400 Palestinian victims have been recorded since its proclamation. Fifty-eight per cent of the Gaza Strip remains under the control of the Israeli occupation army; humanitarian aid reaches the population only in dribs and drabs, while people live in a state of complete destitution. For its part, the nebulous international community discreetly looks the other way, and we are witnessing the continuation of a programmed genocide that history will remember as an indelible stain on principles of humanity that are scarcely respected any longer. In the West Bank, in a context that is certainly different, the process is in reality identical: the unleashing of violence by radicalised and fanatised settlers has the explicit aim of expelling Palestinians from their land and homes in order to proceed with outright annexation.

The impunity enjoyed by the State of Israel allows it to pursue the implementation of its projects without facing any sanctions, even as it systematically tramples on the principles of international law. For this reason, the activism of the Israeli government is not confined to Palestinian territory, and over recent months it has multiplied other external military operations, the climax of which was the twelve-day war against Iran in June 2025. While the results are not as clear-cut as Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump have claimed – experts indeed consider that the Iranian nuclear programme has been slowed, but by no means destroyed, and above all that the 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 per cent are no longer under IAEA control – this episode nonetheless marks a weakening, probably a lasting one, of the ‘axis of resistance’ patiently built by the Islamic Republic of Iran over several decades.

These elements therefore indicate that the balance of power is shifting and that profound reconfigurations are currently taking place in the Middle East. Three regional powers are asserting themselves and seeking to secure their leadership: Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

As explained above, Israel exercises undeniable military dominance, which expresses both its strength and its weakness. Blinded by its radicalism, Tel Aviv refuses to contemplate any form of political solution that would require negotiations and the development of compromises. This extremist policy currently prevents the Hebrew state from integrating itself further and achieving greater normalisation within the region. While it is de facto protected by the inertia of most Arab regimes and their lack of concrete political initiative, Israel’s desire to revive and expand the number of Arab states party to the Abraham Accords remains, for the time being, futile. Saudi Arabia’s refusal to join them as long as a Palestinian state is not recognised by Tel Aviv is quite clear. Moreover, while Donald Trump’s unconditional support for Israel is scarcely in doubt, divergences nonetheless exist regarding certain Israeli initiatives that hinder the US president in the pursuit of his objectives. The bombing of Qatar on 9 September 2025 provides an example, since the US president subsequently compelled Benjamin Netanyahu to apologise to Emir Tamim Hamad Al Thani. Similarly, Donald Trump refused to allow any reference to the annexation of Palestinian territories to be included in his twenty-point ceasefire plan presented in Washington on 29 September 2025, alongside the Israeli prime minister. That said, there should be no doubt that Washington’s strategic support for Tel Aviv will remain intact.

Saudi Arabia, under the impetus of Mohammed bin Salman, is in the process of establishing itself in the region. The crown prince has quickly slipped into the role of a leading political figure, marking a clear break with the repeated mistakes of his early years in power. Saudi Arabia now occupies a central role in the geopolitical reshaping of the Middle East desired and organised by Donald Trump. Its role in sponsoring and supporting the new Syrian political authorities in their regional and international reintegration is thus of proven importance. Even more revealing, in these first days of 2026, is the manner in which Saudi armed forces swiftly forced their Emirati counterparts to back down in Yemen. Mohammed bin Zayed, President of the United Arab Emirates, who for a time acted as mentor to the young Mohammed bin Salman, is now regarded by the latter as a destabilising factor. Emirati initiatives in Sudan and Yemen, as well as the deepening of what can now be described as a strategic partnership between the United Arab Emirates and Israel, indeed appear today to run counter to Saudi interests. The balance of power has thus shifted, and Riyadh seems firmly determined no longer to accept that Abu Dhabi should obstruct its plans. In short, Saudi Arabia more than ever needs regional political stability in order to carry out its domestic reform projects and to assert itself as leader of the Arab worlds. In this respect, there is alignment and convergence with Donald Trump’s policy.

Turkey, finally, tends to confirm its role as an unavoidable regional actor. The displayed closeness between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the US president appears to be confirmed, while also underlining that Donald Trump’s unpredictability cannot confer a durable alliance character on the relationship between Ankara and Washington. For the time being, Turkey adheres to Donald Trump’s vision for the region, which for his part recognises certain virtues in it. This is particularly visible in Syria, where Turkey plays an important role, alongside Saudi Arabia, in the country’s international normalisation. Likewise, while the verbal radicalism of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s condemnations of Israel’s policy in Gaza had prevented Turkey from playing a role alongside Qatar and Egypt in the complex mediations between Hamas and Tel Aviv, Turkey’s notable return to this file over the final months of 2025 is an indication that Washington needs Ankara. This, incidentally, is an additional irritant in relations between Tel Aviv and Washington.

A particular word must finally be devoted to Iran, considerably weakened by US and international sanctions and by the military aggression it suffered in 2025, as already noted. These first days of 2026 have also seen a new wave of domestic protest against rising prices and the country’s economic deterioration, with worrying consequences for citizens’ daily lives. Through these demands, we have further proof of the fundamental contradiction between the aspirations of a large part of the Iranian people and the regime’s entrenchment around its prerogatives and privileges. No one knows when or how this contradiction will be resolved, but despite its serious difficulties, Iran will remain, for many reasons, one of the decisive states shaping the region’s evolution over the next fifteen years.

As can be seen, the consequences of 7 October 2023, coupled with Donald Trump’s return to the White House, are numerous across the region. Beyond the few main lines briefly recalled here, many tensions, crises and wars are to be feared in the months ahead.