Turkey: The Perennial Kurdish Question

The conflict between the Turkish state and Kurdish nationalists dates back to the first uprisings of this minority in southeastern Turkey (also present in Syria, Iraq, and Iran) shortly after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. However, it took a new turn in the 1980s with the launch of an insurgency by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which continues to this day. Ankara’s strategy has since alternated between attempts at dialogue and brutal repression. After a relatively calm period, tensions seem to be resurfacing as a wave of arrests has struck several Kurdish figures, and the PKK carried out an attack in Ankara in October.

Where does the conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK currently stand? What role does the Kurdish party, the HDP, play? How can the Ankara attack be explained? How does the Kurdish question shape Turkey’s policy in the Middle East?

Answers provided by Didier Billion, Deputy Director of IRIS and a specialist on Turkey.

A wave of arrests of Kurdish figures took place in Turkey on November 26 and 27. However, the government had previously seemed to show signs of appeasement towards the pro-Kurdish party. How can this situation be explained?

In recent weeks, seemingly contradictory political signals have been sent in Turkey. In October, Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the far-right Nationalist Action Party, known for his radical and constant opposition to Kurdish demands, declared that he was in favor of allowing Abdullah Öcalan – the imprisoned PKK leader, isolated on an island for over 25 years – to speak before Parliament to address the members of the pro-Kurdish party, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), created in 2023, and announce the end of the armed struggle.

The surprise effect was total. What was the significance of such a statement from a man known for his meticulous nationalism? In the days that followed, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan repeatedly confirmed his ally Bahçeli’s words, explaining that he shared the same conviction and that it was necessary to extend a hand to the “Kurdish brothers.” These surprising declarations about the need for harmony between Turks and Kurds, however, completely overlooked the concrete conditions that could finally open a political negotiation process, potentially leading to a compromise and agreement.

The doubt is all the stronger as, simultaneously with these statements, a wave of arrests was organized against HDP mayors for alleged links with the PKK. Mardin, Batman, Halfeti were the first municipalities affected, as well as the district of Esenyurt in Istanbul, this time concerning a mayor from the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the Kemalist party, which was the big winner in the March 2024 municipal elections. On November 26, it was reported that 231 people were arrested for suspected ties to terrorist organizations.

No one can deny that there are links between the PKK and the HDP, but the mere fact that the HDP is a legal, parliamentary party with many elected representatives should protect it from such repressive measures. It is almost certainly through this party that the possibility of resuming a necessary dialogue will materialize. Putting it under pressure and marginalizing it, therefore, does not send encouraging signals. In a different context, the HDP could indeed play a role similar to that of Herri Batasuna in the Spanish Basque Country or Sinn Féin in Ireland when ETA and the IRA were engaged in armed struggle.

The PKK claimed responsibility for the attack on a defense company in Ankara organized on October 23, 2024. How should this action be interpreted? What is the situation of the organization in Turkey?

The PKK is very likely divided by disagreements, particularly between those within its ranks who might be open to negotiations to achieve a negotiated solution, and a faction that appears to be firmly opposed to any compromise. It can be reasonably hypothesized that the attack in Ankara on October 23 was a signal indicating that no solution to the conflict will be implemented without the PKK’s involvement.

This party – which should be remembered as being classified as a terrorist organization by the Turkish state, as well as by the European Union and the United States – is far more powerful than when it launched its armed struggle in 2004, but likely weaker than it was around a decade ago. Two observations arise from this. First, significant blows have been dealt to it by the Turkish military in recent times. But also, the exclusively military and security-focused policy pursued by Turkish authorities for the past forty years will not succeed in eradicating the PKK. In this sense, a true political courage from the regime would be to reactivate the negotiations that were held between late 2012 and July 2015 between PKK representatives and those of the state. Much hope had been placed in those talks, but unfortunately, the process could not be completed.

Finally, when discussing the PKK, its regional dimension, particularly in Syria, should not be underestimated. Indeed, the nearly autonomous Kurdish areas that exist in certain enclaves in northern Syria are led by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed groups (YPG), which are known to be the local projection of the PKK, greatly amplifying its influence by providing it with territorial support.

Turkey has recently moved closer to the Iraqi federal government. What impact could this rapprochement have on the Kurdish autonomous government in Iraq? What policies does Ankara pursue toward Kurdish populations outside its borders?

There is no zero-sum game in Ankara’s relations with Baghdad on the one hand and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq on the other. Ankara’s policy is to maintain fluid relations with both parties for different but complementary reasons.

As far as Iraq is concerned, the primary objective is to strengthen exchanges with a neighboring country whose geopolitical importance Ankara fully recognizes, especially since it is rich in hydrocarbons, which Turkey is sorely lacking. For a long time, Ankara has paid close attention to the relative stability of Baghdad, as it aligns with Turkey’s national interests. In a Middle East in turmoil, finding solid footholds and normalized relations is essential, as emphasized by President Erdoğan during his official visit to Baghdad in April 2024.

Regarding the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq, the relationship also dates back several years. Successive governments led by the Barzani clan view the actions of the PKK as a potential destabilizing factor for the federally autonomous Kurdish region, which creates a genuine political convergence with Ankara. It is worth noting that part of the PKK’s military leadership is based in the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq’s Kurdish region, which are regularly bombed by Turkish air forces.

In recent years, the only time relations between Ankara and Erbil have become tense was when Kurdish authorities organized a referendum in September 2017 aiming to approve independence. Despite a strong majority in favor of independence, it was never declared, as the disapproval from regional states was unanimous, with the notable exception of Israel. The declaration of an independent Kurdistan remains a red line for both regional powers—namely Iraq, but also Turkey and Iran—and international powers.