The War in Iran risks fueling divisions within MAGA

The Israeli-American strikes and the war in Iran that followed are revealing deep internal fractures within the United States. On the one hand, they highlight public opposition to the recent foreign policy decisions of the Trump administration. On the other hand, they expose divisions within the Republican Party itself, as illustrated by the recent resignation of Joseph Kent, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. What is the nature of the divisions within the Trump administration? Does the President still retain the support of his electorate as well as public opinion? An analysis by Marie-Cécile Naves, Director of Research at IRIS.

Joseph Kent announced his resignation from the Trump administration on 17 March in protest against US involvement in the war in Iran. In what way does this decision reflect a deep division within the Trump administration and the Republican camp?

The resignation of Joseph Kent, who stated that the United States had entered the war under pressure from Israel and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) lobby, follows on from the statement made earlier this month by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (who was subsequently forced to backtrack).

On this issue, the background noise generated by influential podcasters such as Megyn Kelly, Joe Rogan, Tucker Carlson, and even Steve Bannon, is growing louder. They have focused, on the one hand, on the breaking of Trump’s promise regarding involvement in foreign conflicts and, on the other hand, they are amplifying anti-Israel rhetoric. This takes on structural importance insofar as it fuels divisions already present regarding the future of the MAGA movement, notably with the rise of an antisemitic movement embodied by the Nick Fuentes faction. Can MAGA become even more extremist? Yes, and the issue of war will inevitably inflame tensions. On 25 March 2026, the traditional Conservative Political Action Conference opens in Dallas, namely the grand gathering of ultraconservatives, which will give us an indication of the balance of power. As for Vice-President Vance, he is being very careful not to speak out. He does not support the war because he knows it is electorally unpopular and what he has in mind is the post-Trump era.

President Trump still maintains control over the Republican Party: he supports candidates in the primaries ahead of the Midterms, with the threat of punishment for the less loyal, and he continues to compel members of Congress (who, on two occasions, refused to sanction the outbreak of the war) to support him.

To what extent are Donald Trump’s foreign policy decisions — intervention in Venezuela, strikes on Iran, blockade of Cuba — supported by his electorate and, more broadly, by US public opinion?

The war is not popular in the United States and is unlikely to become so. US public opinion is not rallying behind the President in the way it rallied behind George W. Bush in 2001-2002. Less than one third of Americans support Trump and this support is concentrated mainly within the MAGA electorate.

It would appear that Donald Trump no longer speaks to his electorate, except to reaffirm the military omnipotence of the United States, put on a “show”, or make jokes. As though war were a game, a distraction, something to get through, or even an “excursion”. On oil, he even stated that rising prices are good news: as the United States is a major producer, they (in this case the US majors) will become richer. The following day, he declared that “prices are rising, but trust me, I am going to win the war and everything will return to normal”.

Is he speaking to his voters, to his entrepreneur friends, or to Wall Street? It would seem that he is speaking above all to the markets. How long will this last? Difficult to say.

In a context marked by budget cuts (a partial “shutdown”) and with the November 2026 midterm elections approaching, is the Trump administration’s domestic strategy likely to consolidate its electorate, or on the contrary deepen divisions, including within the Republican Party?

President Trump’s popularity is steadily declining, but it is clear that the Republican electorate still supports him: among MAGA supporters, loyalty stems from a cult of personality logic; beyond that, he delivers satisfaction on several issues – expulsions of immigrants, anti-trans obsession, tax cuts for the wealthiest, rollbacks on environmental policy. There is no deception regarding the product being sold.

The problem here is purchasing power and this support will fracture if prices continue to rise. This is what is known as the wall of reality. This context is obviously linked to the war in Iran: the rise in oil prices, and therefore petrol prices, is a direct consequence of the war. Yet petrol was almost the only product whose price had been falling in the United States in recent months. And that is not all: the increase in oil prices, if confirmed, will result in higher production costs across many economic sectors: agriculture, large-scale retail, industry, etc.

Let us not forget the direct cost of this war, nearly 15 billion dollars at this stage, while millions of Americans are losing their health insurance, many federal civil servants no longer have jobs, people are unable to borrow in order to buy a home, etc. Furthermore, the White House is requesting an additional 200 billion from Congress for the military budget, in the middle of a partial “shutdown”.

The Midterms, if they take place at all (because the White House is very seriously considering postponing them, or even cancelling them given the scale of the anticipated defeat at this stage), will not take place under normal conditions: Donald Trump wishes to abolish postal voting, impose new rules for access to polling stations, or even prevent certain populations from voting, contest the results in the event of defeat, etc. The deployment of ICE at airports is a test of population control. It is his response to unpopularity.