Syria’s Rehabilitation: What Are the Geopolitical Stakes ?

More than thirteen years after the start of the Syrian crisis, where does the process of Syria’s regional rehabilitation stand? While points of tension remain between Turkey and Syria — the Syrian civil war having severely strained relations between the two states — Ankara and Damascus, through their respective heads of state, appear recently to be signalling a shift in posture by calling for dialogue. Behind these attempts at rapprochement, the role of regional powers such as Iran must be highlighted, as well as that of Russia, which for several years has been calling for a process of normalisation between Syria and Turkey. What can be said about relations between the two neighbouring states? To what extent can we speak of a Syrian rehabilitation in the region, and what are the stakes involved? A discussion with Didier Billion, Deputy Director of IRIS and Head of the Middle East/North Africa Programme.

How has the Syrian crisis exacerbated tensions between the two states in recent years? What is the current state of relations between Syria and Turkey ?

It must first be recalled that relations between the two countries were tense for several decades. There were multiple points of contention: opposing alliances during the Cold War, disputes over border demarcation and the annexation of the Hatay province, water management, the Kurdish question, and the issue of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). It was in the aftermath of the U.S.-led war of aggression against Iraq in 2003 that a spectacular rapprochement took place between Syria and Turkey, with both heads of state multiplying gestures of friendship and promoting cooperation across numerous domains.

At the outset of the deep protest movement in Syria, Turkey unsuccessfully tried to persuade Bashar al-Assad to implement democratisation measures. It was for this reason that, from summer 2011, Ankara took a clear stance against the Syrian regime and played a major role in structuring the opposition to bring it down. During the bloody civil war that ravaged the country for years, Turkey did not hesitate to provide political and material support to opposition groups — including the most radical among them. It was at this time that Turkish officials frequently and confidently predicted that Bashar al-Assad’s regime had only a few weeks left to survive. We now know what happened: Turkey had to admit that the Syrian regime, although significantly weakened, would not fall.

Thus, a new turning point came as early as 2016, notably with Turkey’s participation in the Astana process[1]. Driven by its obsession to prevent the consolidation of autonomy in territories controlled by the PKK’s sister organisation, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), several large-scale Turkish military operations were launched in north-eastern Syria from 2016 onwards. The de facto occupation of part of Syria by Turkish troops remains today the primary point of contention between the two countries. Another issue concerns the 3.2 to 3.6 million Syrian refugees still on Turkish soil. Their presence sparked serious tensions, including violent incidents, at the end of June, and partly explains the defeat of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s party in the municipal elections of March 2024.

Russia and Iraq have recently called for the resumption of dialogue between Turkey and Syria. Who stands to gain from a rapprochement between Damascus and Ankara? And how are the major regional powers positioning themselves with regard to Syria ?

Indeed, there has for some time been a Turkish desire to achieve normalisation between the two countries. This aspiration, however, currently stems solely from Ankara. One recalls, for instance, President Erdoğan’s statements during the May 2023 presidential campaign, expressing his wish to meet his Syrian counterpart. Bashar al-Assad, for his part, remained unmoved, stating that such a prospect was inconceivable so long as Turkish troops occupied part of Syrian territory. That said, Turkish officials have recently multiplied their statements in favour of normalisation, with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan insisting on his willingness to meet the Syrian president as soon as possible and to “restore Turkish-Syrian relations to what they once were” — in other words, before the war. For the first time, at the end of June, Bashar al-Assad expressed his openness to talks with Ankara without setting explicit preconditions — a sign of a change in posture.

It is in this context that Vladimir Putin has once again expressed his wish to see a rapprochement between the two countries. Moscow’s interest is clear. Given its close ties with both Damascus and Ankara, it would be beneficial from its perspective for its two partners to finally cooperate — allowing Russia to reinforce its influence in an increasingly complex international context due to the war in Ukraine. Let us also recall that on this issue, Syria supports Russia unconditionally, while Turkey, though having clearly condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, has refused to impose sanctions. For Moscow, advancing Syria’s rehabilitation on the international stage by encouraging reconciliation with as many countries as possible would be undeniably advantageous. As for the Islamic Republic of Iran, it seeks the stabilisation and reconstruction of the country, hoping to secure a return on investment for its unwavering support of the Assad regime.

The case of Iraq is quite different and rather reflects the country’s ambition to regain regional relevance after a catastrophic period of weakening brought about by the consequences of the U.S.-led war. Baghdad has, for example, played a key role in the normalisation process between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia — even if the final agreement was signed under Chinese auspices. Iraq’s interest is thus to take part in any initiative contributing to the stabilisation of a region that badly needs it and which may elevate its own role.

The resumption of dialogue between Ankara and Damascus is part of a broader trend of Syria’s progressive rehabilitation on the regional scene since 2023. What have been the domestic repercussions of this rehabilitation? What is the current situation in the country ?

The most striking event has undoubtedly been Syria’s reintegration into the Arab League in May 2023, under strong pressure from Saudi Arabia. One might also mention the signing of a “strategic partnership” with China in September of the same year, during one of Bashar al-Assad’s very rare trips abroad. For the latter, the key issue is to secure economic investment to fund the reconstruction of a country devastated by years of war and facing an unprecedented economic and financial crisis — it is widely accepted that 80% of Syrians live below the poverty line — a situation that could spark a new wave of protests, as seen in southern Syria in October 2023.

For the Syrian regime, one of the major problems lies in the fact that neither the United States nor the European Union is considering normalising relations, and therefore neither is willing to participate in the country’s reconstruction — a process likely to require tens of billions of dollars — until a political solution negotiated with the opposition and overseen by the United Nations is implemented. This is why the partnership with China is so significant: China never severed diplomatic ties with Damascus and will not impose any political conditions on its potential investments. It is with this in mind that Syria joined the Belt and Road Initiative in 2022. Nevertheless, international sanctions imposed on Syria prevent China from making major short-term investments. The same logic applies to the Gulf Arab states and to Turkey, which, given its current economic situation, is not in a position to invest significantly in Syria.

Clearly, while Bashar al-Assad may have won the war, he has not yet won the peace.

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[1] The Astana Process, initiated by an agreement signed in May 2017 by Russia, Iran, and Turkey, is a series of meetings between actors in the Syrian conflict aimed at implementing a political solution.