Syria: the troubling weakening of the interim Syrian government

Since 13 July, southern Syria has been facing violent intercommunal tensions. The abduction, then execution, of a Druze merchant by members of the Bedouin community triggered violent clashes in the governorate of Suweida. In this context, which is part of the continuing Syrian civil war, Israel launched air strikes targeting Syrian army tanks in a show of support for the Druze community. What are the origins of the intercommunal tensions between the Druze and the Bedouins? To what extent does Israeli interference reflect the continuity of Tel Aviv’s foreign policy? What are the consequences? To what extent is this escalation of violence indicative of the state of health of the Syrian government? An update with Didier Billion, Deputy Director of IRIS and specialist in the Middle East.

How can we explain the recent escalation of violence between Bedouin and Druze groups that occurred this weekend? To what extent do intercommunal clashes in southern Syria reflect the situation of the new government in Damascus?

As is often the case in such unstable situations, it was a seemingly minor incident that triggered the recent clashes. It is thought to have involved the abduction and killing—under still obscure circumstances—of a Druze shopkeeper by members of a Bedouin tribe. What we do know is that the cohabitation of the Druze and Bedouin communities has long been conflictual due to age-old land rivalries and religious disputes exacerbated by the years of civil war that have bloodied Syria in recent times.

By way of reminder, the Druze are adherents of a faith that emerged in the 11th century from a schism within Shiite Islam, from which it has since become independent. It is marked by deep esotericism, a rejection of any form of proselytism, and the impossibility of conversion. One is born a Druze, but cannot become one. The doctrine is preserved by a small group of initiates influenced by Greek and Hindu philosophies, resulting in a unique form of syncretism. In Syria, the Druze community is estimated to make up around 3% of the total population, and there are also communities of followers in Lebanon and Israel.

However, the core issue is not religious. The recent clashes are more fundamentally linked to the general situation in Syria. The country has been literally crushed by civil war, which has unleashed all the centrifugal forces of a nation that remains a true ethnic and confessional mosaic. The fundamental aim of the interim government, led by Ahmed Al-Charaa, is to rebuild a stable and sovereign Syria. While the jihadist past of the new Damascus leaders is known, so too is their political evolution. Representing a form of Islamist nationalism, they do not deny their affiliation with the Islamist movement to which they claim allegiance, but at the same time they are profoundly Syrian, and their main concern is to rebuild and preserve the country’s unity.

Among many other challenges, a key test lies in the management of religious and/or ethnic communities, with the Kurdish community at the forefront. The memorandum of understanding signed between the interim authorities and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on 10 March 2025 sets out a path for the integration of the civil and military institutions of the autonomous Kurdish region into the state. Managing the Druze community is proving more complex due to the evident interference of external actors.

Faced with rising tensions, the Israeli government launched air strikes targeting Syrian army tanks, despite the ceasefire earlier announced by the Defence Minister. How should this interference be interpreted? With what consequences for Syria?

In recent months, Israeli policy has indeed been a destabilising factor, fanning identity rivalries and attempting in this case to instrumentalise the Druze community, particularly in the Suweida governorate in southern Syria. That community is itself divided, with some elements favouring dialogue with Damascus, while others—particularly following the late April clashes between Kurdish factions and pro-Damascus militias that left over 130 dead—no longer trust the Syrian authorities and clearly lean towards cooperation with Tel Aviv, which does not hesitate to portray itself as their protector.

Israeli leaders have fully grasped the advantage of such a situation in preventing Syria from being reunified under the leadership of former jihadists, whom they distrust. They can, on the one hand, rely on Druze community leaders in Israel who, as early as 1948, supported the creation of the Israeli state and, in some cases, participated in the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from Galilee. Since then, there has been a Druze lobby in Israel with no small degree of influence. Recently, the Israeli Druze religious leader Mouwafaq Tarif did not hesitate to urge the Israeli army to bomb Syria after the April violence.

More importantly, Israel is carrying out an aggression against Syria that forms part of the regional military escalation implemented by Tel Aviv. Taking advantage of the period of uncertainty following Bashar Al-Assad’s flight in early December 2024, Israel ramped up its strikes: 300 bombings of Syrian military targets were recorded in a matter of weeks. The Israeli army also used the situation to occupy the Syrian side of Mount Hermon, in violation of the 1974 ceasefire agreement supervised by the United Nations, which Benjamin Netanyahu has unilaterally deemed void. Since then, more than 800 new strikes have targeted Syrian strategic infrastructure and capabilities, and Israeli military units have thus taken up long-term positions on the territory of a sovereign state. In a further escalation by Israel, the headquarters of the Syrian army and the Ministry of Defence were bombed in Damascus on 16 July. The events of recent days confirm that pre-emptive war and contempt for international law are indeed the standard operating procedures of the Israeli state.

Given the asymmetry of the forces involved, the military operations conducted by Tel Aviv—resulting in at least 300 deaths in three days—forced Syrian leaders to withdraw their troops from the city of Suweida and its surroundings. The structural weakness of the Syrian state probably left Ahmed Al-Charaa with little choice, but the hubris of the Israeli leadership is imposing its brutal force at the expense of any negotiated political outcome.

Finally, what assessment can we make of the first six months of Ahmed Al-Charaa’s government? What results have been achieved in efforts to secure Syria’s international rehabilitation? Are the easing of Western sanctions bearing fruit for the Syrian economy?

It is important first to recall the catastrophic state of the country at the time of Bashar Al-Assad’s flight on 8 December 2024: a human haemorrhage—with more than 400,000 dead—an economy in ruins—with gross domestic product more than halved— and public infrastructure and services often reduced to nothing… The list could go on in describing Syria’s devastation.

The challenges ahead are immense, and it is understandable that the results so far have not met the overly optimistic hopes of hasty observers. The stakes are threefold for the country’s new leaders: to establish a more inclusive regime, rebuild strong relations with as many states as possible, and secure the lifting of sanctions that continue to harm the country. Thus far, it must be acknowledged that Syria’s new political authorities have not made any fatal errors. It is quite clear that Ahmed Al-Charaa has opted to cultivate relations with Western powers in an attempt to stabilise the country. A reception at the Élysée Palace by Emmanuel Macron on 7 May was followed by a meeting, in the presence of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, with Donald Trump in Saudi Arabia on 14 May, which confirmed the previous day’s announcement that the United States would suspend sanctions against Syria for six months. The European Union, for its part, lifted its sanctions on 20 May.

For the leadership team in Damascus, these measures are part of a positive trend, though they are not sufficient to resolve the many issues that must be addressed to stabilise the country. Moreover, the price of these promises of engagement lies in Damascus being compelled to remain silent in the face of Israeli policy in the region. Thus, there was deafening silence during the Israeli assault on Iran on 13 June.

The situation of the past few days, inflamed by Israeli intervention, undoubtedly weakens the Syrian interim government. If one considers its stabilisation to be a major regional priority, then the so-called international community must now respond unambiguously and finally take steps to ensure that international law is upheld.