New Wave of Protest in Iran: The Beginning of a Revolutionary Process?

Since 28 December, a new wave of social and political mobilisation has been sweeping across Iran and appears to be taking on considerable масшта.

The causes of the protest, initially organised by the bazaris—known for their conservatism and for traditionally playing an important role in Iranian economic structures, but who are gradually being marginalised as a result of endemic corruption among the elites—are linked to structural factors: a sharp rise in the price of gold and foreign currencies against the national currency, which is reported to have lost 30% of its value in 2025, combined with inflation exceeding 50% according to official figures. This situation, and the deterioration in the living standards of a large part of the population, stem from dysfunctions in the country’s economic management and from the profound inequality in the redistribution of wealth. These issues are compounded by US sanctions, which have weakened the country for several years and which were further reinstated by the UN in September 2025 at the initiative of France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

Very quickly, the demonstrations—now taking place daily and clearly spreading across the entire territory—have taken on an increasingly political character, as is almost always the case in such situations. Slogans against the regime and against the Supreme Leader have indeed multiplied. Repression, for its part, also appears to be becoming more brutal and more costly in human lives. These elements must nevertheless be treated with caution, as access to corroborated information is extremely difficult, with the authorities having blocked the internet and social networks—a sign of the regime’s undeniable nervousness. In this respect, comments predicting the end of the regime are, at this stage, premature.

It should first be recalled that this new wave of protest is part of a long series of mobilisations that have punctuated political life in Iran over recent years: the student revolt of 1999; the Green Movement of protest during and especially after the presidential elections of June 2009; the anger-driven rallies of December 2017–January 2018, followed by those of spring and autumn 2019, which had primarily economic and social causes; and finally the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement of 2022–2023. All were violently repressed and were unable to see their demands met.

These movements, whose participants display exemplary courage, share the same limitations as those encountered during the protest movements in the Arab world in 2011 and in the years that followed: the absence of an alternative political project and of an organised instrument capable of attempting to implement it. At this stage, this limitation is decisive. To use a well-known image, any movement of social protest is like water vapour which, if not channelled through a pipe, has no propulsive force and sees its energy dissipate. This is precisely the challenge facing those who take to the streets day after day. For lack of tangible progress and the satisfaction of even a single demand, the movement—despite its impressive vigour—risks running out of steam and withering away, all the more so as repression takes its deadly toll and many of the organisers of the last large-scale movement are now in prison.

Two exogenous elements are nevertheless new in the current movement. First are Donald Trump’s statements threatening to intervene if demonstrators were killed. Such positions are hardly surprising from someone who professes the utmost contempt for what remains of international law, but above all they may prove entirely counterproductive. Not only do they fuel the regime’s arguments that the ongoing demonstrations are orchestrated by foreign powers, but they also disregard Persian nationalism, which does not accept that its fate should depend on decisions taken abroad. That said, the danger of external intervention—in whatever form—cannot be underestimated; it may be assumed that the US administration and the Israeli regime have already examined possible modalities, with all the political catastrophes that such decisions entail. In the region, the Afghan and Iraqi examples remain very negatively present in collective memory.

A second new factor has emerged in recent days: Reza Pahlavi, son of the shah overthrown by the 1979 revolution. This man, whose fortune is explained by the plundering of national resources by his late father at a time when he ruled over one of the worst dictatorial regimes on the planet, casts himself in a favourable light by calling on the United States to mobilise for demonstrations that would in any case have taken place without his appeal. In the current state of political uncertainty and disorientation characterising Iran, one cannot entirely rule out the temptation among some Iranian citizens to place their hopes in a so-called providential figure. However, Reza Pahlavi has no social base within Iran itself, and the fact that Donald Trump has not deemed it useful to meet him to date indicates that this is not, for the moment, the option favoured by the US presidency. Reza Pahlavi’s visit to Benjamin Netanyahu in 2023 and the support expressed by the latter were not particularly well received in Iran. Finally, it appears that the few videos that have reached the outside world in which demonstrators can be heard chanting his name are in fact montages.

The question now lies in the outcome of this movement. Several possibilities exist, and it is essential to be extremely cautious, given how unclear the dynamics at work remain.

The first is the pure and simple collapse of the regime: unlikely, because even weakened it still possesses a repressive apparatus whose effectiveness remains, sadly, very real, and which clings to its privileges and prerogatives—although we know from experience that such an apparatus can be overwhelmed by a powerful mass movement.

A second possibility is an internal solution, arising from divergences that could crystallise between supporters of different political projects, some ultimately preferring to implement reforms—more or less cosmetic—in order to preserve the essentials. However, it must be acknowledged that the most conservative elements understand that the slightest reform could spell their definitive downfall, while the reformists, who are in a minority, have little capacity to impose anything.

Either the authorities accept to meet some demands, but if we consider that these touch upon the regime’s economic and ideological foundations, it would thereby discredit itself and, above all, open a vast space for further demands. Or the authorities refuse to concede any compromise whatsoever—this is the path chosen so far—which may potentially allow them to remain in power for some time yet, but will leave deep scars and herald future mobilisations.

Finally, there is the possibility of external intervention, which for the moment lacks credibility, even if one cannot rule out limited US or Israeli operations. Yet this hypothesis could, paradoxically, encourage a patriotic rallying in defence of the homeland.

As can be seen, no solution clearly prevails today. The number of victims is therefore likely to increase.