Major Defeat for the Kurdish National Movement in Syria

The events of recent days in Syria mark a radical shift in the country’s internal balance of political power and reinforce the policy of regional reconfiguration driven by Donald Trump.

It is worth recalling that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)[1], predominantly Kurdish and structured around the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), signed a memorandum with the interim authorities in Damascus, headed by Ahmed Al-Sharaa, on 10 March 2025. The text outlined the prospect of a comprehensive political agreement to be finalised before 31 December, with the aim of integrating the Kurdish component of the Syrian population into the new political architecture of the country. Negotiations, however, failed to reach the necessary compromise, with the main points of disagreement centring on the place and status of the Kurdish armed forces within the new Syrian army, and on the degree of political autonomy to be granted to the Kurdish region within the country. A complete deadlock thus seemed to have been reached.

From the first days of January, the forces of Damascus attacked two Kurdish neighbourhoods in the city of Aleppo – Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh – and rapidly expelled the SDF. Emboldened by this initial victory, a decision was taken – clearly prepared long in advance – to push the offensive into the territories of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), commonly referred to as Rojava.

The fate of north-eastern Syria was sealed within the space of two days, 17 and 18 January. Government forces retook the provinces of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, both predominantly Arab, and around 80% of the territories administered by the SDF since 2016, when they had driven out the Islamic State with help from the international coalition. What unfolded was a genuine military rout, accompanied by civilian casualties and the hasty flight of entire populations.

The brevity of the sequence and the quasi-collapse of the AANES are striking, but can be explained in several ways. The first concerns, of course, the abandonment of the Kurdish forces by the United States, once again confirming Washington’s strategic choice to support Ahmed Al-Sharaa as part of a project of region-wide reconfiguration under its aegis. There is a disturbing sense of déjà-vu. Time and again the trust placed by Kurdish nationalist leaders in the United States – and sometimes in local autocracies – has almost systematically turned into its opposite. It is an unfortunate constant in the troubled history of the Kurdish people that they are repeatedly betrayed by those claiming to help or protect them. For Kurdish leaders, it is a fatal illusion to imagine that the interests of their people – the stated goal of the SDF – can be defended by relying on the United States, whose interests do not coincide with their own. Admittedly, the difficult circumstances under which the SDF fought made alliance-building necessary, but certain choices have once again proved disastrous. During the civil war, the SDF never attempted to reach any genuine agreement with the Syrian opposition forces, preferring instead to maintain at times ambiguous relations with the regime of Bashar Al-Assad. The events of January 2026 once more demonstrate the danger of depending on the United States, which never operate within a logic of the emancipation of peoples.

The second reason concerns the shift in alliances among Arab tribes which, for around a decade, had pledged allegiance to the SDF, commanded by Kurdish leaders often affiliated with the PKK. It should be recalled that the political system established within the AANES claimed to be inspired by the self-management concepts – democratic confederalism – developed and theorised by Abdullah Öcalan, founder and leader of the PKK, imprisoned since 1999. According to the SDF, the aim was to build an egalitarian society respectful of ethnic, religious and gender minorities. Yet the romantic libertarian aura surrounding Rojava for many years has been abruptly torn apart. While it is true that tribal leaders’ propensity to strike deals with the highest bidder is a familiar feature of the region, one must avoid slipping into orientalist or, worse, essentialist tropes about an alleged intrinsic volatility of tribes. Fundamentally, the situation reflects the brutality of the power relations produced by any civil war. The egalitarian inclusiveness promoted by the SDF appears to have been more utopian than genuinely rooted in the social fabric. More precisely, it appears that the PYD imposed its system in a way perceived by Arab populations as a form of Kurdish nationalist domination. The striking rapidity of the defeat in recent days can in fact be explained by the narrowness of the SDF’s social base in a region that accounts for a third of Syrian territory, a large part of which is Arab.

A third explanatory element lies in the role played by Turkey – which continues to occupy unlawfully part of Syrian territory – and in the substantial support it provided to the Syrian army, notably through the use of highly effective drones. Ankara viewed the moment as particularly opportune to put an end to Rojava, described by Turkish authorities as a terrorist entity due to its dependence on the PKK and perceived as an existential threat. This is yet further evidence of the unwavering support Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has provided, alongside Donald Trump and Mohammed bin Salman, to Ahmed Al-Sharaa’s interim government.

It is clear that the latter emerges considerably strengthened after a month of accelerated shifts in the balance of power. His Islamist-nationalist project is taking shape, driven by a centralising ambition that leaves little room for ethnic and religious minorities. He appears, moreover, far more uncompromising towards these minorities than towards the State of Israel, with which he recently reached an agreement despite Israel continuing to occupy part of Syrian national territory and regularly conducting military operations there in defiance of international law.

The SDF have therefore suffered a major defeat, with their political project brought to a halt. The progressive social model they sought to introduce claimed to differ radically from that embodied by the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq, criticised for being far more conservative and often accused of engaging in clientelist practices with unmistakable feudal undertones. The PKK had stopped calling for independence for a Kurdish state, even going so far as to question the concept of nation-state itself. Nonetheless, the inability of AANES officials to reach a compromise with the interim government in Damascus at the decisive moment proved fatal, and the achievements they claimed have been almost entirely wiped out.

It is in this context that an agreement – in which the United States, France and the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq appear to have played a significant role – favourable to the government in Damascus, since it buries the prospect of Kurdish autonomy in Rojava, was finally reached between the parties on 30 January 2026. The interim authorities in Damascus thus take control of local institutions, border crossings, gas and oil fields, and the internment camps holding Islamic State prisoners. AANES institutions will be integrated into the Syrian state apparatus, and SDF fighters incorporated individually into the new Syrian army. No mention is made regarding the future of the SDF’s women’s units or the foreign PKK fighters. The main concessions are that Kurdish is recognised as a national language and may be taught freely, the Kurdish New Year, Newroz, will become a public holiday, and Syrian nationality will finally be granted to all citizens of Kurdish origin. There is therefore no recognition of self-government or self-determination, but rather the acknowledgement of a few rights owed to a minority. As can be seen, the agreement reflects a balance of power unfavourable to the Kurdish forces, even if its final content is less harsh than what was initially presented to them on 18 January.

What now remains to be seen are the practical modalities of its implementation, for nothing is ever predetermined in a national and regional context that is particularly toxic.

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[1] The Syrian Democratic Forces were created in October 2015 to provide a legal and political framework for the United States’ military support to the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), in the fight against the Islamic State. Led by Kurdish forces, the SDF also included Arab tribes that pledged allegiance.