Major Breakthrough by Rebels in Syria: What Are the Implications for Regional Power Dynamics?

The Syrian civil war, which emerged from the Arab protests in 2011 and has caused over 500,000 deaths, gradually stalled from 2017, with the front lines only shifting marginally between the various opposition groups and the regime of Bashar al-Assad. However, the status quo exploded on November 27, with the start of the rebel offensive from their stronghold in Idlib toward Aleppo, controlled by the loyalists. The weakening of the Damascus regime is reshuffling the regional balance of power due to the involvement of foreign powers in the Syrian theater. Who are the rebels? What is their objective? What role do foreign powers play in the resurgence of the conflict? How does it impact the balance of power in the Middle East? An analysis by Didier Billion, Deputy Director of IRIS and Middle East specialist.

The opposition forces to the regime of Bashar al-Assad, led by the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group, which had previously been entrenched in Idlib, have successfully launched an offensive on Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city, and are now advancing toward the South. What are the rebels’ project and ideology? In what context is this offensive taking place?

It seems necessary to contextualize this offensive by focusing on the group leading it, HTS. Its main leader, Mohamed Al-Julani, is of Syrian origin. He participated in the jihadist war in Iraq after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. After spending time in prison, he returned to Syria in 2011 and participated in the founding of the Al-Nusra Front, the Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda. A disagreement soon arose with Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS in Iraq, who wanted to take control of the entire jihadist terrain of Iraq and Syria. This, of course, was not accepted by Al-Julani. Their split did not occur for religious or ideological reasons but rather, more pragmatically, over the division of political, military, and financial responsibilities of the fighting groups. At the time, Al-Qaeda’s leadership sided with Al-Julani, who thus emerged as the dominant figure among the Syrian jihadists. A major turning point came in 2016 when Al-Julani broke away from Al-Qaeda and abandoned the name Al-Nusra Front to form HTS. Was this a result of a political shift or a tactical move? It is difficult to assess, but it is clear that it helped Al-Julani gain the support of several actors, particularly Turkey, during the Aleppo siege he was already leading at that time. Despite this official break from Al-Qaeda, it should be noted that some of the groups currently allied with HTS are still linked to Al-Qaeda, such as the Islamic Party of Turkestan.

Returning to the current events, it is important to nuance the label “jihadists,” often used to describe HTS members. This is not the type of jihad typical of Al-Qaeda or ISIS in their time, i.e., an international jihad against the “Franks and Crusaders.” HTS is a Syrian organization, with a distinctly Syrian political agenda, though this does not contradict the fact that its ideology is radically Islamist. HTS is composed of supporters of radical political Islam who aim not only to consolidate their control over the Idlib province, which they have dominated for several years, but also to capture as much territory as possible to expand their influence over the rest of Syria. Will they manage to conquer all of Syria? At this stage, it is difficult to predict. Their success in Aleppo is undeniable; it remains to be seen if other cities will fall in the coming days or weeks. As for their long-term project, it aims to weaken the central power in Damascus as much as possible in order to implement Sharia law and the principles of radical Islamists.

In the face of this direct opposition between the forces of the Damascus regime and HTS, what is the position of other armed groups present in Syria, notably the “Syrian National Army” (SNA) supported by Turkey and the “Syrian Democratic Forces” (SDF) led by the Kurdish YPG?

While HTS is indeed the spearhead of this multifaceted offensive, another important component to consider is the “Syrian National Army” (SNA). This is more of a conglomerate of several organizations, sometimes very small, than a proper army, which is actually the case for most of the organizations involved in the Syrian conflict, making the situation particularly complex. In this regard, each small group has its own area of influence, seizes international aid, and tries to establish its own fiefs, often competing with one another. Despite their diversity, the roughly ten factions that make up the SNA share one thing in common: military and financial support from Turkey. Having taken part in the fighting in the northern and northeastern parts of Aleppo, they can be considered “co-victors,” along with HTS, of the battle – which was of relatively low intensity – against Bashar al-Assad’s forces for control of the city. The actions of the SNA are inseparable from Turkey’s objectives, and as such, Turkey can be considered a major beneficiary of the ongoing operations.

This is not the case, however, for the “Syrian Democratic Forces” (SDF), a very different group, including some Arab tribes, but mainly controlled by the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and the primary target of Turkey and the SNA in the Syrian conflict. The SDF is therefore extremely concerned about the current course of the fighting, as it risks cutting off supply routes between the various pockets they control in the north of the country, while strengthening the Turkey-backed SNA.

To what extent could this thawing of the Syrian civil war disrupt the balance of power in the Middle East?

It has been little discussed in recent days, but the evolution of the situation in Syria could indeed potentially alter some of the political, and even military, power dynamics in the Middle East, as it breaks the status quo that had existed in the country since 2017-2018. This status quo was materialized through the Astana tripartite agreement, which included Iran and Russia, supporters of Bashar al-Assad, and Turkey, more closely aligned with the rebels. The three countries had “divided the tasks,” with the first two cooperating and ensuring the protection of Damascus, while Turkey managed Idlib, the rebels’ stronghold. This does not, of course, mean that HTS is under Turkey’s command. It is an indirect relationship, based on local compromises, as is often the case in failed state situations like Syria’s current one. Turkey, Iran, and Russia had agreed that the front line could not change without negotiations and compromises, a resolution that the HTS and its allies’ offensive has swept aside in recent days, opening a new phase in the conflict.

A second factor influencing the shifting balance of power in the region is the attempt, over the past two years, at normalization between Ankara and Damascus. This is part of a broader geopolitical goal promoted by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to reconcile with several Arab states with which Turkey had fallen out: the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and more recently Egypt. Despite Russia’s support for this perspective of normalization between Ankara and Damascus, Bashar al-Assad, blinded by the hubris of his apparent victory, had consistently opposed it until now, demanding the withdrawal of Turkish troops occupying several enclaves in northern Syria as part of their fight against the SDF, something Turkey has flatly refused. The rebel offensive could radically change this situation. The rout of Damascus forces, fleeing Aleppo without fighting, could indeed push Bashar al-Assad to reconsider his stance, especially under pressure from Russia, which might condition its support for Assad on him finally agreeing to normalize relations with Ankara. Thus, Turkey currently emerges from this crisis in a position of strength, allowing it to advance its two main concerns in Syria: establishing a buffer zone along the Turkish-Syrian border to control the SDF, close to the PKK, and sending back the more than 3 million Syrian refugees living on its soil, whose presence is increasingly unacceptable in Turkey.

The weakening of Bashar al-Assad on the Syrian battlefield is also viewed favorably by Israel. Iran’s supply of Hezbollah in Lebanon, which Tel Aviv seeks to stop, passes through Syria, and Damascus is one of Iran’s main footholds in the region. However, Israel had long seemed to prefer the maintenance of Bashar al-Assad over the rise to power of Islamist and jihadist groups at its border. Its strategy now seems to have shifted, aiming to push its pieces as far as possible to weaken Iran, its obsession, even at the risk of Islamist groups taking over Damascus.