Giorgia Meloni: Has Giorgia Meloni Entered a New Political Phase?

After three years in power without major difficulties, Giorgia Meloni’s government is experiencing its first genuinely difficult period, both domestically, following the defeat in the justice referendum of 22–23 March 2026, and in terms of its foreign policy choices.

Giorgia Meloni’s so-called centre-right coalition has now entered Italian political history as the second longest-serving government of the country’s republican era. This resilience is due both to a loyal electorate — Fratelli d’Italia remains stable in the polls at around 30 % — and to a more moderate policy line than many had anticipated, which has limited criticism from the opposition. Nevertheless, the defeat in the recent justice referendum inevitably carries psychological consequences for voters and for the ethos of the Prime Minister, who had until now appeared untouchable. This result should not be interpreted through the lens of right-wing voters, who seem to have remained loyal to the leader, but rather through that of the opposition electorate — the left and the Five Star Movement — which, through this “No” victory, has seen that a majority may be achievable if the proposals are clear and the political struggle united. The Prime Minister has lost some of her stability in recent weeks, and the foundations that ensured her command of the political scene have begun to crack: Giorgia Meloni must now answer for some of her previous choices and adjust certain political strategies.

Trump, an ally turned liability

Giorgia Meloni sought to position herself as a bridge between Europe and the United States. While her privileged relationship with the White House had been viewed positively under Joe Biden, it has been perceived far less favourably under Donald Trump. As a result, this connection with the Tycoon has significantly hindered Italy’s diplomatic cooperation with its main European partners. Donald Trump has profoundly destabilised the global order, becoming a particularly cumbersome ally in the context of European unity on international affairs, especially regarding support for Ukraine.

On this issue, however, the problem remains relative: the Italian government as a whole — with the exception of Matteo Salvini — has consistently condemned Russia’s attack on Ukraine, thereby gaining support among more moderate voters while simultaneously raising doubts among the more sovereigntist electorate, which is often more sympathetic towards Russia. In contradiction with Giorgia Meloni’s pro-European image, her support for Viktor Orbán during the Hungarian parliamentary elections has also failed to help rebuild relations with moderate or progressive parties and leaders within the European Union.

Giorgia Meloni therefore attempted to maintain a form of electoral and strategic coherence: remaining loyal to her political allies, such as Viktor Orbán, while avoiding a rupture with the pro-Ukrainian line defended by the European Union. Yet this balancing act, designed to appeal both to her sovereigntist electorate and to her European partners, has proved to be of limited benefit in terms of cooperation with her principal allies. This represents a genuine risk for the Italian economy, which continues to struggle — with growth hovering at around 0.5% — and which, more than ever, needs to regain the confidence of its partners.

Italy is, indeed, a transformation economy: rising energy costs have an immediate impact on both economic performance and production costs. Without privileged relations with neighbouring countries, the Bel Paese could find itself facing shortages of raw materials or problematic surpluses of unsold goods due to excessively high selling prices.

Giorgia Meloni therefore needed to find a solution — perhaps even a pretext — to dismantle the bridge she had sought to build between the European Union and the United States, and to construct another between herself and Italy’s principal European partners. The confrontation and verbal sparring between the President of the United States and Pope Leo XIV unexpectedly offered Giorgia Meloni an opportunity to free herself from a friendship that had become far too embarrassing. She consequently distanced herself from the American administration, which simultaneously brought her closer to the line supported by the leading figures of the European Union.

However, the situation is not so straightforward for Giorgia Meloni, as Italy hosts two major military bases essential to operations in the Near and Middle East, particularly the Naval Air Station Sigonella base in Sicily. This military presence on the island complicates matters, as it directly exposes Italy to potential reprisals, especially since the same Sicilian strategic space also hosts the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), a satellite communications system operated by the US Navy. Giorgia Meloni wishes to distance herself from Donald Trump, yet she must preserve ties with the American executive in order to assess the risks Italy faces amid the military escalation in the Near and Middle East.

She also had to contend with the consequences of her support for Viktor Orbán during the most recent Hungarian parliamentary elections. Such strong backing for the Hungarian Prime Minister was not without consequences, given that the majority of European leaders had supported the opposition. Nevertheless, this situation is presented by Italian sovereigntists as something of a false problem, as they point out that the winner of the Hungarian elections also comes from the right. What was initially support for Viktor Orbán is now framed merely as a preference for one candidate over another: the result remains satisfactory for the Italian sovereigntist right, which increasingly adopts the posture of a moderate conservative force.

Between an uncomfortable majority and a reinvigorated opposition

The leader of Fratelli d’Italia must also manage the allies within her governing coalition. The justice referendum had primarily been initiated by Forza Italia — the party founded by Silvio Berlusconi — and the failure of this reform places Giorgia Meloni in an awkward position vis-à-vis her Foreign Minister, Antonio Tajani. Matteo Salvini, meanwhile, continues trying to maintain media relevance, but his attempts to return to the forefront of political debate generally prove ineffective, or even counterproductive, both for himself and for the government. His barely concealed support for Vladimir Putin also remains a thorn in the side of the coalition.

Giorgia Meloni is not facing major difficulties despite this first electoral setback, but her coalition allies could become liabilities if the current trend continues. This situation — unprecedented since Fratelli d’Italia came to power — has given fresh momentum to the opposition: the victory of the “No” campaign in the referendum demonstrates that the Italian sovereigntist right is not invincible.

Yet while winning a referendum is one thing, building a coherent electoral programme despite inevitable compromises is quite another. Nonetheless, a more positive and enthusiastic dynamic now appears to be emerging once again: even centrist parties — Azione, led by Carlo Calenda, and Italia Viva, led by Matteo Renzi — seem somewhat inclined to accept an agreement for a broad coalition. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to imagine a stable and lasting agreement between all these actors, given the scale of their differences: while Giuseppe Conte of the Five Star Movement maintains positions opposed to military support for Ukraine and to certain orientations of the European Union, Carlo Calenda has famously tattooed the Ukrainian trident on his arm.

A new rising figure on the Italian left could also provide renewed momentum for this plural left-wing camp. Silvia Salis, the current Mayor of Genoa, appears destined for a rapid ascent within the opposition ranks and could potentially achieve the difficult task of rallying all progressive parties together. Yet this remains a formidable challenge: previous experiences of broad centre-left coalitions — from L’Ulivo to L’Unione under Romano Prodi — demonstrated just how difficult it is to hold together highly diverse political forces. Prodi’s second government, formed in 2006, survived for less than two years.

Giorgia Meloni has therefore undeniably entered a new political phase, though not necessarily one of rupture. Domestically, the Prime Minister appears determined to remain faithful to the strategy that enabled her rise to power: a right-wing coalition kept under control, a reassured sovereigntist electorate, and a more institutional and moderate image than initially expected. Internationally, however, the correction appears far more pronounced. Her friendship with Donald Trump, as well as her overt support for Viktor Orbán, have revealed their limitations in a context where Italy requires European credibility and economic confidence.

Giorgia Meloni is therefore not abandoning her political identity, but she appears compelled to rebalance its expression: less visible proximity with her most problematic allies, and greater European centrality. The new Melonian phase is not one of immediate weakening, but rather one of necessary adjustment.