Hezbollah Strikes on Israel: A Conflagration Averted?

Relations between Israel and the Lebanese Hezbollah have long been characterized by significant conflict, and a new particularly tense chapter has opened following the October 7 attacks and the massive bombings on Gaza. As Iran’s closest ally in the “axis of resistance” against the Jewish state, which also includes the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas, Syria, and various Shiite groups in Iraq, Hezbollah, led by Hassan Nasrallah, has been particularly active in recent months. The murder of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in the heart of Tehran further fueled tensions in a region already on the brink of implosion. On August 25, Hezbollah launched a large-scale attack targeting Israeli military structures. Could this escalation lead to a regional conflagration? An interview with Didier Billion, Deputy Director of IRIS in charge of the Middle East/North Africa Program at IRIS.

In what context does the Hezbollah attack of August 25, 2024, take place? What were the objectives pursued by Hezbollah?

There is actually a double context to understand the military operations on Sunday, August 25. The general context, first, lies in the rising regional tensions since the Hamas attack against Israel on October 7, 2023, which has only increased due to the genocidal policies carried out by the State of Israel against the Gaza Strip. The systematic massacre organized by Israeli authorities against the Gazan population currently stands at nearly 40,000 dead—actually much more, with no precise figure available due to the scale of the disaster—most of whom are civilians, alongside the destruction of any possible social life for many years to come.

The more immediate context is related to the assassination of Fouad Chokr, one of the leading military figures of Hezbollah and right-hand man to Hassan Nasrallah, on July 30 in Beirut. Given the political significance of this loss and the location of the assassination, Hezbollah could not let it go unpunished and had made several statements to that effect. However, it was actually Israel that launched a preventive operation on the night from Saturday to Sunday to destroy Hezbollah’s rocket launcher systems to prevent the large-scale operation promised by Hezbollah from coming to fruition.

In the aftermath of this attack, what was Israel’s response? What assessment can be made of these attacks for each party?

Hezbollah, through the voice of its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, clarified during a press conference held on the evening of the operations that the targets of the Katyusha rocket fire – which experts consider to be imprecise and easily interceptable – and drones focused on eleven military bases, including the one in Glilot, near Tel Aviv, which is said to be an Israeli military intelligence and Mossad base. None of the Hezbollah strikes targeted Israeli cities, which fairly clearly indicates the limits the Lebanese militant group has set for itself.

As mentioned earlier, the Israeli side stated that the airstrikes carried out by its air force – seemingly involving around a hundred planes – targeted thousands of Hezbollah’s launch ramps. This figure was immediately denied by the latter.

The exact toll is almost impossible to know, as, as is always the case in such situations, the triumphalist statements made by both sides are highly exaggerated, and in reality, the massive crossfire did not alter the military balance between the two belligerents.

It is also worth noting that while the United States reaffirmed its unwavering support for Israel, they apparently did not participate in intercepting the rockets launched by Hezbollah.

This brief episode highlights both the volatility of the regional situation and the limits each side has set for themselves. In any case, by Sunday, each of the protagonists explicitly stated that they wished to end the conflict at that stage. Hezbollah cannot leave the repeated assassinations of its leaders unpunished, as it risks losing credibility, but it is fully aware that there is no interest in launching a large-scale military offensive against Israel. Such an action would not only be highly detrimental to a Lebanon already extremely weakened, but it would also diminish Hezbollah’s key political role in the country.

Israel, for its part, operates under a radically different logic, though not without contradictions. It has been understood for weeks that Benjamin Netanyahu is seeking to regionalize the conflict in order to re-solidify support from his Western allies, particularly the United States, who have become increasingly critical of the government’s relentless forward push. However, this plan for regionalization is not supported by Western powers, who fear above all a risk of escalation that could quickly become uncontrollable.

What is the current state of the military capabilities of the “axis of resistance” compared to those of Israel? Should we expect a regional escalation of the conflict after nearly a year of war in Gaza?

One must be careful not to focus solely on the balance of military forces, but primarily on political considerations. However, each component of the so-called “axis of resistance” possesses operational capabilities that are difficult to assess precisely but should not be denied or underestimated. Let’s first recall the main forces in this composite entity.

Hamas and Islamic Jihad, though not eradicated despite the repeatedly affirmed goals of Benjamin Netanyahu, have been significantly weakened and are not in a position to launch any offensive.

The Iraqi Shiite militias close to Iran possess real operational capabilities, which are particularly evident in attacks on U.S. interests on Iraqi soil, but they are not in a position to launch an offensive externally due to their militia nature.

The Yemeni Houthis have surprisingly demonstrated operational aptitude, having significant effects on maritime traffic in the Red Sea and the northern extension of the Suez Canal. While they possess real military expertise, their strength lies primarily in their ability to disrupt international trade, which is not negligible.

Syria, as mentioned, has almost no capacity for conducting external operations due to the devastating consequences of the civil war.

As previously noted, Hezbollah has impressive military potential, particularly deployed along the northern border of Israel, but we know it cannot truly use it for the political reasons already mentioned.

Finally, Iran, unlike all the other actors mentioned, is a state actor with a variety of operational military means that can undoubtedly cause casualties and damage in Israel, but it is most concerned with avoiding being drawn into an uncontrollable escalation in the event of a direct conflict with Israel.

For an obvious reason, it would be a complete error in perspective to simply add up these military forces. Each component of the axis of resistance shares the same rhetoric about the “Zionist enemy” – and more broadly against U.S. imperialism – but each has its own national political agenda, making a coordinated attack on Israel almost impossible. Furthermore, each of these forces also fully understands that if such an attack were to occur, Washington’s response would be swift and would elevate the military operations to another level, in which this “axis of resistance” would likely have nothing to gain.