Towards a Resolution of the Kurdish Question in Turkey?

Abdullah Öcalan’s declaration of 25 February 2025, made public by parliamentarians and leaders of the Kurdish party, the People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), two days later, will mark a significant moment in the already long history of the Kurdish question in Turkey. However, it seems premature to call it historic.

The political context of Abdullah Öcalan’s declaration

To everyone’s surprise, it was the leader of the far-right Nationalist Action Party, Devlet Bahçeli, known for decades for his constant and radical opposition to Kurdish demands, who initiated a new political phase in October 2024. He declared his support for allowing Öcalan to speak before Parliament to address DEM deputies and announce the end of the armed struggle. Many commentators then questioned what had driven Bahçeli to take such an initiative. Indeed, it seems inexplicable on his part unless considered as a calculated division of roles with his political ally, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The latter took a few days to react, making a very vague initial statement about the need to extend a hand to the “Kurdish brothers” and bring peace and harmony to the country.

Since then, DEM parliamentarians have visited Abdullah Öcalan three times on the island of İmralı – in the Sea of Marmara, south of Istanbul – where he has been held in isolation since 1999, receiving only rare visits. These events were undeniably the first signs of an apparent shift in stance on handling the Kurdish question. This impression was reinforced when, upon returning from their visits to Öcalan, the parliamentarians held highly publicised briefings with each political group represented in Parliament.

Nonetheless, there has been a complete lack of discussion so far on the concrete conditions necessary to finally initiate a political negotiation process leading to a compromise and an agreement. Doubts are even stronger as, alongside these apparent advances, a wave of arrests targeted DEM mayors due to their alleged ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Mardin, Batman, and Halfeti were among the first municipalities affected, as well as the Esenyurt district in Istanbul, where a Republican People’s Party (CHP) mayor was targeted. The CHP is the Kemalist party that won the March 2024 municipal elections. On 26 November, the arrest of 231 people was reported. On 11 February, the DEM mayor of Van was dismissed and sentenced to three years in prison. He was the eleventh mayor removed in this way – nine from DEM and two from the CHP, the main opposition party. Between 14 and 18 February, nearly 300 more individuals were arrested across the country on similar grounds. These examples illustrate the repressive climate prevailing in Turkey, which starkly contrasts with Öcalan’s openings. The authorities likely seek to reassure the nationalist electorate, which is inherently opposed to Kurdish demands and is playing an increasingly structuring role in Turkish politics and electoral outcomes, raising concerns about the future of the process.

The content of the declaration

Entitled “Call for Peace and a Democratic Society,” Abdullah Öcalan’s declaration is brief. He recalls the ancient coexistence between Turks and Kurds – over 1,000 years, as he emphasises – revisits the reasons and timing of the PKK’s creation, and repeatedly stresses the fundamental importance of democratic values, models, and practices. Öcalan clearly breaks away from some of the PKK’s historical demands. The idea of a separate state, the possibility of a federal solution, or the prospect of administrative autonomy for Turkey’s southeastern regions all appear to be abandoned. It is striking that no explicitly Kurdish demands are included in this declaration, which instead features broader and less precise calls for democratic and harmonious coexistence.

Conversely, the cornerstone of the declaration is a clear call for disarmament and the self-dissolution of the PKK, signalling a radical shift in potential prospects. However, the content and form of this call suggest a weakening of the PKK, which does not necessarily mean its disappearance from the national and regional political landscape. Nevertheless, on 1 March, the PKK announced its adherence to Öcalan’s appeal, declared a ceasefire, and convened a congress whose “success will depend on Öcalan’s direct involvement.” This phrasing allows for multiple interpretations.

Conditions for real progress?

Given the nature of this declaration, it is legitimate to question its significance and, above all, the likelihood of its implementation.

Firstly, it is useful to remember that this is not the first time attempts to resolve the Kurdish question have been made in Turkey. To recall only those from the Erdoğan years: 2009, 2010-2011, and especially the late 2012 to summer 2025 period, which generated genuine hope but ultimately failed due to short-sighted electoral concerns.

The current context is different but does not necessarily inspire greater optimism. The alliance between Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the far right since 2015, along with the severe restrictions on democratic freedoms following the 2016 coup attempt, are factors that do not favour a negotiated solution with the PKK and DEM.

Öcalan’s call for disarmament and the self-dissolution of the PKK immediately raises two key questions. Does he still hold the unquestioned authority over the PKK that he once did, after 26 years of imprisonment? In other words, is the organisation’s military leadership in the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq willing to comply without any guarantees in return? Given the PKK’s history and operational structure, this seems unlikely.

For any real chance of success, the government must provide tangible assurances; otherwise, positions will remain entrenched. Several possible measures could be considered: amnesty for political prisoners accused of PKK links; an end to the many restrictions on DEM activists and officials; reinstatement of removed DEM mayors; recognition of Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights; and decisions regarding the future of Abdullah Öcalan and Selahattin Demirtaş, the former leader of DEM’s predecessor party, imprisoned since 2016. These measures are simple to outline but require political will and courage from the Ankara authorities to be implemented.

The regional dimension

Finally, another key factor to assess is the regional context, which will influence the likelihood of a successful agreement.

Firstly, Iraq. A DEM delegation visited Erbil on 16 February to meet with Nechirvan Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, to deliver a message from Öcalan. These Iraqi Kurdish leaders – who have always been wary of the PKK, seeing it as a destabilising force in their region – may or may not have the ability to persuade the PKK’s military leaders to comply with Öcalan’s disarmament request. This remains uncertain and will fundamentally depend on the guarantees provided.

Then, Syria. This aspect is even more crucial. The northeast of the country, commonly known as Rojava, is governed by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which are structured around the Democratic Union Party (PYD), itself closely linked to the PKK. Difficult negotiations have been ongoing for weeks between the new Syrian authorities and the SDF. Damascus’s main objective is to preserve and consolidate national unity, which means reducing the autonomy gained by the northeast during the civil war and, most importantly, integrating the SDF’s military structures into the newly forming Syrian army. The authorities in Damascus, known for their close ties with Ankara, face a dilemma: too many concessions to Syria’s Kurds would anger Turkish leaders, while excessive alignment with Ankara’s demands could prevent the SDF from agreeing to a negotiated settlement with Damascus. It is precisely here that Öcalan’s role could be crucial. If Erdoğan initiates genuine democratic reforms in response to his appeal, Öcalan could attempt to influence the SDF leadership to accept Damascus’s demands. However, Mazloum Abdi, SDF commander-in-chief, quickly responded to Öcalan’s appeal, stating that it concerned the PKK and not Syrian Kurdistan.

For these reasons, any possibility of achieving positive outcomes in Turkey partly depends on regional dynamics, reflecting the transnational nature of the Kurdish issue.