The United States and Iran: The Indecisive Armada

The United States’ economic, financial, digital and military power, combined with its democratic model, made it the defender of the Western world during the Cold War and the regulator of global affairs since 1990. The Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, the Pacific, Europe and Ukraine: it intervenes, at the request of the international community or without its assent. Even if significant opposition arose against the project of going to war in Iraq (2003), the United States succeeded in assembling a coalition ready to act without any mandate from the UN Security Council.

Today, the solitary exercise of power conducted Urbi et Orbi by Donald Trump and the erratic course of his decision-making process encourages the Western community to exercise greater restraint, both in supporting and criticising American posturing. The idea is widely shared that the Iranian population must be supported in its struggle against murderous theocratic tyranny—yes, but how? The leverage of sanctions has become blunted: Iran can still sell its oil, with the help of the ghost fleet that enables it, without that fleet being hunted down; the European Union has indeed imposed sanctions on the Revolutionary Guards—the pillar and co-actor of the Mullahs’ power—but still hesitates to classify them as a terrorist organisation; the rest of the world is unconcerned or supplies arms to Iran.

Thus remain the United States, its power, and its commander-in-chief.

An– Either to support the popular uprising by force and prevent repression. A militarily difficult mission, because the insurgents are not structured into forces and have no support bases from which they could attack the regime with American support [scenario akin to Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), Syria (2003)].

• Overthrowing the Iranian regime would require the execution of an Iraq-type scenario (2003), involving ground military capability.
• Or to put pressure on the regime by launching a few punitive strikes when repression intensifies, in the hope of precipitating the regime’s fall.
• Or to seize this opportunity to secure, under threat, the dismantling of nuclear and missile programmes and the end of the proxy strategy (Houthis, Hamas, Hezbollah) that threatens Middle Eastern allies.

The Americans reject the first objective; consider the cost-effectiveness of the second too poor; but openly move towards the third: NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS (@realDonaldTrump). A few exchanges are underway with the Iranian regime, without real negotiations having begun, and statements remain incendiary on both sides. Attempts at mutual deterrence through rhetoric, but only the balance of power truly matters.

What are Iran’s capabilities after the June 2025 war?

The United States and Israel conducted in June 2025 a methodical air war with a substantial volume of assets, which enabled them to eliminate air defences, weaken Iran’s long-range strike capabilities, and penetrate its airspace to hit strategic nuclear sites without suffering a single loss. Iran’s response focused on Israel, with an inconsequential strike on the American base at Al-Udeid in Qatar. This time, Iran claims to be ready to retaliate forcefully and is preparing for it: beyond the fact that the Mullahs and the Revolutionary Guards are not taken by surprise, they fully understand that they will be particularly targeted, through their economic interests and their military capabilities. The Revolutionary Guards control almost all productive and commercial infrastructures and constitute a very well-equipped army—targets that strike at their active core.

Their air-defence units were partially rebuilt with Chinese support; their retaliatory capabilities rely on stocks of long-range missiles, Shahed drones in large numbers, a submarine fleet (Kilo-class, 3,000 tonnes, armed with Kalibr missiles, and 23 Ghadir-class submarines, 123 tonnes, equipped with missiles and torpedoes), fast boats, and proxies (Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas). This gives them the capacity to sow disorder in the Middle East via proxies, to block the Strait of Hormuz, to attempt to strike American ships (civilian and military), and, of course, to cover Israel with a rain of missiles.

What “cards” do the Americans hold?

Iran’s retaliatory capabilities frighten America’s allies in the region. They are in contact with the Iranians and have announced their refusal to allow actions to be carried out from US installations on their territory (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates). Turkey denounces the risk of migratory flows should the Iranian regime fall. Yet the pre-positioned combat and logistical assets are indispensable to sustaining a potentially long air campaign. Air-defence systems have been deployed to these bases, but concerns extend beyond missile retaliation. Israel expresses doubts about any action against the Mullahs that would not be definitive; its general staff is certainly associated with planning, at least for intelligence. Consequently:

The first phase of the manoeuvre is political, to obtain agreements or provide assurances (Trump cannot apply here the “Donroe corollary”) in order to secure the use of bases housing pre-positioned stocks and aircraft.
This political phase is conducted in coordination with an intelligence-gathering plan to identify targets for the initial strikes (elimination of air defences); major targets (Revolutionary Guard units and economic infrastructures);
And finally the development of a comprehensive and sustained strike plan, along with a defence plan covering the entire area of responsibility of the US Central Command.
Another simultaneous phase: force generation.

The Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group is particularly powerful: an air wing of 90 aircraft offering all necessary capabilities—intelligence, electronic warfare, air defence and air-to-ground strike—deployable over more than 700 km, extended by weapon range; three frigates each equipped with 90 missile launchers, including the formidable Tomahawk missiles capable of sea-to-land strikes up to 1,600 km. It can inflict serious damage on the Revolutionary Guards.

But if the first salvos do not bring them to the negotiating table, the United States cannot stop there and will need to sustain its operations: the air campaign over Serbia—certainly less resistant than Iran—lasted 78 days with 480 sorties per day on average; in the first three days of the Iraq war (2003), the United States fired 2,800 Tomahawk-class missiles.

Reinforcement by a second carrier strike group appears indispensable. The George H. W. Bush left Norfolk on 13 January to join the North Atlantic, where the French army’s Orion exercise is taking place. It could also reach the Indian Ocean according to announcements from the commander-in-chief.

L’indécise Armada

By setting as its political objective the renunciation by Iran of what it considers its core interests (the nuclear programme and proxy capabilities), and without rallying a coalition of volunteers around it, President Trump has set himself a task difficult to accomplish with the current assets in the theatre. The most demanding hypothesis is that of going all the way in the showdown with Iran. For now, he does not genuinely have the necessary cards. Does he intend to acquire them, or continue a poker game he will walk away from once he grows tired?

We will know if the George H. W. Bush CSG enters the Mediterranean or if other assets are deployed to the area (Tomahawk-equipped frigates; special forces). Otherwise, the guns may thunder, but their effects will fall short of the objectives. It will be punitive strikes that will not destabilise the regime in its determination to resist demands concerning its military nuclear programme. For the moment, we are witnessing meticulous—and therefore lengthy—planning for a major operation that could aim to be decisive and cannot be reduced to strikes such as those against Afghanistan (2001) or even Serbia (1999). The enemy is of a different calibre, and the operational plan far more complex.