The Trump Doctrine in the Caribbean: Between Regional Reconfigurations and Island Vulnerabilities

The operation conducted by Donald Trump in Venezuela at the beginning of January plunged the country into profound uncertainty. But beyond the Venezuelan case alone, it is the entire set of Latin American geopolitical balances that has been shaken up, and more particularly those of this hinge space that is the Caribbean. The decline of the Petrocaribe programme, combined with migratory and economic risks, places the island states before a new balance of power, highlighting the extent of their structural dependencies. In this fragmented context, Caribbean issues also concern France, as well as the major powers rival to the United States. Interview with Alain Carton, Associate Research Fellow at IRIS.

What repercussions have Donald Trump’s actions against Venezuela had in the Caribbean, which can be summed up as a “Monroe Doctrine”? What reactions have these prompted among populations, and how are the governments of the different island states reacting?

Even before political reactions, the first impact of the event is economic. Actions carried out by the US administration have slowed trade and disrupted air traffic and tourist flows. Port activity is now itself under threat in an area already very fragile, made up of small island economies or economies shaped by the oil and tourism mono-industry. The increased presence of US ships and aircraft in the southern Caribbean since 2025 worries island governments, with risks of spillover or massive migratory flows in the event of prolonged instability.

The energy dependence of several Caribbean states that benefited from the Petrocaribe programme—supplying Venezuelan oil at preferential prices—has been radically altered with the exhaustion of the Chávez system and the US blockade. Petrocaribe was a major instrument of Venezuelan diplomacy, enabling Caracas to secure the support of many Caribbean states in international forums (Organization of American States – OAS, United Nations – UN, Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas – ALBA). This influence was long perceived as a threat by the United States, which sought at all costs to limit its expansion and strengthen its own presence in the region.

This could give rise to increased rivalries between major powers (United States, China, Russia, European Union – EU), each seeking to strengthen its influence through energy investments, financing and strategic partnerships in the area. This multipolarity could offer new opportunities, but at present it increases regional fragmentation and competition for access to resources.

More than ever, the political and economic landscape of the Caribbean appears fragmented, and Donald Trump’s policy—which divides the states of the area—reveals a situation of growing inequality between countries in crisis and others that benefit from oil revenues. Regional organisations (Caribbean Community – CARICOM, Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States – OECS) are not structured enough to assert themselves against external powers or to chart a strategic line. Officially, CARICOM convened its Bureau of Heads of Government on 3 January 2026 and issued a statement reaffirming attachment to the principles of the United Nations Charter while calling for peaceful dialogue and stating that it was ready to support diplomatic efforts for Venezuela’s stability. CARICOM is thus attempting to preserve a strategic neutrality that is difficult to maintain.

But behind this façade, the increased US military presence since 2025 fuels concerns about a lasting militarisation of the area. Several Caribbean governments, dependent on tourism and trade flows, find themselves caught between the need to cooperate with Washington and the fear of being drawn into a regional confrontation. The countries most dependent on US tourism and trade flows (the Bahamas, Jamaica, Barbados) are encouraged to support the American position. Others, such as Grenada or Dominica, hesitate to condemn Caracas and seek to secure new energy sources in order to reduce their vulnerability.

This crisis could further accentuate internal divergences and reduce the Caribbean’s ability to speak with one voice on the international stage. The region does not have a single position on the crisis, most states being rather cautious or critical vis-à-vis Donald Trump’s policy, especially on immigration and trade.

How are relations between Washington and Caribbean countries likely to evolve? Do these events redefine political positions and regional balances in the Caribbean space?

Donald Trump’s interventionist policy towards the Caribbean–Latin America area, and Venezuela in particular, culminated in the abduction of Nicolás Maduro, but it began with his term in office and reflects two priorities in the eyes of the US administration: US energy security with the presence of American oil companies; and the fight against crime and illegal immigration.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited Jamaica, Guyana and Suriname in March 2026 after an initial visit to the region as soon as he took office. He made US investment and support for economic development conditional on opening up public procurement and infrastructure markets, and on rallying to “America First” fundamentals in terms of immigration and the containment of Venezuela. Added to this is the open fight against the Chinese presence. If one can speak of a revival of the “Monroe Doctrine”, it is indeed here that it applies, with the aim of deterring China’s projects, which are growing in ports, airports and major commercial infrastructure in a space claimed as an American lake, the “third border”. This policy relies particularly on Guyana, and to a lesser extent Suriname, which have become oil Eldorados. The United States has signed a memorandum of understanding on security cooperation with Guyana, which becomes its strategic partner for the Caribbean space.

Washington is determined to reassert its influence in a region increasingly courted by its international competitors, with a strategy aimed at responding to immediate crises, economic competition and regional security concerns, with a particular emphasis on fighting China’s expansion and protecting Guyana against Venezuelan attempts at aggression.

For Caribbean leaders, this attention presents both opportunities and dilemmas. Security assurances and access to the US market come with implicit expectations regarding limiting Chinese cooperation, which could significantly restrict their development options.

The Venezuelan crisis and the contraction of oil deliveries have reshuffled the deck: several countries have moved closer to the United States, China or the European Union in order to diversify their energy and financial partnerships.

How does France, and more particularly its overseas territories in the Caribbean, view Donald Trump’s posture and the threat he poses to the region?

First of all, the regional integration of France’s overseas departments in the Americas is not real. Even if regional cooperation is intensifying via INTERREG, only Martinique has sought to become an associate member of CARICOM, albeit with an essentially symbolic scope. French Guiana is interested in cooperation with northern Brazil (Amapá) but is mainly exposed to predation by its neighbours (Brazil, Suriname). The three French departments are a destination for immigration from countries in the area (Dominica, Haiti, Saint Lucia), which is experienced more as a challenge than as a factor of integration. France seeks, via its embassy in Saint Lucia, to create an area of influence among the English-speaking states of the eastern Caribbean gathered within the OECS, with which Guadeloupe and Martinique are associated. This influence is expressed through cooperation in health, education and the environment. It aims to encourage the establishment of French companies in the area and to secure political support during multilateral initiatives. But this regional organisation is above all technical, and its political weight is less than that of CARICOM.

As a result, France often finds itself alone, with or facing the United States, as a “major” power in the region without being a regional power—especially since its territories, covered by European regulations, have interests that diverge from the Caribbean sub-group of ACP (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific) countries. Indeed, the French overseas departments in the Americas are integrated into the European single market and benefit from the status of outermost regions. They are governed by EU fiscal, customs and trade rules. They cannot, moreover, have any diplomacy of their own, even within their regional space.

The two major themes of the US administration in the area (energy and the fight against crime) resonate particularly in the French territories, which face security challenges and where energy independence is crucial (fuel prices are administered by the state and distribution is ensured by a monopoly, the SARA refining company). The new configuration of the oil market imposed by the United States will have direct consequences for a French model that is running out of steam and is seeking to diversify its supplies. More broadly, the rise of American protectionism and tariff policy affects island economies dependent on imports and has significant repercussions for the French territories.

In terms of security, the significant presence of the French Armed Forces in the Antilles (FAA) constitutes an instrument for prevention and crisis management in the Lesser Antilles arc, as well as a support point for major regional interventions. The forces are engaged in assisting populations in the event of natural disasters, and above all in combating drug trafficking at sea. Until now, this has been carried out through inter-agency and international cooperation with the US inter-agency anti-drug trafficking body—the Joint InterAgency Task Force-South—for missions falling under state action at sea.

Here again, one can expect the tightening of the American line to complicate French actions from its territories, making an operational adjustment between France and the United States necessary—one that has not yet taken shape.