Russia–Ukraine: what is the situation after four years of war?

Four years after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the balance of power has evolved. As American support has eroded, weakening the West’s ability to defend Kyiv’s territorial integrity, Vladimir Putin’s Russia now occupies a significant share of the claimed territory. Yet despite these gains, the conflict has turned into a war of attrition whose outcome remains uncertain and contested. The Kremlin’s strategy, in contrast to that of the Europeans, may appear to have partially borne fruit, but the Ukrainian question extends far beyond the territorial dimension: it touches on political identity, cultural affiliations and the logic of spheres of influence, within an international order where the very idea of a globalised system is fraying. In this context, how should the current configuration of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict be understood? An assessment with Igor Delanoë, associate researcher at IRIS, specialising in Russian geopolitics.

How can Russia’s military, political and diplomatic strategy be analysed after four years of war in Ukraine? What assessment can be made of its actual effectiveness?

“The special military operation” was certainly conceived at the outset as a rapid operation – a matter of weeks at most – with relatively limited losses. In the Kremlin’s view, it was intended to bring about a reset of the European security system, something that could already be discerned between the lines of the Istanbul agreement of March 2022. NATO, and probably the EU, were expected to halt their eastward expansion, and Ukraine was to become a neutral, non-aligned state.

The transformation of the armed conflict into a prolonged war of attrition has led to a reorientation of these objectives. First, the question of neutrality – and, a fortiori, that of a pro-Russian political orientation of the Ukrainian state, which was certainly one of the initial aims of the “special military operation” – has been set aside. While the Kremlin will likely obtain, at the end of the war, a halt to NATO’s expansion along its borders and restrictions on foreign military presence in Ukraine, it will not alter the nature of the Ukrainian government, which will remain hostile to Russia. From this follows the second objective: restrictions on the capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces. Reaching a situation in which Russia faces a hostile but militarily harmless Ukrainian authority on its doorstep appears to be a relatively acceptable outcome for the Kremlin. To this are added demands concerning the Russian language – a recurring issue in Russo-Ukrainian relations since the 1990s – and the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. In other words, the core of Russia’s demands lies less in the territorial question than in the status of Ukraine. It also seems doubtful that Russia aims to conquer additional Ukrainian oblasts, given the means at its disposal on the ground. The only territory of political value to it is the 25% of the Donbas still controlled by the Ukrainian army, roughly equivalent in size to the French département of Var. Moscow remains convinced that time is not on Ukraine’s side and is betting on the exhaustion of Kyiv’s human, economic and energy resources, as well as on the fatigue and dwindling support of its backers, in order to achieve its aims.

At the diplomatic level, Russia’s strategy has changed little in substance since 2022, following the failure of the Istanbul talks, and has been reinforced after the election of Donald Trump: Moscow is above all counting on an understanding with Washington. The Kremlin’s positions have remained unchanged, while Donald Trump varied, until the summer of 2025, in the approach to negotiations with Moscow: whether to require a prior and unconditional ceasefire, which was the position of the Europeans and Ukrainians, or to engage in discussions while fighting continued, as Russia demanded. The latter option was ultimately adopted, and the diplomatic sequence that opened in Abu Dhabi at the beginning of the year is a first result. The guiding idea remains to establish a framework for a ceasefire through trilateral negotiations, a framework that would then be imposed on the Europeans, according to Moscow’s view. That said, even though Washington has shifted its approach to the conflict under the new administration, the United States retains leverage over Moscow, as demonstrated by the sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil adopted in October 2025, as well as by leaks concerning the CIA’s continued involvement in assisting Ukrainian strikes against Russia.

Is the Russian leadership facing domestic constraints (economic, social, public opinion), or does it still feel legitimate in the eyes of its population? To what extent does the logic of “raison d’État” continue to structure support for the Kremlin?

The Russian leadership still feels legitimate in the eyes of the population, but it is more constrained domestically than it was last year. Economically, first of all, as a number of indicators turned amber at the end of 2025 and the beginning of 2026. Russia ended 2025 with growth of around 1%, after two years above 4%. Inflation, estimated at 5.6% last year, continues to erode purchasing power, especially as perceived inflation is probably two to three times higher depending on the goods considered. With the central bank’s key rate at 15.5%, money remains too expensive and Russian companies have halted their investments. Finally, the budget deficit stood at 2.6% in 2025, after several years below 2%. In other words, the country’s macroeconomic trajectory appears to be settling into a form of stagnation, supported by modest growth of between 1 and 2% annually through to the end of the decade. The drivers behind the economic rebound observed in 2023 and 2024, thanks to the neo-Keynesian approach of the Russian state, which heavily invested in selective industrial revival, have now reached their limits.

Russian society is also showing signs of fatigue with regard to the conflict. While life remains normal in Moscow, this is not the case in regions bordering Ukraine, nor even in certain industrial centres further from the front line. More generally, the population will feel great relief when the war ends, but it is not prepared to act to hasten the end of operations, nor to accept a cut-price peace at any cost. Opinion polls tend rather to show that public expectations align with those of the Kremlin regarding the terms of the end of hostilities, namely a Ukrainian surrender. As for troop recruitment, which still takes place largely on a voluntary basis thanks to attractive salaries and social packages, there appears to be a slowdown in enlistment. Depending on the sources, between 30,000 and 35,000 men now enlist each month to fight in Ukraine, compared with 40,000 to 45,000 monthly recruits for much of 2025.

However, while new constraints do exist, they are not, at this stage, sufficient to call into question either the Kremlin’s war effort or its political calculation and determination in the short to medium term.

Is Russia’s belligerent posture on the international stage across several fronts likely to intensify beyond its current scope of action? Should we expect an endless war, given that the Kremlin has stated that the “information war with the West will never end”? What does this reveal about the worldview promoted by Vladimir Putin and the regime’s ideologues?

What is certain is that the Kremlin remains convinced that confrontation with the West is set to endure, even after the end of the war in Ukraine. That said, this West appears less “collective” than before Donald Trump’s election. While the United States is likely to focus more on its geopolitical competition with China, the European Union is still perceived as fundamentally hostile, as it refuses any dialogue with Moscow on an equal footing so long as Vladimir Putin remains in power and Russia is not democratic. A common analytical framework among Russian observers of international affairs contrasts globalists with regionalists. According to this view, globalists are those who support the international order as it existed before the pandemic. From Moscow’s perspective, the EU and American Democrats remain staunch defenders of this globalised world, embodied by the Davos Forum and seen as being in decline. Regionalists, by contrast, promote a world order structured around regional spheres of influence, in which powers reach agreements according to a transactional logic and where multilateralism persists primarily at a macro-regional level, as illustrated, for instance, by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Trump is perceived by the Russians as favourable to this reorganisation of world affairs, of which the war in Ukraine is, in their view, an accelerator.

More broadly, once the conflict in Ukraine has subsided, the Kremlin will continue to promote a post-Western multipolar international order. Confrontation is likely to persist in the informational sphere and through third-party conflict zones (Africa, the Middle East), but it is doubtful that Russia will embark on another military venture, particularly one directly against NATO. The country will emerge economically drained from this war, will need to regenerate, and the authorities will struggle to justify a new conflict to both the population and the elites.