Peace or Capitulation? The Trump Plan and the Ukrainian Deadlock

A few days ago, Donald Trump presented a new “peace plan” for Ukraine, a document initially comprising 28 points, very similar in form to the one obtained for the Gaza Strip last October, now revised down to 19. Combining territorial concessions, security guarantees and a marginalised role for Europe, this project reveals a shift in the balance of power within the Western camp and raises questions about both American strategy and Europe’s ability to influence the settlement of the conflict. What insights can be provided into the new Trump plan, between the legacy of Istanbul and the adjustments imposed by the current balance of power? What consequences might such a negotiated peace have for the European Union and its strategic future? An assessment with Jean de Gliniasty, Research Director at IRIS and former French Ambassador to Russia.

Between its potential successes and its blind spots, what analysis can be offered of the Trump plan for peace in Ukraine?

Donald Trump’s plan reiterates the main components of the aborted April 2022 agreement negotiated in Istanbul by the advisers to the Russian and Ukrainian presidents (Vladimir Medinski and Andriy Yermak): Kyiv’s renunciation of the Donbass and Crimea, non-accession to NATO, lifting of sanctions, Russian language… It will be recalled that the agreement collapsed over the issues of security guarantees for Ukraine, with the Russians wanting to be included, and the capping of the Ukrainian army’s troop numbers and equipment, with the Russians demanding a limit of 100,000 men. At the time, the Ukrainian army was successfully pushing back Russian forces, and the British Prime Minister Boris Johnson had encouraged Kyiv, likely with the American president’s approval, to reject the agreement, particularly after the Bucha massacre. The summit between Volodymyr Zelensky and Vladimir Putin, which was meant to settle the remaining points, therefore never took place. The Russians have consistently said that this agreement should remain the basis, while taking account of realities on the ground, now more favourable to Russia. This is what the Trump plan of 28 points—prepared in Miami during October by advisers Steve Witkoff and Kirill Dimitriev—attempted to do. But the questions of security guarantees and Ukrainian troop numbers remain unresolved, while in the meantime an additional issue has emerged: that of Russian territorial gains, alongside the difficult-to-accept idea for Kyiv of evacuating territories not yet occupied in the Donbass and freezing the line of contact in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.

What does this American approach reveal within a fractured Western world? What does the current situation show about the balance of power between Washington, Moscow, Kyiv and the Europeans?

Donald Trump and his team (from which Keith Kellogg, more favourable to Ukraine, has just been removed) want to rid themselves of the Ukrainian conflict as quickly as possible and, if possible, reap the benefits of any potential peace. The Europeans matter little in his desire to normalise relations with Russia in order to focus on “business” and on China. Yet Europe cannot be sidelined since it will have to play a role in security guarantees and in financing the reconstruction of a devastated Ukraine. The 28-point plan mentions the stationing of European fighter jets in Poland, European financial participation in Ukraine’s reconstruction, and Ukraine’s entry into the European Union—even though Europe was not consulted in the drafting of the plan. Nonetheless, it has attempted to make its voice heard and to improve a plan it considers too unfavourable to its interests and those of Kyiv: it notably requests that the minimum size of Ukrainian forces be increased to 800,000 men (instead of 600,000 in the initial plan) and, above all—and this will be unacceptable to Moscow—that territorial compromise be negotiated after the ceasefire enters into force, not before. Kyiv, for its part, faces triple pressure: that of the corruption scandal weakening Volodymyr Zelensky, that of the Russian advance on the ground, and that of the United States, which is threatening to cut all aid.

What might be the potential consequences of such a peace plan for the European Union?

The Europeans, unlike in previous episodes, have accepted the (Russo-)American text as a basis, while introducing amendments. They are resigning themselves to a possible peace more favourable to Russian interests—although they are trying to improve it at the margins—because they know that Kyiv can no longer win the war and that they themselves will be unable to replace American support in the long term. Just as they failed to enforce the Minsk agreements (which would have spared Ukraine heavy losses in both human lives and territory), they failed to position themselves as mediators and have found themselves bypassed by Donald Trump. Ultimately, should Donald Trump’s initiative succeed, they will indirectly benefit from the overall improvement in the political, military and economic situation on the continent.