Analyses / Asia-Pacific
27 February 2025
The European Union and India Draw Closer in the Shadow of Trump 2.0.

Ursula Von der Leyen and the entire college of European Commissioners are in New Delhi on Thursday, 27, and Friday, 28 February 2025, for a long-planned EU-India summit. While the meeting follows a well-established schedule, the circumstances in which it takes place are far from routine due to the upheavals caused by the early steps of Donald Trump’s administration on the international stage.
EU-India: A Summit with a Strong Political and Strategic Dimension
If one were to sum up the nature of relations between India and the European Union (EU) over the past quarter-century in a single word, “languor” would immediately come to mind, as declared, reaffirmed, and then reasserted objectives have stretched on for years.
The first summit bringing together India and EU leaders took place in Lisbon in 2000. In principle, these summits were supposed to be held annually, alternating between Europe and India. In practice, there have been just over fifteen such meetings, sometimes separated by a year, sometimes two, and at times by an even longer gap—with or without publicly explained reasons. Initially, Covid-19 was cited as a reason for delays, yet that did not prevent later meetings from being held via videoconference. Shortly after coming to power in 2014, Narendra Modi snubbed Brussels, irritated by the European Parliament’s criticisms of human rights issues in India.
More generally, Modi prefers bilateral relations with a few carefully chosen states over multilateral meetings. France, particularly favoured by Modi’s India, has no reason to complain. Germany and Italy are also among his preferred partners.
In 2007, India and the EU launched negotiations to reach a free trade agreement. The depth of disagreements quickly became apparent. In addition to the intrinsic difficulties of the negotiation itself, there was an obvious lack of political will on both sides, leading to the suspension of talks in 2013. However, negotiations resumed in 2022, with a renewed shared interest from both New Delhi and Brussels, despite the persistent obstacles. Yet, with the necessary political will, these challenges no longer seem insurmountable.
Meanwhile, as the EU became increasingly concerned about China’s rising power, it rediscovered India, a previously neglected partner—a sentiment that India reciprocated, partly for the same reasons. This explains why, in April 2021, following France’s lead, the EU adopted an Indo-Pacific strategy. The previous year, in July 2021, India and the EU had also concluded a strategic partnership titled “India-EU Strategic Partnership: A Roadmap to 2025.” In other words, as this document nears its expiration, it is time to renew and extend it.
This India-EU summit, therefore, from the outset, carries a political and strategic dimension that goes well beyond the trade discussions that have marked their contacts for the past 25 years.
Naturally, however, the international context, shaped by Donald Trump’s inauguration for his second term and the upheavals hinted at by his early decisions, is imposing itself on the agenda of this meeting.
The Lingering Shadow of US Tariffs
Certainly, Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington on 12 and 13 February seemed to go well, with both leaders displaying great cordiality towards each other. However, this did not prevent the US president from repeating, just after his guest’s departure, the same message he had been stating before the visit: “Here’s what we’re going to do: reciprocity. Whatever you charge, I charge.”
Indian tariffs are among the highest in the world. Having greatly benefited from globalisation, India must now navigate an increasingly fragmented world.
The War in Ukraine
After refusing to condemn the Russian invasion for three years while expressing its willingness to host peace talks, India, like the rest of the world, is now witnessing Donald Trump’s tendency to align with Moscow’s rhetoric.
A habitual proponent of abstention at the United Nations, India abstained twice on 24 February: once on the Ukrainian resolution and once on the US resolution (which was supported by Russia). More broadly, the accelerated rapprochement between Moscow and Washington has raised concerns in New Delhi about losing its unique relationship with Russia.
The Fragmentation of the International System
Indian diplomacy has been built on the principle of “non-alignment” since independence, also referred to as “neutralism” or the “third way” during the Cold War’s era of bipolarisation. Over the past decade, however, it has evolved into “multi-alignment,” a more pragmatic (or opportunistic) version of non-alignment, tailored to a multipolar world.
Yet, the current fragmentation of the international system, exacerbated by the unilateralism of US policy under Trump 2.0, threatens to undermine India’s carefully honed balancing act unless it recalibrates its multi-alignment strategy. This is one of the key reasons behind India’s renewed interest in engaging with the European Union, despite its well-known flaws—internal divisions, slow decision-making processes—whereas, on the Indian side, a single decision by Prime Minister Modi is often enough to set the course. At the same time, in this complex geopolitical equation where India seeks to position itself at multiple intersections, its clear efforts to strengthen ties with China since the end of 2024 are particularly noteworthy.
The European Union, whose more hesitant members have just realised that the transatlantic link is on the verge of breaking and that the American alliance is no longer guaranteed, now needs to reinforce its other partnerships. Mutatis mutandis, a similar reflection is underway in New Delhi, even though India, as a matter of principle, rejects the concept of formal alliances. A reliable partnership is preferable to a dubious alliance.
Ultimately, two medium-sized geopolitical powers, when compared to the weight of Moscow, Beijing, and Washington, may exert greater global influence through coordinated initiatives than they would separately. This, at least, is the bet that both Indians and Europeans are making.