Israel’s Rise in Power and the Challenges It Poses in the Middle East

The Middle East is currently undergoing a restructuring of power balances, in particular between three regional powers—Iran, Turkey and Israel—with profound consequences for other actors. The region experienced a first redistribution following the entry of US troops into Iraq in 2003, which resulted in the country breaking up into confessional entities. Moreover, while the arrival of the Arab Spring at the end of 2010 was hailed as a liberating event, it nevertheless triggered a series of crises, and even civil wars, in several countries. This de-structuring of many Arab states thus weakened the regional architecture (the “Arab state system” based on borders inherited from European colonialism) and enabled the return to strength of the former imperial powers, Turkey and Iran. While the Islamic Republic of Iran then broadened its sphere of influence—in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Gaza—Turkey, for its part, also gained a foothold in Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia and Qatar (where it has a military base), not to mention Gaza, where Hamas, stemming from the Muslim Brotherhood movement, is not far, in its ideological foundations, from President Erdoğan’s AKP party.

The region is, however, now experiencing a new shift with Israel’s entry onto the scene following the 7 October 2023 attack, the consequences of which are felt far beyond Gaza. Indeed, we are witnessing a broad rise in Israel’s power, from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean, not to mention the Caucasus. Tel Aviv has thus put in place security agreements with Greece and Cyprus, with the possibility of joint troop deployments in the event of a crisis. It also maintains ties with Iraqi Kurdistan, as well as with Azerbaijan, which, by virtue of its geographical position, constitutes a central pivot between Iran and Turkey. While the alliances negotiated by Tel Aviv thus appear to encircle Iran (via Azerbaijan and Iraqi Kurdistan), they also envelop Turkey on its western and eastern flanks, while Tel Aviv also seeks to put pressure on Turkey from the south, in Syria, where it regularly strikes infrastructure and military capabilities of the new Syrian regime backed by Ankara. Tel Aviv has moreover supported Druze and Kurdish factions in Syria, which can only alarm Turkey, for which any separatism in Syria (notably Kurdish and Alawite) can only encourage particularisms in Turkey, especially regarding the Kurds, while Israel continues in parallel to strike the pro-Iranian Hezbollah in Lebanon. Finally, after largely neutralising Hamas and striking the Gaza Strip, Israel continues to encircle the West Bank, which is subjected to sustained settlement expansion, while the Palestinian Authority is itself compelled to cooperate closely with the Hebrew state on security matters.

Israel also conducts close security cooperation with the United Arab Emirates, which maintain a broad network of alliances in Libya (Marshal Haftar’s forces) and in Sudan (the Rapid Support Forces), a set-up that bypasses Egypt to the west and south, while Israel itself faces the latter on its eastern flank. Moreover, the recent crisis in Yemen, with the manoeuvre carried out by the Southern Transitional Council—an Emirati ally—towards the Yemeni region of Hadhramaut, together with Israel’s recognition of neighbouring Somaliland, situated opposite Yemen and the strategic Bab el-Mandeb strait (which commands the Red Sea and the Suez Canal), also threatened to envelop Saudi Arabia from the south, while Israel positions itself on the kingdom’s northern flank. While Saudi Arabia hastened to intervene in response to these developments in Yemen, the question of the country’s future is thus posed with particular urgency. Finally, the Israeli attack on Iran itself in June 2025 constituted the high point of this rise in Tel Aviv’s power.

Israel’s regional deployment thus recalls the map of the Middle East held up by Benjamin Netanyahu at the UN, where he suggested striking the “axis of evil” led by Iran, to replace it with another axis running from the Mediterranean to the Sea of Oman and from Europe to India, with Israel at its centre. A regional construction that Tel Aviv seems to be pursuing today by methodically placing its pieces across the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean. The central question is therefore: is this manoeuvre the prelude to a dynamic of peace, or is it merely a simple reversal of the balance of power in Israel’s favour?

The answer to this question lies essentially in Iran and in future developments in that country, as well as in the American stance. Three scenarios thus emerge. The first would be that of a change bringing to power in Tehran a regime close to the United States. The entire region, from Turkey to Iran and from Israel to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, would then be composed of states that are friends, allies or clients of Washington. It might then be possible to envisage a rapprochement, or even regional peace, with security guarantees that all states—today gripped by strong instability—are calling for. But this would require Washington to invest massively in this regional construction and in granting long-term guarantees. The United States, absorbed by its rivalry with China, are they ready for that? Do they really have the capacity?

The second scenario would be to see the mullahs’ regime endure in Tehran, or even a successor that would retain Iran’s defiant posture towards the United States and Israel. The Middle East would then enter a new “cold war” and would be structured around the opposition between regional poles, with Turkey, Iran and Israel holding one another in check, while Tel Aviv would work to consolidate its rapprochement with the Gulf countries. Saudi Arabia would find itself in a delicate position, between a defiant Iran and Israel seeking at all costs to cement its influence with the Saudi kingdom, the keystone of its regional deployment. Meanwhile, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, which form a central “glacis” separating Israel, Turkey and Iran, would risk retaining the status of buffer zones, or, at worst, failed states.

Finally, the third scenario—that of a fragmentation of Iran (whose population is highly heterogeneous and made up, for 40%, of Azeri, Kurdish, Arab, Tajik, Armenian or Baluch minorities), following powerful Israeli or American strikes, or following internal unrest—would also be risky, as it would carry within it the seeds of instability and could potentially spread to Iran’s neighbouring countries. The consequences of a strike on this country must therefore not be underestimated.