Israel, Hezbollah: Is Lebanon Facing a Foreseeable Escalation?

On 23 November, Israel once again struck beyond its borders, this time targeting the southern suburbs of Beirut and killing Hezbollah’s military chief, Haytham Ali Tabatabaï. Carried out in a densely populated area, the attack left five dead and 28 wounded, according to the Lebanese government. Despite a ceasefire concluded exactly one year ago, on 27 November 2024, the 79-km-long Israeli-Lebanese border has remained a fault line ever since the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. The continued existence of Hezbollah, a Shiite militia at the heart of Lebanon’s political and security equilibrium, thus provides a recurrent justification for Israeli extraterritorial operations. At a time when Lebanon is facing an unprecedented economic crisis and its political system—fragmented by a social confessional mosaic—struggles to assert its authority, what real capacity does the government have to respond to these repeated violations? What strategic outlook is taking shape for Israel, as well as for regional and international actors—such as the United States, France, and the Gulf states—traditionally involved in stabilising the regional security theatre? An assessment with Thomas Sarthou, international strategy analyst and graduate of IRIS Sup’.

What is the attitude and what are the current capabilities of the Lebanese government vis-à-vis Israel’s illegal operations?

Since the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon was signed on 27 November 2024, Israel’s repeated violations have triggered unanimous condemnation from the Lebanese political class. Within the new executive, in power since last 9 January, the strongest criticism of Israel’s strategy has come directly from the President of the Republic, Joseph Aoun. He was the first Lebanese official to react after the strikes, condemning a country that ‘refuses to implement international resolutions’ to end the escalation, and calling on the international community to intervene ‘forcefully and seriously’.

Beyond these repeated appeals to the international community, the Lebanese state suffers from a structural inability to assert its sovereignty over its entire territory and to put an end to Israeli aggression. While the cessation of hostilities agreement signed just one year ago provided for a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, Tel Aviv maintains five positions—which it itself describes as ‘strategic’. Moreover, Israel has multiplied strikes on Hezbollah-related targets, from the southern border area to Beirut’s southern suburbs, the Bekaa Valley (in the east), and even northern Lebanon. Beirut’s inability to respond to this rests on two major factors.

Firstly, the weakness of its military institution. Under-equipped and understaffed, it is experiencing one of the ‘worst economic crises in modern history’, according to the World Bank. With inflation soaring since 2019, a soldier earns on average 60 dollars and must therefore often find a second job to cover basic needs. This chronic capacity deficit makes the Lebanese army structurally dependent on foreign aid, particularly from the United States—whose interests in the region do not necessarily align with the development of a strong Lebanese army on the Israeli border.

Secondly, the Lebanese state cannot currently rely on a favourable regional environment to support its assertion of sovereignty. Joseph Aoun knows this all too well, as it took the endorsement of five regional and international powers for him to accede to the presidency after two years of vacancy. Yet the members of this ‘Quintet’—the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar—have reduced their support.

Arab capitals remain in a wait-and-see posture in the face of Israel’s increasingly assertive hubris in the region. Riyadh and Doha continue to condition their economic assistance for Lebanon’s reconstruction on significant progress on the disarmament of Hezbollah and concrete measures to end the captagon trafficking that transits from Syria to the Gulf, via Lebanon. Egypt, which enjoys the diplomatic advantage of being able to speak to Israel, the Lebanese state, and Hezbollah, is trying to forge a regional dynamic—as shown by its foreign minister’s visit to Beirut two days after the attack. But its economic and political weight is too limited for this to produce any significant momentum.

As for France, which co-chairs with the United States the committee responsible for monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire, its credibility is steadily eroding as Israel continues its violations. This is what Joseph Aoun reportedly told President Macron’s adviser Anne-Claire Legendre in early November: France’s ‘moral support’ is no longer enough. For while French diplomacy takes the lead on a wide range of major issues (organising conferences to support the army and reconstruction, reforms needed to set up a programme with the IMF, relations between Damascus and Beirut), the decisive decisions are taken in Washington, not Paris. A recent example illustrates this situation: the renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate this summer. While France linked the withdrawal of the UN force to the Lebanese state’s effective control of its territory, the United States under Donald Trump secured an unconditional withdrawal as early as next year.

Ultimately, Washington is setting the pace and is growing impatient over the disarmament issue. The Trump administration has set the end of the year as the deadline for seizing the Shiite movement’s arsenal and proposes to sponsor bilateral discussions between Tel Aviv and Beirut. Last week, the United States cancelled an entire series of meetings between American officials and the current head of the Lebanese army, General Rodolphe Haykal. Echoing Israeli rhetoric, they accuse the Lebanese army of not being active enough in dismantling the militia.

What are the latest developments in this process, and what is the current military capacity of Hezbollah? How is this dynamic perceived in Lebanon? Could it worsen the country’s internal stability?

Given the information available, it is very difficult to assess the scope of Hezbollah’s military capabilities. One thing is certain: the Shiite movement was severely weakened by the 66-day high-intensity war waged by Israel between May and November 2024. Militarily, it was undeniably a defeat for Hezbollah, which had until then been the only actor in the region to claim a military success against Israel in 2006. This defeat reached its peak with the so-called ‘beeper’ attack on 17 September 2024 and the death of its charismatic secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, 10 days later. It also resulted, politically, in a reduction of its influence and in the appointment of General Joseph Aoun to the presidency.

However, the latest Israeli strike that killed Haytham Ali Tabatabaï, a senior commander in Hezbollah’s elite force, shows that the militia’s chain of command has not been entirely decimated. Some observers even note that almost all officers and non-commissioned officers assassinated during the war have been replaced. Nonetheless, Israeli and American media claims that the militia continues to strengthen must be approached cautiously. In strictly material terms, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria—which had previously served as a hub for arms deliveries—and the restrictions at the port of Beirut introduced by the new Lebanese authorities make resupply difficult.

As for progress on the group’s disarmament, the figures must also be treated with caution. According to Lebanese authorities, more than 90% of Hezbollah-related infrastructure south of the Litani River (which runs west to east across southern Lebanon) has been dismantled. These same authorities claim that operations were conducted in cooperation with the militia. UNIFIL—which has been mandated since 1978 to ‘assist the Lebanese government in restoring its effective authority’—corroborates this information and, in its latest report, welcomes the progress made by the Lebanese army on disarmament. However, the central question is less whether the disarmament process is advancing than what its scope ought to be.

Here, two interpretations of the November 2024 ceasefire agreement clash. The first, shared by Washington, Tel Aviv, and some Lebanese political actors, considers that disarmament must be carried out ‘starting with the area south of the Litani’ (art. 7.a), and therefore ultimately concerns the entirety of Lebanese territory. Opposite them, Hezbollah and its allies argue that UN Security Council Resolution 1701, on which the agreement is based, applies only to the south of the country. The Lebanese government eventually settled the issue. On 5 September, it tasked the army with drawing up a five-stage plan starting in the south and extending to the rest of the country. This decision provoked the discontent of the government’s Shiite ministers, who left the meeting before the final statement.

Thus, among both the population and the political class, the principle that the state should hold the monopoly on arms is unanimously accepted. Hezbollah and its supporters do not reject disarmament as such, but its modalities. They criticise the government’s current approach: it should not serve as a ‘response to foreign demands or Israeli blackmail’ but should be embedded in a ‘consensus on a comprehensive strategy for security, defence, and the protection of national sovereignty’. At the other end of the political spectrum, some Christian parties openly opposed to Hezbollah—and recently buoyed by their victories in municipal elections—are calling for immediate, comprehensive disarmament without dialogue.

In this climate of political polarisation, confessional fault lines inevitably reappear. Joseph Aoun is acutely aware of this and is trying to embody a central and compromise-driven position. In his address to the nation on 21 November, on the eve of the 82nd anniversary of independence—delivered exceptionally in southern Lebanon—he criticised both sides and said he wanted to defend ‘the interests of the homeland and of the entire people’. Yet, given the state’s inability to effectively protect its citizens from Israeli aggression, this discourse appears increasingly fragile.

Is an Israeli escalation in southern Lebanon possible in the near future?

Since 7 October 2023, Tel Aviv has been pursuing a regional strategy of escalation. This can be observed in its asymmetric response in Gaza and in the occupied Palestinian territories, but also in Syria, Iran, and in recent attacks targeting Qatar. In Lebanon, an additional threshold would be crossed if Israel were to resume massive bombardments of the country and its infrastructure or to advance ground troops, as was the case in 2024. Lebanese leaders do not rule out this scenario. On 25 November, the Lebanese prime minister declared that the country was in a situation of ‘unilateral war of attrition’ and that all ‘precautions were being taken to face any escalation and its humanitarian, social, or other consequences’.

This is precisely what Israeli leaders are explicitly threatening to do. On 26 November, Israel’s defence minister, Israel Katz, warned that the IDF would intervene ‘forcefully’ in Lebanon if Hezbollah is not disarmed ‘by the end of the year’. It is, however, difficult to assert that Tel Aviv is ready to engage in a new high-intensity conflict in Lebanon, particularly on the ground. Following the recent announcement of a major IDF operation in the West Bank, the opening of a third simultaneous front may prove difficult to manage for a military institution already exhausted by over two years of war.

In this respect, close attention will need to be paid to the attitude of the United States, which is currently adopting a relatively accommodating stance toward Benyamin Netanyahu’s bellicose policy in Lebanon. What interest would Washington have in allowing Israel to invade southern Lebanon? In its strategy to foster business-friendly stability in the region, the Trump administration now seems to be turning its focus more towards Syria. Joseph Aoun understands this well and warned the Lebanese in his national address that ‘the world is about to grow tired of us’.

What would Israel’s interests be? Tel Aviv claims that the five positions it maintains in southern Lebanon are ‘strategic’. Yet it has long been the case that holding high ground no longer provides the decisive advantage it once did—as shown by the extensive use of drones by the IDF in Lebanon. The current Israeli occupation instead serves as leverage over the Lebanese government. The creation of a buffer zone in the south could be used as a bargaining chip to negotiate an asymmetrical peace—similar to what Israel is attempting in Syria by occupying the Golan and surrounding areas.

Ultimately, an escalation cannot be ruled out: it depends on Israel’s choices and on the attitude of the United States, in a context where Lebanon has very little control over the dynamics shaping it.

---

[1] During the voting session, an array of diplomatic delegations sat symbolically above the Lebanese MPs, their presence implicitly serving as an endorsement of the future president’s election.

[2] In the Weberian sense, meaning endowed with authority based on personality and prestige.