Greenland–United States: Towards a Marriage of Convenience?

The emancipating empire against colonisation

American ambitions regarding Greenland and, more broadly, territories deemed essential to their interests are not new. As early as the signing of the Treaty of Paris on 3 September 1783, marking the end of the War of Independence, the Confederation of the Thirteen Colonies pushed beyond the borders defined by the treaty. Through war, purchase, or barter, the thirteen colonies quadrupled their size, expelled Indigenous populations, drove out European powers, and pushed back newly independent Mexico (1821). This success in territorial expansion, the growing power of the new state, and the awareness that the political landscape of the American continent would change with ongoing and future independences encouraged President Monroe in 1823 to formulate the fundamental principle of his foreign policy, applied without interruption by subsequent presidents: “Europeans for the Old Continent, Americans for the New World.” This “Monroe Doctrine,” intended to prevent Europeans from attempting to recolonise the Americas, was reinforced in 1904 by the Roosevelt Corollary, through which the president asserted the right of the United States “to exercise international police power” in the American hemisphere. Initially aiming to dissuade Europeans from acting in the Americas, the use of this corollary led the United States to interfere in the internal affairs of American states to obtain their political and economic submission. Donald Trump clearly fits into this legacy: building around the United States a subordinate and protective space stretching from Antarctica to the Arctic. A bartering of colonisation for American imperium.

The long political struggle for Greenland

Russia’s willingness to sell Alaska (1867) offered the first opportunity to push towards the Arctic, secure control of the Bering Strait, and be present among the circle of Arctic nations—anticipatory positioning. In the immediate term, the aim was to threaten the British in Canada, prompting the idea of completing the encirclement by purchasing the Danish colony of Greenland.

Denmark’s refusal did not discourage them from proposing the purchase again in 1910, 1946, 1955, 2019, and 2025. In 1910, it was a barter deal—rejected—involving American possessions in the Philippines. During the Second World War, the United States occupied Greenland to prevent the Germans, who had occupied Denmark, from taking it. After the war, they considered it self-evident that their bases should remain in order to prevent any intrusion by the USSR, the new enemy and Arctic neighbour. The purchase offer was refused, but the US Army remained in place and the government secured, through the 1951 defence agreement, full freedom to install military facilities, station military personnel and their families on the territory, and exercise military action in the associated land, air, and maritime spaces—all exempt from control and taxes and under exclusive American jurisdiction. This treaty, placed under the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty, was to remain in force for the duration of the Alliance. In 2004, an addendum was added to include the local Greenlandic government established in 1979. It is worth noting that the 2023 defence agreement between Denmark and the United States excludes autonomous Greenland, which remains bound by the 2004 agreement. The texts are in place to allow, lawfully, an increased American military footprint in Greenland. However, in 2004, this was not considered urgent. But in 2009, a Danish-Greenlandic treaty recognised the island’s autonomy and allowed for potential independence at the request of Greenlandic authorities supported by a referendum. Meanwhile, hostility between Russia and the United States increased, clearly expressed in Putin’s Munich speech (2007), and China had “awakened.”

From then on, the strategic and political equation changed for the United States.

Security tensions in Europe mounted, and claims culminated in the war in Ukraine. The unwavering friendship between Russia and China, whose military strength is evident, suggests an impending confrontation between blocs, with an initial friction in Ukraine that may be followed—or accompanied—by a second around Taiwan. A glance at a map clearly shows that the link between the two blocs, the weak point of the Western bloc, is the Arctic, an open door onto its flank and the maritime routes of the North Atlantic.

• First, Russian power in the area is significant, with the Northern Fleet being a major strategic component of its navy, comprising surface vessels and submarines, including nuclear ballistic missile submarines. To facilitate civil and military navigation in these spaces, Russia possesses the most powerful fleet of icebreakers (34 diesel-powered and eight nuclear-powered), supplemented by two icebreaker frigates armed with long-range Kalibr missiles. The Northern Fleet’s role is to secure access to the “World Ocean” through the passages between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom (the GIUK gap). Tight control of the GIUK gap is vital in the event of a confrontation with Russia—possibly supported by China or assisting China through a diversion manoeuvre via the Arctic while China attacks Taiwan. The US Navy would then have to split its forces to conduct operations in both the Pacific and the North Atlantic to protect its approaches, thereby weakening itself.

• Second, the Arctic is the shortest ballistic or aircraft route between Russia and the United States.

The Arctic has thus once again become a strategically vital space for the security of the United States and the Atlantic Alliance. Strengthening military capabilities for its defence is deemed indispensable. The US aims to deploy a dual defensive system along the High North line.

• The first involves conventional combat assets. In 2018, the Navy reactivated the Second Fleet, dissolved in 2011, and expanded its remit from the North Atlantic to the Arctic in order to counter the increasing Russian naval power. In October 2025, entirely lacking such capability, it ordered eleven icebreakers from Finland. NATO, for its part, reorganised its commands and deployments to address the Russian threat. For maritime defence, NATO’s standing naval forces have existed since the 1970s. A joint forces command (JFC) was created in Norfolk (US) in 2019 to defend the Atlantic and the High North, with priority given to transatlantic lines of communication. In 2025, it was reinforced by Sweden, Finland, and Denmark. But NATO’s efforts are in reality more focused on the Baltic–Mediterranean line and transatlantic communication for both air-land and naval postures. Hence the US objective of pushing European members of the Alliance to invest more in the defence of the GIUK gap.

• The second concerns missile defence of US territory—a national security issue requiring geographic advantages offered by Greenland. The United States has the right to use it for military purposes (see above). Pituffik base in the far north fulfils three missions: surveillance, early warning, and guidance of retaliation against an intercontinental ballistic missile attack; control of the US satellite network (and some allied satellites); and maintenance of a deep-water port. It is vital for the United States, which nonetheless considers that the alert/detection sequence must be complemented by interception as close as possible to the launch point—thus requiring the installation of anti-missile launch sites (the ‘Golden Dome’ concept). It is also the only western port capable of hosting warships for Arctic monitoring/defence.

Commercial stakes

Climate change—extending the transoceanic Pacific-Atlantic navigation period via the Arctic from today’s two to three months without icebreakers—will facilitate military manoeuvres and increase commercial traffic.

Traffic along the Northern Sea Route, via the Bering Strait and then through the Arctic Ocean along the Russian coast, is growing, albeit still at a low level (35 million tonnes transported in 2025). The Chinese are major actors there and have developed close cooperation with the Russians, even integrating into Russian material and immaterial Northern Sea Route infrastructures. Russia’s Arctic coastline, the only populated and economically active Arctic littoral—resource exploitation, industrial production, military activities—makes the Arctic today a “Russian sea” whose traffic Russia controls.

For Greenland itself, beyond major strategic considerations, its value lies in its mineral, oil, and fishing resources, and its climate, favourable for installing vast energy-intensive data centres for artificial intelligence. China has shown interest since 2012, providing investments equivalent to over 11% of Greenland’s GDP. China also presents itself as a “near-Arctic state” with a “Polar Silk Road” project described in its White Paper on the Arctic, in which it asserts that non-Arctic states have rights in numerous domains in the region and is determined to claim a place in “Arctic governance.” The United States shares these interests but feels more legitimate—and above all wants to anticipate China’s rise in the area.

The Arctic is a potential theatre for Russo-Chinese confrontation with the Americans (Westerners), just as much as Ukraine or Taiwan—and perhaps simultaneously.

Winner-takes-all

Having the capacity to deny, if necessary, access to the Atlantic is therefore a major asset for the United States, but also for Europe, which could be taken from behind. The United States has concluded that Europeans, and even NATO, have failed to grasp this threat. Paradoxically, it was the American threat to seize Greenland by force that awakened them. In this sense, Trump’s negotiation tactic shook minds: asking the impossible to obtain the desirable—“Think big and kick ass.” NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and the Danish Prime Minister declared on 22 January 2026 that NATO (of which the US is a member!) “must increase its commitments in the Arctic. For defence and security in the Arctic are the responsibility of the entire Alliance.” As for the role of the United States, the 1951 treaty will be expanded and deepened. On 22 January, NATO’s Military Committee acknowledged the reality of a growing threat in the High North and the need to prepare for it, while stating it was still awaiting the political objectives pursued.

Given the security, economic, and resource-security stakes for the century ahead, the US objective is indeed to be a major and recognised actor in the region, with the support of NATO’s European members. A support they know will be solid only if these countries develop military capabilities commensurate with the security challenges. This is the meaning behind the threats of disengagement they levelled at European countries, resulting in NATO’s 2014 commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence, raised to 5% in 2025 at the Hague summit.

Part of these budgets must now be devoted to the Arctic. The National Defense Strategy 2026 states clearly: “U.S. partners throughout the Western Hemisphere can do far more […] to prevent U.S. adversaries from controlling or otherwise exercising undue influence over key terrain, especially Greenland, […]”.

After this crisis, an epilogue emerges along the following lines:

• NATO (European members) concedes that it must strengthen its capabilities in the Arctic to defend GIUK approaches, thereby reinforcing America’s conventional defensive shield;
• The United States secures an agreement to open discussions with Denmark/Greenland to amend the 1951 defence agreement (already highly favourable), adding guarantees enabling installation of its anti-missile defence system (Golden Dome) on a permanent basis;
• This increase in military presence will also allow them to accompany, and even influence, the process leading towards independence and to ensure solid ties with the future state;
• They will position themselves as protector, funder, and supporter of the development of this state—albeit under constrained sovereignty. But could a state of 56,000 inhabitants in such extreme latitudes survive without a protector? A marriage of convenience will impose itself.
• It will then be time, in at least a decade, to look into economic returns. In this respect, the American strategy is to secure the distant future by rapidly securing potential resources.

Putting an end to fairy tales

Concluding this crisis by claiming that Europe’s determination forced Trump to back down belongs to the realm of fairy tales and leads us toward further crises and disillusionment.

The reality is different:

• Faced with rising geopolitical blocs, Europe and the United States both need NATO; the above-outlined epilogue benefits both, given the lack of real European engagement in Arctic protection—unless Europe wishes to shift its alliance towards the Sino-Russian bloc?
• Europe must strengthen its position within the Alliance, starting with strategic analyses grounded in geopolitical reality and a global vision, sharing its conclusions with its ally and adapting its military capabilities to threats;
• It is from this firm geostrategic position that Europe may find the resolve to free itself from American tutelage across multiple sectors—whether imposed by Trump or by past and future presidents;
• Europe’s strategic autonomy is essential to its survival but must be preceded by a strategic assessment centred on facts, without concession to value judgements about actors.

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[1] “Think Big and Kick Ass in Business and Life”, by Donald Trump and Bill Zanker, HarperCollins, 2007

[2] Today, Denmark’s contribution to Greenland’s budget is approximately €600 million. The United States will have no difficulty increasing it.