Xi Jinping in France: Sixty Years of Uneven Franco-Chinese Relations

For the first time since 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping undertook a state visit to France on 6 and 7 May 2024. In reality, it was a European tour, as he continued his journey to Serbia and Hungary, two countries characterised by a strong Chinese economic presence. As Beijing and Paris celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of their diplomatic relations, what is the current state of Franco-Chinese relations? What are the strategic stakes of Xi Jinping’s visit at a time when the war in Ukraine occupies a central place in French foreign policy? Insights from Emmanuel Lincot, associate researcher at IRIS, professor at the Catholic Institute of Paris, and author of Le très grand jeu. Pékin face à l’Asie centrale.

Xi Jinping is beginning a multi-day tour of Europe, starting with France on 6 and 7 May. What are the stakes of this state visit to France, which marks the celebration of sixty years of diplomatic relations between the two countries? What is the current state of relations between Beijing and Paris?

First, there is the significance of this anniversary, as in China, sixty years marks the end of a cycle. This cycle has been marked by a sometimes stormy history and now deeply unbalanced exchanges. France’s trade deficit has continued to widen, and threats of tariffs on certain French products destined for the Chinese market confirm what is being observed globally: economic warfare is firmly entrenched. China has no choice but to massively export its surplus production (electric vehicles, etc.) to maintain a growth level that is seriously struggling — and will likely face European tariffs in turn. None of this bodes well. Strategically, China will not alter its stance on Russia. In fact, cynically, it has no interest in seeing the conflict in Ukraine come to an end. This war weakens Russia a little more every day, making it increasingly subordinate to Beijing, while also tying up American resources on the European front, keeping them away from the Taiwan issue. Nor does China have any greater interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict ending — quite simply because the Muslim world carries more weight for it, and this war undermines the IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor) project being pursued by India and its Israeli partner; a project that competes with Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. In this context, France and China are set to enter a period of turbulence — and for a long time. The deterioration in their relations will come after the American elections (November 2024), which, regardless of the outcome, will accelerate this economic war. In retrospect, in 1964, Beijing emerged from its diplomatic isolation — brought on by its split with Moscow — by playing the French card, thereby moving closer to the West. Sixty years later, Beijing is strengthening its partnership with Moscow and entering into a logic of confrontation with the West. But China probably has far more to lose from this reversal.

The war in Ukraine will feature prominently on the political agenda of this visit. What is China’s position on the Russia–Ukraine conflict? What does Emmanuel Macron expect from his Chinese counterpart on this issue and other major international matters?

We should expect nothing from the Chinese regarding the war in Ukraine, for the reasons stated above. Nor should we expect much from the Americans, as this war is one component among others in the broader confrontation between the Russo-Chinese duopoly and Washington. The solution, therefore, can only come from the Europeans themselves. What is interesting here is that China, although very committed to the principle of state sovereignty, does not take a position on Russian aggression, as we know. This ambiguity also serves to intimidate the West over the issue of Taiwan. The Americans, through a magnifying effect, present it as the next major conflict — whereas, in my view, such a conflict would be fundamentally difficult for China to pursue. Moreover, China has a long-standing tradition of knowing how to win a war without fighting. From this perspective, Emmanuel Macron is right not to lead France — evidently to its detriment and without the means to do so — into a belligerent confrontation over Taiwan. He is equally right to oppose the opening of a NATO office in Tokyo. Defusing the risk of a Sino-American conflict, and seeking a third way, is France’s historical — some would say “Gaullist” — calling. This third way should also apply in the environmental sphere, where, in this regard, there is arguably more support to be found on the Chinese side than the American one. In short, as you’ve understood, we are allies of the Americans, but we do not share the same interests.

What are the objectives of Xi Jinping’s European tour? Why is the Chinese president continuing his visit to Serbia and Hungary after leaving France?

It is a way of signalling what is to come: namely, that we, the Chinese, intend to prioritise developing relations with countries that share our views — and Moscow’s. So be it. Ultimately, Xi Jinping will receive Vladimir Putin upon his return to Beijing. This reinforces my belief that Xi Jinping will not change his position on Russia. In sum, there are now three Europes. Firstly, France — the EU’s only nuclear military power and its only member on the UN Security Council. The presence of Ursula von der Leyen alongside Emmanuel Macron in welcoming Xi Jinping was a reminder that France and Brussels stand united in facing China. Secondly, Germany, tempted by a solo path — previously with Russia, now with China; Chancellor Olaf Scholz having travelled to Beijing just days earlier. And finally, the Balkans — the most vulnerable part of Europe. It is the Europe turning its back on Brussels. In other words, Xi Jinping’s visit highlights the deep divisions among Europeans.