What Trump’s Announcements on Syria Reveal About US Policy in Lebanon

Lebanon could learn from Al-Charaa [Editor’s note: Syrian president].” These words, spoken by the US envoy to Lebanon, Morgan Ortagus, highlight two key elements necessary to understand the political dynamics at play in Lebanon: their close intertwining with the Syrian political trajectory, and the central role of American diplomacy — two dimensions all the more significant as they are now amplified by the current regional geopolitical context.

These remarks come as, during his trip to the Gulf – his first foreign visit since being elected – Donald Trump announced the lifting of US sanctions on Syria. Economically, this decision will have direct repercussions on the Land of the Cedars, allowing its ports and businesses, and even Lebanon’s banking sector, to benefit from Syrian reconstruction. Beyond these potential economic outcomes, the move also reflects a broader shift in US regional policy, of which Lebanon is a testing ground.

American involvement in Lebanon

A revealing sign of the particular attention the new US administration is paying to Lebanon’s situation is that the country has, for the first time, been the subject of high-level presidential remarks. In his speech at the Saudi-American Investment Forum, Donald Trump described Lebanon as a country at a major political turning point, stressing that the new government elected at the beginning of the year offered “the first real chance in decades for a more productive partnership with the United States.” A key player in the Middle Eastern chessboard, Lebanon has long been an integral part of American diplomacy in the region. Although Washington’s engagement has fluctuated over time, it has intensified during Lebanese crises, revealing the importance the US places on the country’s political evolution.

After the relative failure of its interventionist policy during the civil war (1975–1990), US policy gradually shifted towards regional security dynamics, notably Lebanon’s relations with Israel. After a phase of relative disengagement in the 2010s, US activity increased under Joe Biden’s administration with the signing in 2022 of a maritime border agreement between Lebanon and Israel, brokered by Israeli-American negotiator Amos Hochstein. The outbreak of conflict between the two countries following the Hamas attack on 7 October 2023 also led the Biden administration to engage in de-escalation talks between Lebanon and Israel, resulting in a ceasefire agreement signed on 27 November 2024.

Under the Trump administration, US involvement in Lebanon has revolved around the goal of renewing the country’s elites within the context of a reshuffling of the national political scene. The transition of the Lebanese file between the Trump and Biden teams was carried out with a certain degree of continuity, as demonstrated by their coordinated efforts to support the presidential candidacy of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Joseph Aoun, who was elected on 9 January 2025. Likewise, the Trump administration played a key role in the formation process of the new Lebanese cabinet. Through Morgan Ortagus, Washington sought to capitalise on Hezbollah’s military setback against Israel by curbing its political influence within the new cabinet headed by Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. The US envoy notably reminded Joseph Aoun during a meeting on 7 February 2025 – the day before the cabinet was formed – of the White House’s red lines: “Hezbollah will no longer be allowed to terrorise the Lebanese people, including through participation in the government.”

While some portfolios were nonetheless awarded to figures close to the Shia party and its allies, the pressure from Washington prevented the formation of a “blocking third” – that is, the exclusive granting of a community’s representation to a single political force, giving it the power to topple the government in case of disagreement. This marks a first since the institutionalisation of this practice in 2008, when Hezbollah imposed the demand following the Doha agreements. Lastly, in economic terms, the US Treasury played a central role in the selection process for the new Central Bank governor, Karim Souhaid, clearly communicating its expectations regarding the qualifications required, as revealed by Reuters. According to sources cited by the news agency, meetings held between the State Department, the White House, and the Lebanese Prime Minister’s office focused on how candidates planned to tackle Hezbollah. This American interventionist approach illustrates a desire to exert influence over all technocratic levers to limit Hezbollah’s sway within the Lebanese state.

Bringing Lebanon back into the Arab fold

US diplomatic activity on the topic of the new administration’s appointments was coordinated with another regional actor seeking to reassert its diplomatic role in Lebanon: Saudi Arabia. In this respect, Ms Ortagus’s comments are clear: if Lebanon is to take inspiration from the Syrian leader, it is in “the way he cooperated with Saudi Arabia.”

The current geopolitical climate, marked by the weakening of so-called “Axis of Resistance” forces in their conflict with Israel, ushers in a phase of regional reassertion – both political and economic – by the Gulf countries, described as the “Gulf Moment” by Emirati political scientist Abdelkhaleq Abdullah. Donald Trump’s decision to make his first overseas trip to the Gulf reflects this new dynamic. While the Arabian Peninsula monarchies offer real economic opportunities for the new White House tenant, they remain key conduits for US diplomacy in the region. In Lebanon, after having gradually withdrawn from the political scene – even recalling its ambassador in October 2021 – Saudi Arabia now aims to increase its influence amid a regional reconfiguration marked by Hezbollah’s weakening and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria.

After being particularly active in the negotiations that led to Joseph Aoun’s election, holding numerous meetings with Lebanese leaders in the run-up to the vote, Saudi envoy Yazid Ben Farhan paid another visit to Beirut on 13 April. This tour served as an opportunity to discuss implementing measures to secure Beirut’s airport and port, a central issue for Riyadh, which is concerned both by captagon trafficking and a possible Hezbollah rearmament via these infrastructures. In addition, the Saudi envoy met with Nawaf Salam following his first official visit to Damascus. Discussions focused extensively on Lebanese-Syrian relations, which have experienced episodes of border tension. On 17 March, deadly clashes between the two countries prompted the Saudi authorities to organise a meeting in Jeddah between the Syrian and Lebanese defence ministers to ease tensions.

It is also worth noting that at the same time as Donald Trump’s Middle East tour, the 34th Arab League summit was taking place in Baghdad. On the eve of his departure for the Iraqi capital, the Lebanese Prime Minister stated in an interview with the pan-Arab daily Asharq Al-Awsat that Lebanon had returned “to the Arab fold” – an implicit reference to the end of Iranian influence over the Land of the Cedars. This influence had worsened tensions with the Gulf countries, peaking in October 2021 when several nations recalled their ambassadors following remarks by former Lebanese Information Minister Georges Kordahi, a Hezbollah ally, who criticised the war in Yemen. During his address to Arab leaders, he also praised Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic role in the lifting of US sanctions on Syria. This intention to bring Lebanon back into the Arab sphere, as made clear by Morgan Ortagus, fits within a broader strategy of regional reshaping encouraged by US diplomacy, of which its relationship with Israel is another key pillar.

Lebanon through its relations with Israel

As a member of the committee overseeing the implementation of the ceasefire agreement between Lebanon and Israel, the United States has made the dismantling of armed groups in Lebanon the cornerstone of its diplomacy in the country. This provision of the 27 November 2024 agreement was reiterated once again by the US envoy on 20 May, stating that the Lebanese authorities still had “a lot to do.” While President Joseph Aoun has claimed that the Lebanese army has already “cleared 85 to 90%” of the area south of the Litani River, as specified in the ceasefire agreement, Washington is demanding the complete disarmament of Hezbollah, that is, across the entire country. Although the credibility of the Lebanese statements remains open to doubt, the Shia militia’s cooperation – it has not claimed any attacks on Israel since the ceasefire – and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon’s (UNIFIL) announcement of the dismantling of 225 weapons caches in the south, tend to confirm that the disarmament process in the south of the Litani is indeed underway.

Nevertheless, this dynamic still falls short of US expectations. Their maximalist stance, echoed by Israeli officials, encounters two main obstacles. The first is technical, relating to the difficulties faced by an under-equipped and understaffed Lebanese army – which is also heavily dependent on American aid – in effectively dismantling armed groups nationwide. Moreover, while the Shia militia is cooperating in the south, it flatly rejects any disarmament outside the area covered by the ceasefire. The root of this refusal reveals the second obstacle: Hezbollah refuses to make further concessions given that Israel violated the agreement’s terms by not fully withdrawing its troops from southern Lebanon within 60 days of the truce’s signing. Indeed, Israel continues to occupy five strategic points and has carried out strikes targeting Hezbollah members, which have resulted in over 71 civilian deaths since 27 November, according to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Caught in this contradiction, the new Lebanese executive is struggling to implement the “state monopoly on arms”, to use Joseph Aoun’s own phrase, demanded by Israel, the United States, the current government and political forces opposed to Hezbollah. While the Lebanese authorities are making progress on disarming Palestinian refugee camps, with Mahmoud Abbas’s visit on 21 May, the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons remains the Gordian knot of Beirut’s relationship with Tel Aviv – and thus its relationship with the United States. The overlap between Israeli-American security demands and Lebanon’s efforts to reassert effective sovereignty – notably through the monopoly on legitimate violence – traps Beirut in a deadlock: every solution becomes externally dictated and stripped of national legitimacy.

This is perhaps the deeper meaning behind Morgan Ortagus’s statement. From Washington’s perspective, if Lebanon is to truly learn from Al-Charaa, it is perhaps in the Syrian leader’s relative passivity in the face of the occupation of part of his territory and Israeli strikes conducted there. This attitude appears reinforced by the American posture towards him. The day after the announcement of the lifting of US sanctions on Syria, CNN revealed that direct talks had taken place in Azerbaijan between Israeli and Syrian officials. According to the Jerusalem Post, the framework for these discussions would include mutual recognition of the sovereignty of Israel and Syria and the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. The normalisation of Arab countries’ relations with Israel remains a central objective of the Trump administration, which hopes that such rapprochement with Syria will prompt Saudi Arabia to follow suit. Similarly, the US Special Envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, declared in March that normalisation was “a real possibility” between Beirut and Tel Aviv.

As Israeli leaders continue their repressive drive in the Palestinian territories – with the launch on 18 May of a major offensive named “Gideon’s Chariots” – any process of normalisation with Israel that does not take into account the future of the Palestinians will have harmful consequences for regional stability. From Damascus to Beirut, this should be one of the key lessons of the Abraham Accords negotiated in 2020 – yet it does not appear to have been grasped by the current US administration. This strategic blindness signals the limits of US diplomacy in Lebanon, and more broadly, in the region.

Ultimately, the policy pursued in Lebanon by the new Trump administration fits into a broader continuity. Eager to maintain a degree of regional stability and protect the interests of its regional allies, this foreign policy finds specific expression in the current context. Just as in Syria, Washington seeks to capitalise on the setbacks of so-called “Axis of Resistance” forces to shape the political reconfiguration in Lebanon, bring the country into a new regional order dominated by the Gulf states, and safeguard Israel’s strategic and security interests.