Tomahawk Missiles for Ukraine: From Media-Political Noise to the Reality of the Arsenals

At the end of September 2025, US Vice President J.D. Vance raised the idea of selling the American Tomahawk missile to Ukraine, emphasising that the final decision would rest with the President. His statement followed a request by President Zelensky, made on 23 September, for long-range strike capabilities against Russia. At first glance, President Trump appeared enthusiastic; however, after a phone call with Vladimir Putin on 16 October, he now seems opposed to the idea. Is this yet another of Donald Trump’s many whims, the result of Putin’s influence, or simply a reflection of America’s actual military limitations?

A naval weapon designed to strike ships or land targets

The Tomahawk (BGM/UGM-109) is an anti-surface naval missile that entered service in 1983 and was used during the First Gulf War (1991), and later in Afghanistan, Iraq (2003), Yemen (2024), among other conflicts, during which 2,400 missiles were launched by the United States Navy.

This subsonic missile, with a total weight of 1,200 kg, can carry either a 200 kg explosive warhead, cluster bombs, or graphite bombs designed to neutralise power grids. It has a range of 1,600 km—roughly twice the distance between Kyiv and Moscow. The nuclear version, which had a range of 2,500 km, has been out of service since 2013.

The missile’s lethality is enhanced by its erratic low-altitude flight profile and highly precise navigation, continuously updated throughout its trajectory with data on enemy defences and target location. Its navigation systems include GPS, an inertial navigation system, and a terrain contour matching system (TERCOM). Some variants also include a Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator (DSMAC), which compares stored images of the target with the actual scene during terminal guidance, further improving accuracy and countering jamming.

The Tomahawk is thus a formidable weapon for deep strikes into enemy territory without risking pilots’ lives. It remains a key component of the Navy, which guarantees American global supremacy through its ability to project power from 140 ships and submarines worldwide.

A weapon sought by the US Army and Marine Corps

From 2021 onwards, following the US withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019—which banned land-based missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km—the US Army and Marine Corps sought to strengthen their own long-range strike capabilities in response to Russian and Chinese advancements.

The Army developed the Mid-Range Capability System (MRC), composed of a Battery Operations Centre (COB) and four Typhoon launcher vehicles capable of firing Tomahawk missiles from land. One MRC system is to be integrated into each of the five Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTF): three for the Pacific (one operational by 2025, the others in 2026 and 2027), one in Germany (2025), and one reserve unit in the United States (2028).

By October 2025, the Army possesses only two MRC systems: one operational since 2024, deployed in the Pacific (Hawaii) and operating across the region (Philippines, Australia, Japan); the other based in Germany.

As for the Marine Corps, it opted for a drone-mounted launcher—the LRF—with a single launch ramp. The first four launchers entered service in 2024, with an additional order for 56 planned. However, the project was cancelled in 2025, and the four existing launchers were transferred to the Navy and the Army. This was an opportunity for the Army, which, learning from 2024 Pacific deployments that required numerous C-17 aircraft, is now considering complementing its MRC/Typhoon systems with the smaller, less bulky LRFs.

What options for Ukraine?

Returning to the promise of providing Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine, one must understand that this involves supplying both the launcher batteries (MRC systems) and the missiles themselves. Since the United States will not sell warships, this can only concern land-based systems.

In total, the United States currently has two operational batteries: one with the essential MRC/Typhoon COB and another with the COB used for the four LRF launchers, both required for firing Tomahawks from land. These are deployed in the US’s main theatres of interest—the Pacific and Europe.

The Army has also ordered 56 missiles for the 2026 budget, though for now these batteries use SM-6 missiles. The system was tested in 2024–2025 with both SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles during the Talisman Sabre 2025 exercise in the Pacific.

Regardless of the strategic, political, or moral arguments for or against granting Ukraine deep-strike capabilities, the Tomahawk systems will not be delivered—or more precisely, sold—to Ukraine because they are neither operational nor available given the United States’ current strategic priorities. President Trump reiterated this on 17 October.

Unless the United States decides to prioritise Ukraine over the Pacific and European theatres, it is highly unlikely that Washington will take the risk of weakening its Pacific posture. Such a move would be perceived as a victory by China, which has protested for a year against the MRC/Typhoon deployments. Nor would the US sacrifice its European assets that contribute to the continent’s security. This matter might be reconsidered once all five batteries are in service (2028)—or earlier, should Washington choose to take the highly improbable risk of undermining its own strike capabilities.

The return of the Euromissile crisis?

One uncertainty remains: the potential availability of the BGM-109G Gryphon Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM-Tomahawk) launchers that equipped the Army until the early 1990s and were designed to deliver nuclear Tomahawks. Retired from service around 1990 following the Euromissile crisis and the signing of the INF Treaty, these systems were dismantled. Could any surviving launchers be restored and sold to Ukraine with European funding? The answer is almost certainly no.

However, it is worth recalling that GLCM/Tomahawks and Pershing missiles were at the heart of the Euromissile crisis. Whereas in 1990 “the pacifists were in the West”, today Western public opinion appears broadly supportive of supplying long-range weapons to Ukraine.

Nevertheless, the United States has two overriding priorities: to be prepared for a potential confrontation with China over Taiwan and to rebuild ties with Russia. Above all, it simply lacks enough ground launchers for its Tomahawk missiles.