Tariffs: Africa at the Heart of Sino-American Rivalry

On 14 February, China announced that from 1 May 2026 it will remove customs duties on imports from 53 African countries, meaning all of its diplomatic partners on the continent with the exception of Eswatini. This measure forms part of Beijing’s broader strategy to consolidate its position as Africa’s leading economic partner, in a context of heightened rivalry with the United States and intensifying competition for access to African markets and resources. What economic interests are pursued by Beijing and Washington in Africa? What stance can Europe adopt in the face of Sino-American rivalry on the continent? An overview with Émilie Laffiteau, Associate Research Fellow at IRIS.

What could be the consequences of this removal of customs duties for the economies and trade policies of African countries?

This announcement comes at a time when Sino-African trade has continued to grow in recent years: in 2025, bilateral trade reached roughly 348 billion dollars. However, this increase remains marked by a structural and growing imbalance in China’s favour, with Chinese exports to Africa far exceeding African exports to China, resulting in a deficit of around 102 billion dollars for the continent. Beijing thus remains Africa’s leading trading partner, accounting for nearly one-fifth of its trade, whereas the continent still represents only about 4% of China’s external trade.

The stated aim of the measure is to boost African exports and strengthen economic ties with the continent. It could indeed offer an opportunity for some countries to increase their sales to the Chinese market thanks to competitiveness gains associated with the removal of customs duties. Countries that already possess an industrial or agro-export base — such as South Africa, Morocco, Kenya, Ethiopia or Tunisia — could benefit more from this preferential access, which may help reduce, at least partially, their trade deficits with China. Conversely, for countries whose exports remain dominated by raw materials, hydrocarbons or unprocessed agricultural products, the effects are likely to remain limited, as demand for such goods is less sensitive to tariff changes (extractive products, for instance, are lightly taxed and their demand depends primarily on global prices rather than tariffs).

Without industrial diversification, the removal of customs duties therefore risks perpetuating an asymmetric trade pattern: African exports might increase in volume but without structural transformation, while Chinese imports would continue to grow rapidly. In the medium term, only countries capable of locally processing their resources or developing industrial sectors may improve their trade balance — gains that will nonetheless depend on their ability to meet standards, produce at scale and integrate into logistics chains towards China — whereas economies that remain dependent on raw materials may see their imbalances persist or even deepen.

At a time when Donald Trump has imposed additional tariffs ranging from 10% to 30% depending on the country, across almost the entire continent, Africa risks finding itself at the centre of the trade war between Washington and Beijing. What are their strategic and economic interests in the region?

The increase in tariffs decided by the US administration — with rates between roughly 10% and 30% for several African countries, including South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and Egypt depending on the product category — forms part of the broader protectionist strategy of “America First”, aimed at reducing the trade deficit and reshoring industrial production. At the same time, the United States is seeking to secure supplies of strategic minerals such as cobalt, copper and lithium, which are essential to green technologies and semiconductors. This approach is reflected in the support given to infrastructure projects such as the Lobito Corridor, intended to link the copper belt of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia to the Angolan port of Lobito in order to facilitate the export of minerals to Western value chains.

For its part, China is pursuing a dual strategy: securing access to raw materials essential for its industry and expanding its commercial outlets in a fast-growing market of more than 1.3 billion people. By removing customs duties on almost all African imports, Beijing seeks to consolidate its status as the continent’s leading economic partner while strengthening its influence within the “Global South”. This policy is part of a broader presence based on infrastructure financing, the development of industrial zones and railway or port projects often linked to the Belt and Road Initiative, such as the Addis Ababa–Djibouti railway line or the Doraleh port in Djibouti.

Long shaped by logics of extraction and dependency, Africa now appears as a theatre of geoeconomic competition between Washington and Beijing. The United States prioritises securing critical resources and containing Chinese influence, while China focuses on trade integration, investment and access to raw materials. This rivalry may provide African countries with greater room for manoeuvre to negotiate investments, infrastructure and market access, but it also carries the risk of new dependencies or conflicting political pressures, in a context where commercial, energy and strategic issues are closely intertwined, sometimes with diverging logics.

In the face of this Sino-American rivalry, what position does the European Union hold in terms of trade with Africa? What economic prospects might emerge between the two continents in light of the two aforementioned powers?

The European Union plays a central role in Africa’s trade relations, despite China’s rise and increasing US commercial pressure. In 2024, trade in goods between the EU and Africa reached around 355 billion euros, including roughly 189 billion euros in European imports and 165 billion euros in exports to the continent, resulting in an overall surplus for Africa. The EU therefore remains a strategic trading partner, representing about one-third of Africa’s external trade. Moreover, more than 90% of African exports enter the European market duty-free thanks to several preferential schemes, particularly the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) concluded with various African regions, offering comparatively favourable market access relative to other major powers.

However, trade remains structured around a pattern that is slow to evolve: Africa exports mainly raw materials, hydrocarbons and agricultural products, while Europe exports mostly machinery, chemicals and manufactured goods. This model, which shows similarities with the continent’s trade relations with China or the United States, generates strong interdependencies: the EU depends on African resources, particularly energy and minerals, while many African countries remain reliant on European industrial imports. At the same time, Europe remains the continent’s leading investor, with around 239 billion euros in foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks in 2023, giving it lasting economic weight.

Faced with Sino-American rivalry, the European Union is seeking to position itself as an intermediary and stabilising partner, relying on trade agreements, investment and energy-transition projects, notably through the Global Gateway initiative. Launched in 2021, it aims to mobilise up to 300 billion euros by 2027 to finance sustainable infrastructure, particularly in Africa, offering an alternative to Chinese financing based on higher environmental and social standards and stronger partnerships with the private sector. This strategy could provide African countries with an alternative: rather than aligning exclusively with China or the United States, they could diversify their partners and benefit from competition among major powers to secure better market access, financing and technology transfers. In the medium term, the most favourable prospects concern countries capable of integrating Euro-African value chains (renewable energy, agricultural processing, critical minerals), which could help rebalance their trade accounts and reduce their dependence on raw-material exports.