New Faces, Same Challenges? An Analysis of the Appointment of the Lebanese Government.

The election of President Joseph Aoun, following a presidential vacancy of more than two years, followed by the swift appointment of Nawaf Salam as Prime Minister, has redefined the Lebanese political landscape. The rise to power of a president of the International Court of Justice, who campaigned on a platform of breaking with the dominant political class, reflects the desire of some Lebanese forces to launch the political and economic reforms expected by the international community and part of the population. In fact, the name of the Prime Minister had already been mentioned within circles close to the 2019 protest movement, which called for, among other things, the end of political sectarianism and the endemic corruption that have led the country into an unprecedented economic crisis.

Towards a renewal of the elites?

In many ways, the composition of this government embodies a form of renewal. Nawaf Salam sought to break with the post-civil war tradition that allowed political parties to choose their ministers, by setting criteria aimed at limiting their influence over the government.

Among the 24 members of the Salam cabinet, only three have previously held ministerial positions: Ghassan Salamé (Minister of Culture), Tarek Mitri (Vice-President of the Council of Ministers), and Yassine Jaber (Minister of Finance). Additionally, only one minister is affiliated with a political party, namely the Minister of Youth and Sports, appointed by the Lebanese Armenian party Tachnag. The Aoun-Salam duo also succeeded in directly appointing 10 ministers, including those of the Interior and Defense, portfolios that will be central to key issues during this term, such as Hezbollah disarmament and the control of Lebanese borders.

Some ministers come from the private sector, like the Minister of Economy, Amer Bsat, who worked for the asset management company BlackRock, while others come from academia, such as Rima Karamé, Minister of Education. Furthermore, the common denominator among these profiles is their knowledge of international affairs: Mr. Bsat was an economist at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Messrs. Salamé and Mitri both served as UN special envoys to Libya, and Mrs. Sayyed, appointed Minister of Social Affairs, worked for the World Bank.

Finally, one of the major successes of the new executive is the absence of a “blocking third” clause granted to any political party. This provision, institutionalized by the Doha Agreement of 2008, allows a political force with one-third of the ministers plus one to exercise a veto power and overturn the government. The Shiite tandem, composed of Amal and Hezbollah, and their allies have frequently resorted to this practice.

Important concessions granted to the Shiite tandem Amal-Hezbollah

The duration of the negotiations to form this cabinet reflects the multiple blockages between the new tandem at the helm of the state and the traditional Lebanese forces. The context invited the duo to capitalize on the momentum provided by almost unanimous international and popular support, as well as a geopolitical situation that allowed them to pressure certain parties, particularly Hezbollah. However, the necessity to respect the confessional balance of the cabinet, in accordance with the Lebanese Constitution, made the task more difficult for the executive. Indeed, excluding the Shiite tandem, which holds the entire political representation of the Shiite community given the results of the 2022 legislative elections, would have de facto delegitimized the government.

In this regard, one issue caused a blockage in the final days of negotiations: the choice of the fifth minister from this confessional group within the cabinet. While the new Prime Minister avoided giving political formations a “blocking third,” the Shiite tandem could have had another last weapon of government paralysis if all the ministers from their confession were allied with them. The use of this strategy to deprive a government of its “confessional legitimacy,” a principle rooted in the Lebanese political system although not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, has been used in the past. A compromise was eventually found in the person of Fadi Makki, Minister of State for Administrative Development, who is not affiliated with the two Shiite parties.

On other issues, Nawaf Salam had to make concessions. The most significant (and criticized) was the appointment of a close associate of the Amal party to the Ministry of Finance in the person of Yassine Jaber. This former deputy, allied with the leader of the Shiite Amal party, Nabih Berri – without ever having been formally affiliated – held positions as Minister of Economy and Trade in Rafic Hariri’s government (1995-1998), and Minister of Public Works and Transport in Omar Karamé’s government (2004-2005). His profile seems to align with the criteria of non-affiliation with traditional political parties promoted by Mr. Salam. According to his entourage, he withdrew from the political arena in 2022 after distancing himself from the party leader.

Moreover, his record within the parliamentary Finance and Budget Committee might satisfy some reformist circles. For more than a decade, Mr. Jaber relentlessly denounced the explosion of public debt, advocating for a reform of the public sector, notably institutions like Electricité du Liban. However, he has shown a stance aligned with the banking sector regarding the Diab government’s restructuring plan on the issue of how to allocate losses related to the liquidity crisis and the collapse of the financial system. This plan, developed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), proposed allocating around $70 billion in losses, first to the banks’ shareholders, then to the Central Bank of Lebanon, and finally to the state, while protecting depositors as much as possible.

His profile raises even more concerns as he was appointed with the approval of the leader of Amal and could thus become an instrument to hinder government action. Mr. Berri’s insistence on securing this sovereign ministry is primarily political, enabling the Shiite party to gain the “fourth signature” on decrees taken by the Council of Ministers, alongside those of the President, the Prime Minister, and the relevant minister. The Ministry of Finance, being involved in most decrees that have a financial component, allows the Shiite parties to have leverage and a blocking mechanism over the executive branch’s actions.

On this issue, Messrs. Salam and Aoun conceded to the demands of the two Shiite parties, which opened the door to criticism and claims from other traditional parties that also wanted their “share of the pie.” It is worth noting that the Christian Lebanese Forces party, having won the 2022 legislative elections, secures 4 portfolios, the same number as those assigned to the Shiite tandem. Samir Gemayel’s party even gains a sovereign portfolio with Foreign Affairs, as well as the Ministry of Energy, previously held by its Christian rival, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), which was allied with Hezbollah in the previous government and is notably absent from the new one.

A tangle of domestic policy issues

Numerous issues are on the Prime Minister’s desk. The new cabinet will have to initiate an economic recovery for the country, notably through a drastic restructuring of its banking sector, as the poverty rate exceeds 50% and approximately $86 billion remain illegally frozen in bank balances. In response to the 2019 liquidity crisis, Lebanese banks imposed severe restrictions on withdrawals, exacerbating the crisis of confidence and plunging the country into recession.

Judicial reform is also eagerly awaited by many Lebanese, who hope to see the investigation into the 2020 Beirut port explosion brought to completion. Furthermore, the government must work to fill vacant positions within the public administration. The Civil Service Council reports unprecedented vacancy rates: 94.2% for the fifth category, 72.9% for the fourth, 67.3% for the third, 81.3% for the second, and 44.3% for the first.

This tangle of domestic policy issues is further complicated by a regional context fraught with instability. The massive Israeli bombings in 2024 will have severe economic consequences for a country already on the brink of collapse and will require substantial financial aid, itself conditioned on political and economic reforms. Additionally, the fall of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime in Syria has brought new instability to Lebanon’s eastern border. In recent days, violent clashes have erupted between Shiite tribes in the Bekaa region and forces of the new Syrian regime, prompting the intervention of the Lebanese army and President Joseph Aoun, who has engaged in talks with his Syrian counterpart, Ahmad Al-Chareh.

The most pressing issue requiring immediate action is undoubtedly the stabilization of the southern border, which necessitates the disarmament of Hezbollah’s militia forces. This matter is crucial for the implementation of the ceasefire with Israel in the south, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701. Moreover, a significant portion of the economic and financial aid promised by the international community to Lebanon is contingent on compliance with these UN resolutions.

The Issue of Hezbollah’s Disarmament

A crucial step in this regard will be the ministerial declaration, a document outlining the political, economic, and security priorities of the new government. It is set to be drafted in the coming days in the Council of Ministers before being submitted to Parliament for approval. The commission responsible for its drafting includes the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Culture—both appointed under the quota of the President and the Prime Minister—along with Yassine Jaber, the Minister of Transport and Public Works (from the Progressive Socialist Party), and the Minister of Industry (from the Lebanese Forces). The central issue of this declaration will be whether to maintain or remove the reference to the tripartite formula of “Army, People, Resistance,” which is highly valued by Hezbollah as it politically legitimizes its weapons.

Following the announcement of his cabinet, Nawaf Salam stated that the broad lines of the declaration should be in line with Joseph Aoun’s inaugural speech, in which there was no mention of “resistance.” However, previous ministerial declarations have upheld the right of the Lebanese people to resist Israeli occupation without explicitly referencing the tripartite formula. The content of this declaration will directly impact the new Lebanese government’s stance on UN Resolution 1701. Notably, Article 3 of the resolution does not explicitly call for Hezbollah’s disarmament but rather for the removal of weapons present “without the consent of the Lebanese government.” Successive Lebanese governments have leveraged this ambiguity to claim compliance with the 2006 UN resolution.

However, the situation on the ground has changed, which could prompt Lebanese authorities to accelerate the deployment of the Lebanese army south of the Litani River and initiate a genuine process of Hezbollah’s disarmament. The party has suffered significant military setbacks, and Israel—having secured an extension of its withdrawal period from southern Lebanon with the approval of the ceasefire monitoring committee led by France and the United States—continues to carry out airstrikes on southern Lebanese towns.

The key question remains: will Hezbollah’s military defeats and the political gains secured by the Shiite tandem in this new government compel the group to cede ground on the resistance issue, which is of paramount importance to its militant base? Or, conversely, will the concessions granted to the new executive in appointing the fifth Shiite minister embolden Hezbollah to demand a blank check for maintaining its weapons—and, by extension, its popular legitimacy?

A Symbolically Charged Calendar with Political and Memorial Challenges

On this sensitive issue, the new executive will have to navigate a calendar laden with symbolic significance. The year 2025 marks the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War. Additionally, February 14 will commemorate the 20th anniversary of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri—an event that ushered in a period dominated by Hezbollah and its allies in Lebanese politics, as well as heightened sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Shiites, leading to violent clashes, notably in 2008.

Since then, the Sunni community has faced a crisis of political representation, as evidenced by the defeat of Hariri-aligned political forces in the 2022 parliamentary elections and the low voter turnout recorded in major Sunni cities such as Tripoli. This often-overlooked component of the Lebanese political landscape remains a fluid and evolving force. Furthermore, all traditional Sunni political factions have been excluded from the new government. In this context, the speech of Saad Hariri, leader of the Future Movement, during the commemoration of his father’s assassination, will be particularly anticipated.

Finally, the funeral of former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah will take place on February 23 in Beirut. Statements by Sheikh Ali Daher, reported by Hezbollah’s Al-Manar television network, declaring that “February 23 will mark the victory of blood over the sword” reflect the party’s intent to showcase its mobilization power. This dynamic was already evident on January 26, when Hezbollah supporters marched through Beirut following the return of residents to border villages in the South.